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Robinson considered and pursued several other potential opportunities with diligence and effort. ... Firestone incurred were considered capital expenses because they were incurred to acquire or create a business, not in the running of a business. ... It seems to me that all of the expenditures relating to the investigation of opportunities must be considered on the same footing. ...

Pfizer Ireland Pharmaceutical, 2011 FCA 77, 419 N.R. 189 [Pfizer Ireland], the Prothonotary pointed out that the Hughes Decision did not conclusively determine the issues of patent validity and infringement. [27]   The Prothonotary also considered the fact that, under the Former Regulations, appeals taken from Federal Court decisions concerning applications were often found to be moot by this Court because the Minister had issued a NOC to the generic (the second person) prior to the hearing of the appeal. ... Sexton J.A. considered, in light of this argument, that it would be useful to review the Court’s jurisprudence on the issue. [75]   Sexton J.A. examined our decisions in Merck Frosst, David Bull, Apotex 2001, Novartis, and, finally, Sanofi. ... The trial judge was aware of the previous NOC proceedings in relation to the '393 Patent and considered them to be instructive (reasons at para. 18). ...

The importance of the “one member, one vote” mutualist principle allows the MGIAs to be considered equally, notwithstanding their respective size. ... The holding of voting shares of the capital stock of the corporation normally constitutes a basic condition to be met, but there may be exceptions. [54] This conclusion is evident in the summary of the principles of corporate and taxation law considered in Duha, which are restated below (paragraph 85): (1) Subsection 111(5) of the Income Tax Act contemplates de jure, not de facto, control. (2) The general test for de jure control is that enunciated in Buckerfield’s, supra: whether the majority shareholder enjoys “effective control” over the “affairs and fortunes” of the corporation, as manifested in “ownership of such a number of shares as carries with it the right to a majority of the votes in the election of the board of directors.” (3) To determine whether such “effective control” exists, one must consider: (a) the corporation’s governing statute; (b) the share register of the corporation; and (c) any specific or unique limitation on either the majority shareholder’s power to control the election of the board or the board’s power to manage the business and affairs of the company, as manifested in either: (i) the constating documents of the corporation; or (ii) any unanimous shareholder agreement. (4) Documents other than the share register, the constating documents, and any unanimous shareholder agreement are not generally to be considered for this purpose. (5) If there exists any such limitation as contemplated by item 3(c), the majority shareholder may nonetheless possess de jure control, unless there remains no other way for that shareholder to exercise “effective control” over the affairs and fortunes of the corporation in a manner analogous or equivalent to the Buckerfield’s test. [55] To decide who has effective control of ProRé, the Court must take into account, among other things, the legislation governing the corporation, namely the ProRé Act, under which the existence of ProRé was continued as a corporation. ... Consequently, the agreement entered into by ProCap’s shareholders cannot constitute a unanimous shareholder agreement. [65] Even if one considered the agreement between ProCap’s shareholders in this case to be a unanimous shareholder agreement, the agreement did not in fact deprive ProCap’s shareholders of being able to exercise de jure control of ProCap. [66] As stated in paragraph 62 above, the transfer of the property or the enterprise of ProCap had to be approved by a vote of two thirds of the shareholders. ...

The CTR contains a copy of the RFI and a certificate signed by Scott Jeffery, Case Manager with the CRA, dated March 28, 2019, certifying the two documents that were considered by the Minister’s delegate in making the decision to issue the RFI on behalf of the Minister: (1) the Information Sheet for the RFI (redacted on the basis of relevance, solicitor-client privilege and section 37 of the Canada Evidence Act, RSC 1985, c C-5); and (2) a draft RFI. ... In my view, Zeifmans’ arguments regarding the importance of subsections 231.2(2) and (3) and their purpose in constraining the Minister’s information-seeking powers are properly considered within the Vavilov framework for reasonableness review (see Entertainment Software Association v Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2020 FCA 100 at paras 32-35 (Entertainment Software); Roofmart Ontario Inc. v Canada (National Revenue), 2020 FCA 85 at para 20). [18] Questions of statutory interpretation are not unique and can be reviewed for reasonableness (Vavilov at paras 115-116): [115] Matters of statutory interpretation are not treated uniquely and, as with other questions of law, may be evaluated on a reasonableness standard. ... In Advantage Credit Union, Justice Mandamin, then of this Court, considered the contradictory conclusions of TD Bank and Artistic Ideas, cited the decision in Morton and followed Artistic Ideas (Advantage Credit Union at para 17): [17] I agree with Deputy Justice Strayer [in Morton]. ...

In my opinion, the larger context within which this appeal should be considered is the social, political and legal disadvantage suffered by poor, divorced women and the growing trend in the feminization of poverty. ... Apart from this distinguishing factor of poverty, this appeal is substantially the same as that considered in Thibaudeau, supra. ... However a judgment of the Court from an appeal under the informal procedure should be considered with respect and may have a strong persuasive influence depending on the circumstances. ...

He cannot explain to the Court why certain amounts had not been considered in these analyses. ... All things considered, this study was not convincing. There was also the analysis conducted by Mrs. ... On this point, I also considered the appellant Madeleine Coderre's testimony, particularly that part concerning this unreported interest of $937.50. ...

I had considered recalling counsel to argue the effect of the case but since it confirmed the conclusion which I had reached in any event I did not consider that I was justified in doing so. ... Joyal, J. considered the capital investment as an important factor as indicating a serious new commitment and new orientation sufficient to bring the taxpayer into the first category of farmer described by Dickson, J. ... The Federal Court of Appeal stated at page 288 (D.T.C. 5155): Start-up costs, contrary to what the trial judge said, cannot be considered as the basis for an alternative ground of decision. ...

So the first step in his approach was to have considered three assumed ($8 million, $13 million and $15.5 million) fair market values of the realty at Valuation Day and to prorate those amounts amongst the senior playing members. ... His opinion was that at each increasing level of the assumed real estate values, an SPM at Valuation Day would have considered the risks associated with retaining his bond/debenture. ... He had considered and dismissed any possibility that the members acting in concert would have sold the realty, purchased another at a lesser price and distributed the difference to themselves as being merely factually hypothetical. ...

However, where, as here, no market exists in that form, regard must be had to other indicia of value: other circumstances and conditions must be considered. ... The problem of where no ready market exists was considered by Mr. Justice Kellock in his judgment in Smith et al. v. ... The witness, prior to his present position as a writer, was considered as a numismatic consultant in currency history. ...

Tax was to be considered, but it was not the consideration when this company was formed. ... It is the part that was not reinsured that the respondent considered as not having been shifted. ... If the corporate veil was lifted, Humber would be considered as the same company as the appellant, and the part of the risk not reinsured by Humber would be considered as not shifted by the insured (the appellant) to the insurance company (Humber). ...