Search - convention

The RPD found that the Applicants were neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection within the meaning of sections 96 and 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA]. ... Their claims were heard together, and the Principal Applicant was appointed the designated representative of Viktoria. [11]   The RPD determined that there was no nexus to a Convention ground under section 96 of the IRPA, and therefore the Applicants’ claims were considered under section 97. ...

In addition to losing friends, his employment and his access to housing were affected as a result of his marriage. [8]   The RPD finds that the Applicants have not satisfied the burden of establishing a serious possibility of persecution on a Convention ground or that they would be personally subjected, on a balance of probabilities, to a danger of torture, or a risk to life, or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment upon return to Croatia based on the nexus of actual or perceived ethnicity. Therefore, the RPD found that the Applicants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection pursuant to sections 96 and 97(1) of the IRPA. [9]   The RPD considered the evidence but found that the discrimination the Applicants may have experienced from 1996 to 2011 did not amount to persecution. ...

Huang was not a Convention refugee and is not a person in need of protection. ... Huang was not a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. [53]   As a result of the various errors and lack of transparency in the reasons for the Decision, it must be set aside and returned for redetermination by a different panel. [54]   There is no serious question of general importance arising on these facts. ...

Introduction [1]   This is an application for judicial review of the Refugee Appeal Division [RAD]’s decision affirming the Refugee Protection Division [RPD]’s finding that the Applicants are not Convention refugees or persons in need of protection as defined in sections 96 and 97(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA]. ... Impugned Decision [12]   In a decision dated January 29, 2019, the RAD dismissed the Applicants’ appeal, and confirmed the RPD decision that the Applicants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection, pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(a) of the IRPA. [13]   The RAD declined to hold a hearing pursuant to subsection 110(6) of the IRPA. ...

Jacobus was not a convention refugee nor a person in need of protection pursuant to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA]. [2]   Ms.  ... As already noted, the reasonableness of the IFA determination is the sole issue under review in this application. [9]   For reasons set out below, I find that in considering Bali as a viable IFA, the RPD reasonably applied the two-pronged test established by the Federal Court of Appeal in Thirunavukkarasu v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 FC 589 (FCA) that: [I]n order to prove a claim to Convention refugee status… claimants must prove on a balance of probabilities that there is a serious possibility that they will be subject to persecution in their country. ...

Singh) is seeking judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Appeal Division [RAD], dated February 25, 2019, dismissing his appeal, confirming the decision of the Refugee Protection Division [RPD], dated March 24, 2017, and determining that he is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. [2]   For the reasons set out below, the application for judicial review will be dismissed. ... Singh is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection within the meaning of sections 96 and 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [the Act]. ...

Un montant qu’une personne a reçu d’une autre personne a) pendant une période de temps alors que la personne qui a reçu ledit montant était fonctionnaire du payeur ou était à l’emploi de ce dernier, ou b) en raison ou au lieu de paiement ou en acquittement d’une obligation découlant d’une entente intervenue entre le payeur et la personne qui a reçu ledit montant immédiatement avant, pendant ou immédiatement après une période ou la personne qui a reçu l’argent était fonctionnaire du payeur ou était à l’emploi de ce dernier, est réputé, aux fins de l’article 5, une rémunération des services que la personne qui a touché ledit montant a rendus à titre de fonctionnaire ou pendant sa période d’emploi, sauf s’il est établi que, indépendamment de la date où a été conclue l’entente, s’il en est, en vertu de laquelle ledit montant a été reçu, ou de la forme ou de l’effet juridique de ladite entente, ce montant ne peut pas raisonnablement être considéré comme ayant été reçu i) à titre de cause ou considération totale ou partielle de l’acceptation de la charge ou de la conclusion du contrat d’emploi, ii) à titre de rémunération totale ou partielle des services rendus comme fonctionnaire ou en confirmité du contrat d’emploi, ou iii) à titre de cause ou considération totale ou partielle d’une convention prévoyant ce que le fonctionnaire ou employé doit faire, ou ne doit pas faire, avant ou après la cessation de l’emploi. ... Quant au sous-paragraphe i) de l’article 25, la somme de $5,000, partie d’un montant de $30,000 ne peut pas raisonnablement être considérée comme étant la considération pour avoir accepté la charge ou avoir passé le contrat d’emploi; quant au sous-paragraphe ii), la même somme ne peut pas non plus être raisonnablement considérée comme ayant été reçue à cause de services rendus mais cette même somme peut raisonnablement être considérée comme étant en conformité au contrat d'emploi puisque le contrat d’emploi prévoyait le paiement de $30,000 si l’employeur y mettait fin dans certains cas qui étaient prévus au dit contrat; quant au sous- paragraphe iii), le même somme ne peut pas non plus être raisonnablement considérée comme reçue à titre de considération d’une convention prévoyant ce que le fonctionnaire doit faire et ne pas faire après la cessation d’emploi car les dispositions du paragraphe 5 du contrat du 21 auût 1970 ne faisaient pas partie du contrat d’emploi tel que modifié le 10 janvier 1969. ...

The two main issues are whether during that year it was a resident of Canada or carried on business here and, if so, whether its commercial profits for the year were exempt from taxation under Article 1 of The Canada-United States Tax Convention * [1] In order for the Convention to be applicable, there must be a finding that the Corporation’s business was a U.S. enterprise and that it either had no permanent establishment in Canada or if it did, that part of the commercial profits was not attributable to that establishment. ... If it was carrying on business here, it would still not be taxable (by reason of the Canada-US Tax Convention Act) if it was a US enterprise without a permanent establishment in Canada or if no part of its profits could be allocated to any such permanent establishment in Canada. ... Disposition of Appeal The claim will therefore be allowed with costs and the matter will be referred back to the Minister of National Revenue for reassessment in accordance with these reasons. 1 Refer The Canada-United States of America Tax Convention Act, 1943, SC 1943, c 21. ...

The Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (the panel) determined that the applicants were neither Convention refugees under section 96, or persons in need of protection under section 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. (2001) c. 27.   ...

Justice Martineau BETWEEN: KARAKOUS MOURAD SOUNYA ARAKILIYAN Applicants and THE MINISTER OF IMMIGRATION, REFUGEES AND CITIZENSHIP Respondent JUDGMENT AND REASONS [1]                The applicants are challenging the reasonableness of the decision of the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada to confirm the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) that the applicants are not Convention refugees or persons in need of protection under sections 96 and 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA]. [2]                The applicants, a husband and wife who are 76 and 61 years of age respectively, are dual citizens of Syria and Armenia. ...