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The claim is made by the respondent under Section 58, subsections (4), (5), (6) and (6A), of The 1948 Income Tax Act, which reads as follows: 58. (1) In this Act, trust or estate means the trustee or the executor, administrator, heir or other legal representative having ownership or control of the trust or estate property. (4) For the purposes of this Part, there may be deducted in computing the income of a trust or estate for a taxation year such part of the amount that would otherwise be its income for the year as was payable in the year to a beneficiary or other person beneficially interested therein or was included in the income of a beneficiary for the year by virtue of subsection (2) of section 60. (5) Such part of the amount that would otherwise be the income of a trust or estate for a taxation year as was payable in the taxation year to a beneficiary or other person beneficially interested therein, shall be included in computing the income of the person to whom it so became payable whether or not in was paid to him in that year and shall not be included in computing his income for a subsequent year in which it was paid. (6) For the purposes of subsections (4) and (5), an amount shall not be considered to have been payable in a taxation year unless it was paid in that year to the person to whom it was payable or he was entitled in that year to enforce payment thereof. (6A) A beneficiary or other person beneficially interested in a trust or estate who is entitled, either contingently or absolutely, to the property of the trust or estate or some part thereof at some future time, may deduct from the amount that would otherwise be his income from the trust or estate by virtue of subsection (5) such part of the amount that would otherwise be deductible from the income of the trust or estate for the year under regulations made under paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of section 11 as the trust or estate may determine; and any amount deductible under this section for a taxation year shall be deducted from the amount that the trust or estate would otherwise be able to deduct under regulations made under the said paragraph (a) but shall, for the purpose of section twenty, be deemed to have been allowed to the trust or estate under those regulations in computing its income for the year.” ...

’ ’ If he had not considered himself bound (as indeed he was) by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re Fleck, [1952] O.W.N. 260; [1952] C.T.C. 205, Ferguson, J., before whom the application came, would have found that the money constituted capital in the hands of the trustees and not income but in view of that authority he declared otherwise. ...

The appellant’s directors considered it proper to record in their accounts the value of the gross royalty interest in such potential production. ...

What is the line which separates the two classes of cases may be difficult to define, and each case must be considered according to its facts; the question to be determined being— Is the sum of gain that has been made a mere enhancement of value by realising a security, or is it a gain made in an operation of business in carrying out a scheme for profit-making?” ...

Had she been illegally deprived of her rights by the registration under The Land Titles Act of a fraudulent disposition made without her consent, a right to damages might have arisen for her under the provisions of the Dower Act, but that situation did not arise, and accordingly the two rights above mentioned are the only ones that need be considered. ...

These words cannot be considered as merely surplusage, which would be the result if I were to adopt the submission of the respondent that to merely have filed the returns of the preceding years at any time is a sufficient compliance with the provisions of the section. ...

The Minister considered that Jacob Mayer was ‘‘a person or one of several persons’’ by whom the appellant was directly or indirectly controlled and that the transaction between him and the appellant was, therefore, a transaction between persons not dealing at arm’s length, from which it followed that the capital cost of the property to the appellant must be deemed to be the amount that was the capital cost of it to its original owner, Jacob Mayer. ...

Battrum’s Statement of Income and Disbursements, in so far as it is based on the vouchers and statements supplied to him, may be considered as accurate. ...

The appellants say that the amount written off over the period in question for depreciation is subject to the provisions of the Accumulations Act, now R.S.O. 1950, c. 4, and that such amount has been shown, by reason of the price realized on the sale of the business, to have been excessive to such an extent that the whole amount of the write-offs should now be considered income to which the appellants are entitled. ...

Certain other facts will be later referred to, but I considered it advisable to quote the section at this point because of certain admissions made at the hearing. ...