Docket: IMM-11716-24
Citation: 2025 FC 1708
Montréal, Quebec, October 21, 2025
PRESENT: Mr. Justice Gascon
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BETWEEN: |
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MD REAZ UDDIN |
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Applicant |
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and |
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION |
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Respondent |
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I. Overview
[1] The applicant, Md Reaz Uddin, is seeking judicial review of a decision rendered on June 13, 2024 [Decision] by a Migration officer [Officer] of the High Commission of Canada in Singapore. In the Decision, the Officer refused Mr. Uddin’s application for a permanent resident visa filed under the Quebec investor class pursuant to subsections 11(1) and 12(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA] and section 90 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 [IRPR]. The Officer rejected the application because they were not satisfied that Mr. Uddin truly intended to reside in Quebec.
[2] Mr. Uddin submits that the Decision is unreasonable because the Officer’s reasons for refusal are not rational nor logical, and because their assessment of his application is incoherent. Further, Mr. Uddin raises a concern of reasonable apprehension of bias against the Officer who interviewed him and subsequently refused his application.
[3] For the following reasons, the application for judicial review will be dismissed. I find that Mr. Uddin has not met his onus of demonstrating that the Officer’s Decision is unreasonable or that there is any reasonable apprehension of bias against the Officer.
II. Background
A. The factual context
[4] Mr. Uddin is a citizen of Bangladesh who resides in that country. He is married and has two adult children who are included as dependents on his permanent resident application. He owns and operates a gas station in Bangladesh whose market value was estimated at more than $2 million in 2021, at the time of his application.
[5] Mr. Uddin plans on being involved in the garments industry in the province of Quebec. In November 2020, his wife, son, daughter and himself each received their Certificat de sélection du Québec [CSQ] from the Quebec government in the investor program. In March 2021, following the Quebec government’s approval, Mr. Uddin applied to become a permanent resident of Canada under the Quebec investor class. The application was acknowledged by the Respondent, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration [Minister], on the same day.
[6] In November 2023, the Minister requested additional documents and updated forms from Mr. Uddin, including an outline of all steps he had taken to prepare for his relocation to Quebec, a detailed written settlement plan for his arrival in Quebec, and a detailed written outline, accompanied by any available evidence, explaining his employment and/or business plans after his arrival in Quebec. Mr. Uddin responded to the Minister in late December 2023.
[7] In May 2024, Mr. Uddin was requested to attend an interview with the Officer at the High Commission of Canada in Bangladesh. The interview was held on June 11, 2024. Two days later, Mr. Uddin received the Decision indicating that his application for permanent residence was dismissed because the Officer was not satisfied that he had the requisite intent to reside in Quebec, as required by paragraph 90(2)(a) of the IRPR.
B. The Officer’s Decision
[8] As is often the case for this type of application, the Decision itself is brief and adds up to only a few lines. However, the Global Case Management System [GCMS] notes taken by the Officer — which form part of the Decision — provide further light on the analysis conducted by the Officer and on their grounds for refusing Mr. Uddin’s application. In this case, the Officer identified several concerns that, in their view, raised doubts as to Mr. Uddin’s intent to reside in Quebec.
[9] First, the Officer found that Mr. Uddin had put little to no effort in settling down in Quebec. They noted that Mr. Uddin did not learn French and was struggling to speak English at the interview. The Officer determined that Mr. Uddin provided no credible explanation on how he was planning to run a business in Quebec without speaking French or English.
[10] Second, the Officer concluded that Mr. Uddin was vague with his settlement and business plans in Quebec. Because all the documents submitted were dated after the request from November 2023, the Officer indicated they were not giving them much weight. More generally, the Officer found that there was no evidence of house searching prior to that request and that there was a lack of accommodation plans on Mr. Uddin’s part.
[11] These various concerns led the Officer to doubt that Mr. Uddin intended to reside in Quebec. The Officer thus refused Mr. Uddin’s application for permanent residence under subsection 90(2) of the IRPR.
C. Standard of review
[12] The Supreme Court of Canada’s landmark decision in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 [Vavilov] established a presumption that reasonableness is the applicable standard in judicial reviews of the merits of administrative decisions (Pepa v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 SCC 21 at para 35 [Pepa]; Mason v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21 at para 7 [Mason]), unless the circumstances lend themselves to the application of an exception to this presumption (Canadian Society of Authors, Composers and Music Publishers v Entertainment Software Association, 2022 SCC 30 at para 28; Vavilov at paras 33–64, 69–72).
[13] The parties, and the Court, agree that the decisions of permanent residence visa officers are reviewable against the standard of reasonableness and that no exception applies (Tito c Canada (Citoyenneté et Immigration), 2025 CF 1681 at para 14 [Tito]; Kawser Masud c Canada (Citoyenneté et Immigration), 2025 CF 1602 at para 32 [Kawser Masud]; Sony c Canada (Citoyenneté et Immigration), 2025 CF 1603 at para 28 [Sony]; Fatema v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 772 at para 9 [Fatema]; Fu v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 1720 at para 30; Quan v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 576 at para 14 [Quan]; Tran v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 721 at para 16 [Tran]).
[14] Where the applicable standard of review is reasonableness, the role of a reviewing court is to examine the reasons given by the administrative decision maker and to determine whether the decision is based on “an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis”
and is “justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker”
(Pepa at para 46; Mason at para 8; Vavilov at para 85). The reviewing court must therefore ask whether the “decision bears the hallmarks of reasonableness—justification, transparency and intelligibility”
(Vavilov at para 99, citing notably Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at paras 47, 74).
[15] As part of its analysis of the reasonableness of a decision, the reviewing court must take a “reasons first”
approach and begin its inquiry by examining the reasons provided with “respectful attention,”
seeking to understand the reasoning process followed by the decision maker to arrive at its conclusion (Pepa at paras 46–47; Mason at paras 58, 60; Vavilov at para 84). Before a decision can be set aside on the basis that it is unreasonable, the reviewing court must be satisfied that “there are sufficiently serious shortcomings in the decision such that it cannot be said to exhibit the requisite degree of justification, intelligibility and transparency”
(Vavilov at para 100). An assessment of the reasonableness of a decision must be robust, but it must remain sensitive to and respectful of the administrative decision maker (Mason at para 8; Vavilov at paras 12–13). Reasonableness review is an approach anchored in the principle of judicial restraint and in a respect for the distinct role and specialized knowledge of administrative decision makers (Vavilov at paras 13, 75, 93). In other words, the approach to be followed by the reviewing court is one of deference, especially with respect to findings of facts and the weighing of evidence. Absent exceptional circumstances, the reviewing court will not interfere with an administrative decision maker’s factual findings (Mason at para 73; Vavilov at paras 125–126, citing Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 SCC 31 at para 55).
[16] Turning to the issue of procedural fairness and bias of the decision maker, the approach to be taken has not changed following Vavilov (Vavilov at para 23). It has typically been held that correctness is the applicable standard of review for determining whether a decision maker complies with the duty of procedural fairness and the principles of fundamental justice (Mission Institution v Khela, 2014 SCC 24 at para 79; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at para 43).
[17] However, the Federal Court of Appeal has affirmed that questions of procedural fairness — including those related to alleged bias of the decision maker — are not truly decided according to any particular standard of review. Rather, it is a legal question to be answered by the reviewing court, and the court must be satisfied that the procedure was fair having regard to all of the circumstances (Algoma Steel Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 2023 FCA 164 at para 22; Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers v Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2020 FCA 196 at para 35, leave to appeal to the Supreme Court dismissed, no 39522 (August 5, 2021); Lipskaia v Canada (Attorney General), 2019 FCA 267 at para 14; Canadian Airport Workers Union v International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 2019 FCA 263 at paras 24–25; Perez v Hull, 2019 FCA 238 at para 18; Canadian Pacific Railway Company v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 69 at para 54 [CPRC]).
[18] Therefore, the ultimate question raised when procedural fairness and alleged breaches of fundamental justice are the object of an application for judicial review is whether, taking into account the particular context and circumstances at issue, the process followed by the administrative decision maker was fair and offered the affected parties a right to be heard as well as a full and fair opportunity to know and respond to the case against them (CPRC at para 56; Huang v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 940 at paras 51–54). No deference is owed to the decision maker on issues of procedural fairness, including those involving bias on part of the decision maker.
III. Analysis
A. The Decision is reasonable
(1) The Quebec investor class
[19] An immigration officer asked to grant a visa, including a permanent resident visa, must generally be satisfied that an applicant meets the requirements of the IRPA (subsection 11(1) of the IRPA). There exist multiple classes under which applicants can be selected as permanent residents in Canada, including economic immigration, in which case the selection is based on the foreign national’s ability to become economically established in Canada (subsection 12(2) of the IRPA). The various economic immigration programs and their selection criteria are set out in Part 6 of the IRPR. For several of these programs, part of the selection process is delegated to certain provinces (Qiao v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 247 at para 12 [Qiao]). However, the federal government holds the exclusive authority to grant permanent resident visas and admit foreigners on Canadian soil.
[20] To be a member of the Quebec investor class, an applicant must satisfy two criteria: (1) be named in a CSQ; and (2) intend to reside in Quebec. There are no other requirements.
[21] Here, it is not disputed that Mr. Uddin and his family were all granted a CSQ. However, because the intention to reside in Quebec is a condition separate from being selected by the province of Quebec, visa officers must themselves assess whether an applicant intends to reside in that province (Liu v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1392 at para 16 [Liu]; Khan v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 104 at para 6 [Khan]; You v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1675 at para 18; Qiao at para 14; Rabbani v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 257 at para 42 [Rabbani]; Ransanz v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2015 FC 1109 at para 27).
[22] Determining the “intent”
of an applicant is an exercise infused with subjectivity. The case law is clear that a visa officer has a large degree of discretion when determining the “intent”
of an applicant to reside in a given province, as they are allowed to take into account all available indicia at their disposal, including past conduct, present circumstances, and future plans of an applicant (Tito at para 24; Kawser Masud at para 36; Sony at para 32; Liu at para 57; Fatema at para 29; Khan at para 21; Kabir v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1123 at para 27; Quan at para 24; Qiao at para 15; Tran at para 33; Yaman v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 584 at para 29; Rabbani at para 43; Dhaliwal v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 131 at para 31 [Dhaliwal]).
(2) The alleged preliminary assessment of the intention to reside in Quebec
[23] Mr. Uddin argues that a prior officer wrongfully applied the OP-9 processing manual, and that this prior officer had already determined, before the issuance of the request for additional documents in November 2023, that his intention to reside in Quebec had been established. He relies on the GCMS notes from November 2023 made by this other officer, which read as follows:
As per the processing manual, the province of Quebec is responsible for the selection of applicants destined to their province. Selection by the province of Quebec is taken as evidence that the provincial authority has conducted an assessment of the candidate and found that, in their view, the candidate has met the requirements, intends to reside in Quebec, and has a strong likelihood of becoming economically established in Canada.
[24] I am not persuaded by Mr. Uddin’s submissions on this front. I instead agree with the Minister that there is no evidence that this prior officer misapplied the OP-9 processing manual. The notes cited by Mr. Uddin only highlight the fact that he received a CSQ from the province of Quebec (Tito at para 50). However, as mentioned earlier, the Minister is not bound by Quebec’s assessment and must conduct its own assessment of an applicant’s intention to reside in the province.
[25] These notes from another officer thus do not constitute a prior determination that the criterion of the intent to reside in Quebec was met by Mr. Uddin. If that had been the case, given that there are only two criteria provided for in paragraph 90(2) of the IRPR, a permanent resident visa would have been issued to Mr. Uddin and his family by the Minister. There would have been no need to issue the November 2023 letter requesting additional documents nor to conduct an interview in June 2024 (Tito at para 50).
(3) The alleged unreasonableness of the Decision
[26] Regarding the merits of the Decision, Mr. Uddin first argues that the Officer erroneously failed to mention some of his evidence in their reasons and how this evidence was assessed, notably his son’s inquiry to McGill university about admission, his communication with the organization Promis based in Quebec, and the letter of support from a friend residing in Quebec. He also submits that the Officer’s assessment that he did not have the intent to reside in Quebec was unreasonable because the evidence rather showed the contrary. Finally, he claims that it was unreasonable for the Officer to request additional documents and information in November 2023 and in the convocation letter and then not give them much weight because they were recent.
[27] With respect, I am not convinced by Mr. Uddin’s arguments.
[28] It is well accepted that an administrative decision maker’s failure to mention evidence does not necessarily make a decision unreasonable (Tito at para 30; Singh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1554 at para 35 [Singh]; Valencia v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 386 at para 25; Khir v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 160 at para 48 [Khir]; Aghaalikhani v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1080 at para 24). It is also a well-settled principle that administrative decision makers are presumed to have weighed and considered all the evidence before them unless proven otherwise (Kanagendren v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FCA 86 at para 36, leave to appeal to the Supreme Court dismissed, no 36508 (November 19, 2015); Singh at para 35). In the same vein, a failure to mention a particular piece of evidence does not mean that it was ignored (Pepa at para 47; Vavilov at para 91; Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62 at para 16; Singh at para 35).
[29] It is true that, when an administrative decision maker does not properly deal with evidence squarely contradicting its findings of fact, the Court may intervene and infer that the decision maker overlooked the contradictory evidence when reaching its conclusion (Ozdemir v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCA 331 at paras 9–10; Singh at para 36; Cepeda-Gutierrez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1998 CanLII 8667 (FC), [1998] FCJ No 1425 (QL) at para 17). However, the failure to consider specific evidence must be viewed in context, and it is only when such evidence is critical and squarely contradicts the decision maker’s conclusion that the reviewing court may determine that the tribunal unreasonably disregarded the material before it (Singh at para 36; Khir at para 48; Torrance v Canada (Attorney General), 2020 FC 634 at para 58). Given the reasons provided by the Officer in their Decision, I do not find that the Officer disregarded critical evidence nor unreasonably weighed the evidence submitted by Mr. Uddin.
[30] While Mr. Uddin provided the Officer with his children’s certificates from elective French courses, the Officer could reasonably conclude that this was not an indication of Mr. Uddin’s intention to reside in Quebec (Qiao at para 22). Mr. Uddin declared not having learned French because he was busy with his business. However, in his response dated December 21, 2023, Mr. Uddin declared that taking French classes was one of his primary agenda for the next year. Moreover, when asked about how he was planning to run a business in Canada without speaking either official language, he responded that he could speak a little English, that he didn’t need to know English to communicate with Bangladeshis, and that his staff or his son would be able to communicate with foreigners. The Officer found this explanation unconvincing.
[31] During the June 2024 interview, the Officer also expressed their concerns about the fact that some of Mr. Uddin’s evidence was recent, as if Mr. Uddin “started gathering these information [sic] after [the Officer] sent [him the] request”
. Mr. Uddin explained that before actually getting the permanent resident visa, there was no point in reaching out to his contacts. Again, Mr. Uddin’s answers did not relieve the Officer’s concerns about his intent to reside in Quebec.
[32] In terms of business plan, Mr. Uddin wanted to get involved in the garment manufacturing industry, starting with safety vests and dresses. He provided a five-page business plan detailing the business’ anticipated location, target products, target customers, and projected budget.
[33] As for accommodation, Mr. Uddin explained planning to rent a place through AirBnB for a few weeks and subsequently rent an apartment or a house, and then maybe buy a house if he moves in the area permanently. He provided apartment listings in the Pierrefonds-Roxboro area. At the interview, when asked what plans he had made to settle down in Quebec, Mr. Uddin answered: “After going there, I have to observe for some time. I will do business there. I have experience in real estate. I have done business all my life. I will find something useful there. I will find out the best option and observe the market.”
[34] In short, the Officer found Mr. Uddin’s settlement, accommodation, and business plans in Quebec were vague. I am satisfied that it was reasonably open to the Officer to draw this conclusion based on the evidence provided by Mr. Uddin.
[35] Mr. Uddin argues that it is even harder for applicants to prove their intent to reside in Quebec given the extended processing delays for the Quebec investor class. While he acknowledges being vague in his answers to the Officer’s questions during the interview, he submits that it was unreasonable for the Officer to expect detailed answers given that he did not know if he would be accepted for permanent residency, and how long it would take to receive the answer. In his case, his application was moving “faster than he could have expected.”
He qualifies the processing delays as the “elephant in the room”
that should have been weighed by the Officer in their assessment. Furthermore, he claims that an “intention”
does not implicate taking concrete steps nor having a detailed plan.
[36] With respect, I am not persuaded by this line of argument. I find it reasonable for the Officer not to excuse the vagueness of Mr. Uddin’s answers by the lengthy processing delays. Nothing prevents a visa officer from considering whether an applicant has some ongoing and recent engagement related to their “lifetime project”
to resettle in Quebec in their assessment of the applicant’s intent to reside in the province.
[37] In sum, I cannot find any shortcomings in the Officer’s Decision that would warrant intervention from this Court. Mr. Uddin’s submissions essentially express his disagreement with the Officer’s Decision and assessment of the evidence. On judicial review, the role of the Court is not to reweigh the evidence on the record or to substitute its own conclusions to those of visa officers. Visa officers have a broad discretion when rendering decisions under the IRPA and the IRPR, and their decisions are entitled to a high degree of deference from the Court given their specialized expertise (Quan at para 30). A decision maker may take into account all indicia, including past conduct, present circumstances, and future plans, as ascertained from the available evidence in assessing intent (Dhaliwal at para 31). This is what the Officer did in this case.
B. There is no reasonable apprehension of bias from the Officer
[38] As a second argument, Mr. Uddin submits having reasons to believe that the Officer who assessed his application and interviewed him was biased. This belief is based on how his interview was conducted and on comments made in the Officer’s notes. It is also based on the interview notes from three other files. In addition, Mr. Uddin alleges that there is an undue and unfair wave of refusals of Quebec investor class applications by the Singapore office, and more specifically by “Officer SJ23675.”
(1) The affidavit of Ms. Sylvie Toupin
[39] In support of his application, Mr. Uddin files an affidavit from Ms. Sylvie Toupin, a legal assistant at the firm of his counsel. In her affidavit, Ms. Toupin refers to nine applications for leave and for judicial review recently filed before this Court for applicants refused under the Quebec investor class, all from the Minister’s embassy in Singapore. She notes that out of the nine applications, six of them were refused by the same Officer as in the case at hand. Two of these applications have already been judicially reviewed by Justice Yvan Roy and Justice Negar Azmudeh, who both dismissed the applications (Liu and Awal v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1024 [Awal]).
[40] The Minister takes no position about the affidavit evidence and leaves the matter at the discretion of the Court. However, the Minister points to the reasoning of the Court in Awal on that issue and argues that it should apply here.
[41] It is true that as a general rule, the evidentiary record before a reviewing Court on judicial review is restricted to the evidentiary record that was before the decision maker (Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada v Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright), 2012 FCA 22 at para 19 [Access Copyright]). However, there are a few recognized exceptions to the general rule against this Court receiving evidence in an application for judicial review, one of which is when procedural defects or unfairness are alleged (Access Copyright at para 20(b)). More specifically, in matters where an allegation of bias is made, it is often useful, and even necessary, to resort to evidence extrinsic to the case. That is why such evidence is admissible in derogation of the general principle (Arthur v Canada (Attorney General), 2001 FCA 223 at para 8 [Arthur]).
[42] Given that the argument of bias advanced by Mr. Uddin raises procedural fairness issues, I accept that Ms. Toupin’s affidavit is admissible before the Court in this matter.
(2) Apprehension of bias
[43] That being said, the threshold for finding a reasonable apprehension of bias is a high one. The most commonly applied statement of that test was set out by Justice de Grandpré in dissent in Committee for Justice and Liberty et al v National Energy Board et al, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369 at 394 (see also Oleynik v Canada (Attorney General), 2020 FCA 5 at paras 46, 56–57, leave to appeal to the Supreme Court dismissed, no 39118 (October 15, 2020)):
[T]he apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and right-minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the required information… [The test is] “what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically – and having thought the matter through – conclude. Would he think that it is more likely than not that [the decision maker], whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly.”
[44] An allegation of bias against an administrative decision maker is serious and “cannot rest on mere suspicion, pure conjecture, insinuations or mere impressions of an applicant or his counsel”
; rather, such an allegation “must be supported by material evidence demonstrating conduct that derogates from the standard”
(Otoman c Canada (Procureur général), 2025 CAF 88 at para 9; Arthur at para 8; Muma v Canada (Attorney General), 2025 FC 1369 at para 67 [Muma]). A reasonable apprehension of bias will arise when there has been a prejudgment of the matter to such an extent that any representations to the contrary would be futile (Newfoundland Telephone Co v Newfoundland (Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 623 at 638; Muma at para 66). It is evident that mere disagreement with the findings of a decision maker does not amount to evidence of bias (Jagadeesh v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 2024 FCA 172 at para 72, leave to appeal to the Supreme Court dismissed, no 41598 (May 15, 2025)).
(3) Analysis
[45] I find that Mr. Uddin has not met his burden of demonstrating bias from the Officer. Contrary to his submissions, there is no evidence that the Officer did not have an open mind prior to the interview nor that their decision was already taken before the interview.
[46] As far as the allegation of unfair pattern in the Singapore visa post, the only file before me is that of Mr. Uddin (Awal at para 32). While he has filed extracts of files belonging to other candidates in the Quebec investor class whose applications were denied by the same visa post abroad, I did not have the benefit of reviewing these other candidates’ entire record (Awal at para 32) nor of all the other applications made in the same class that were accepted by the Singapore visa post. I cannot base a finding of apprehension of bias on the sole existence of those similar files.
[47] Mr. Uddin also draws an argument from the fact that the Officer confirmed that the same French certificates provided in the other applications were fraudulent, but not his. However, Mr. Uddin was never accused of providing a fraudulent document in his application. I cannot see how the Officer apparently investigating the potentially fraudulent document in three out of the four applications having submitted the same certificate, but not Mr. Uddin’s, could, in itself, raise a concern about the Officer’s impartiality in assessing the latter’s application. Moreover, there is also no indication that Mr. Uddin’s own document was dismissed by the Officer on that basis.
[48] Mr. Uddin has therefore failed to provide any reliable evidence to support his claim of apprehension of bias.
IV. Conclusion
[49] For the reasons detailed above, Mr. Uddin’s application for judicial review is dismissed. I find the Decision to be reasonable, and I cannot conclude that the Officer was biased in their assessment of Mr. Uddin’s application.
[50] There are no questions of general importance to be certified.
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