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Since it was reasonable to be considered eligible because she earned at least $5,000 during 2019, it would be unreasonable to deny her the benefit of the two programs. ... Furthermore, the New Documents and Facts should not be considered by this Court given that: a. ... It appears that the letter was not considered for a more general purpose, such as evidence of an unwritten contractual agreement. ...

Lui, who testified at the hearing, indicated that she considered the AR EPA to be the same as the Bone Creek EPA, which is why she sometimes referred to the AR EPA as simply the “EPA”; d) Clause 7 of the Restructuring Agreement identified that if the AR EPA was not approved by the BCUC, the original Bone Creek EPA, in its original form prior to the Restructuring Agreement, would be in force; and, e) CHD asked BC Hydro for a comfort letter in the event the BCUC did not accept the AR EPA because it would be subject to previous form of the Bone Creek EPA. [35] The foregoing examples are a clear indicator of the objective intention of the parties because they are the words chosen by the parties when agreeing. [36] Further, BC Hydro argues that an agreement continues unless the amendment results in a material alteration to the contractual relationship: “… An alteration is deemed material if it alters the obligations created by the instrument, it gives a different legal character to the agreement, or would change the nature of the relations between the parties; it is material if it varies “the legal position of the parties or the legal incidence of the instruments.” [3] [37] An alteration is considered material if it varies the legal position of the parties or the legal incidents of the instruments. [4] [38] The inclusion of the Optional Term Extension clause in the AR EPA and the additional amendments pertaining to the term extension security were not material changes to the Bone Creek EPA. [39] A complete list of the amendments in the AR EPA are set out in an August 19, 2011 memo. [5] These amendments include: a) Addition of clause 2.2 (the Optional Term Extension); b) Addition of subsection 15.8 requiring Valisa make a payment for network upgrade costs; c) Addition of s. 159 regarding the term extension security; and, d) Changing the guaranteed COD to November 1, 2011. ... The right to extend was not in the original EPA, so its subsequent inclusion in the AR EPA was a modification of the original Bone Creek EPA. [44] Even if the Optional Term Extension can be considered a new supply under the AR EPA, and this appeal has brought to light a consequence of the current wording of s. 182 that the Minister disagrees with (i.e. s. 182 applying to a payment made as a consequence of an amendment that also adds a new supply to the agreement), this is an issue that must be addressed through an amendment to the legislation. ... [81] All of that said, the Respondent’s alternative submission that the Payment for the Optional Term Extension ought to be considered a new, narrower supply agreement within the AR EPA, attracting GST pursuant to section 165, is also compelling. ...

Dallaire considered the application of section 182 of the ETA whereby a tax is deemed to be paid when an amount is paid following the breach of a contract. ... This is purely the interpretation of the appellant who, in performing certain calculations, considered that this could be the case. ... Moreover, it seems as if the fees, expenses and costs incurred by Caterpillar to exercise its rights under the lease and all of the charges related to the late payments were considered separately under the heading "Repossession Costs" (Exhibit A-1, tab 4, page 142) ...

The King, 2023 TCC 55, at para 50. [14] In considering a person’s intention through a lens of occupancy, this Court has considered several factors, including the following in Sozio v. ... Having considered the appellant’s oral testimony and the documentary evidence, I find myself unable to accept the appellant’s evidence. ... He might have moved a mattress and slept there on a few occasions, but I am unable to accept that the appellant occupied the property within the meaning of that concept as considered in the case law referred to above. ...