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According to the defendant, the Company also lost some smaller contracts to Beaupré's agency. 12 Under cross-examination, the defendant admitted knowledge of the Income Tax Act to the extent that any moneys payable by way of consultant fees might be considered as deductible for tax purposes whereas any moneys paid for shares in the capital stock of a company, in these circumstances, was clearly a capital expenditure and, therefore, not deductible for taxation purposes. ... In my view, a non-competition clause was not inserted because it was not considered necessary, either by the defendant or by those acting on his behalf. ...

Then, I also considered the size of the net worth difference I had arrived at, based on the balance sheets submitted by Mr. ... Then I also considered that there was no supporting documentation to indicate the source of the funds in the cash account. ...

He had been the owner for some time of a lot in a very prestigious area of downtown Vernon at a location which would be considered ideal for a building in which the appellant could carry on his profession. ... This may have been only an unavoidable sequel of the overall plan, but was inevitable in order to alleviate the otherwise too heavy cost of construction in this expensive location. 20 I am also prepared to accept the appellant's Statement of Facts to mean that it was never his intention to invest money in the said building as a form of investment in rental property, but that he considered the construction of the building and the rental of the extra space therein as a necessary and inevitable condition for the success ful operation of his professional business. ...

In spite of having declared advances in the amount of $315,000 uncollectable in 1969, the appellant advanced Fanco an additional amount of $135,000 in 1970 which was not reimbursed, and Charter Credit Corporation is also said to have advanced a further $100,000 to Fanco. 13 Early in 1969 the appellant had charged Fanco interest at the current bank rate for the loans or advances made to it but, later in that year, interest was no longer charged on loans made to Fanco, nor was any interest charged on the $135,000 advanced to Fanco by the appellant in 1970. 14 Counsel for the appellant suggested—and, in my view, rightly so—that it is the entire business operation of a company that should be examined, and that it is what a company actually does that must be weighed and considered rather than undue reliance placed on the declared objects of incorporation and the powers granted to a company by its charter. ... Regardless of whether the appellant considered the advances made by it to Fanco as loans, the nature and the purpose of the advances was in fact capital investment made to preserve the appellant's consolidated image. ...

The Minister considered the $60,000 payment a “retiring allowance” within the meaning of subsection 248(1) and included it in the taxpayer's income pursuant to subparagraph 56(1)(a)(ii). ... The other factors such as damages for mental distress and costs are not taxable because they do not enter into the definition of retirement allowance as defined in subsection 248(1) of the Income Tax Act. 28 After having considered all of the evidence, the Court finds and declares that 50% of the sum of $25,376 was received by the Appellant as a “retirement allowance” and is therefore taxable. ...

In my view, the subsection 56(12) definition of “allowance” is to be read together with subsection 60.1(1) of the Act and the latter subsection construed accordingly. 11 The next factor to be considered is the application of subsection 56(12) as it characterises the ‘allowance payable’ in paragraphs 60(b), (c) or (c.1). ... The budget papers, at page 10, describe what amounts payable to third parties were deductible: Before 1984, for an amount to be considered a deductible allowance, it must have been a fixed sum of money paid directly to the recipient for maintenance and support pursuant to a court order, decree or separation agreement. ...

In making this determination, the Minister assumed inter alia the following facts: (a) Denis Beaumier is the appellant's principle shareholder; [admitted] (b) an analysis of the appellant's expenses revealed that the appellant had incorrectly claimed as business expenses for the taxation year ending November 30, 1991, an amount of $7,540 (80% of $9,425) in respect of a trip by the principal shareholder and his spouse to Singapore; (c) in a Notice of Reassessment issued on July 4, 1994, the Minister disallowed travel expenses of $7,540 claimed by the appellant for the taxation year ending November 30, 1991, as he considered this amount to have been a personal expense of the principal shareholder. 8 2.03 The facts assumed by the respondent in the case of Denis Beaumier (96-910(IT)I) are as follows: [TRANSLATION] 2. ... The business trip to the Orient was a trip for which the appellant company signed up for business purposes and it should for the following reasons be considered as an expense incurred in connection with the appellant company's business: (a) it was sponsored by the Association de la construction du Québec; (b) it was specifically organized for member contractors of the Association de la construction du Québec; (c) its purpose was to enable participants to attend conferences offered by various construction associations including the Hong Kong builders association, the Thailand builders association, and the Singapore builders association; (d) The conferences were aimed at providing Canadian contractors with information on various techniques used by contractors in the construction industry in the Orient and on the conditions under which contracts are concluded there, particularly with regard to: construction in wetlands; materials used; contractual obligations of contractors; relations and negotiations between contractors and government organizations; negotiations with unions; etc. ...

Section 123.83 read (and still reads) as follows: 123.83 Directors, officers and other representatives of a company are considered to be mandataries of the company. and at page 349: Article 1710 C.C. reads as follows: The mandatary is bound to exercise, in the execution of the mandate, reasonable skill and all the care of a prudent administrator Nevertheless, if the mandate be gratuitous, the court may moderate the rigor of the liability arising from his negligence or fault, according to the circumstances. 20 But here again, it must be noted that the authors discuss at pages 354 et seq of this article, the degree of care, diligence and skill required by the Act and indicate that diligence must be exercised to prevent the failure. 21 I am of the opinion that the case law of the Court is consistent on the diligence that the director of a corporation must show to avoid the liability prescribed by subsection 227.1(1) of the Act. ... The degree of prudence required by subsection 227.1(3) leaves no room for risk. 23 The evidence is quite clear, both from the Notice and from the appellant's testimony, that the appellant made a conscious and considered choice to pay only the net salaries of employees and the amounts owing to key suppliers in the expectation that the business would become profitable. ...

Novoselac argued that the appeal should be considered a class C appeal, as the Notice of Reassessment changed the Appellant's total income from a $402,000.00 loss to a $433,000.00 gain at line 150 and that the total tax payable by the Appellant was determined to be $193,000.00. ... Gibson argued that amounts for computer research should be considered as overhead. ...

The matter was considered and left open in the case of Emanuel v. Sy mon, [1907] K.B. 235 at 241, and I quote from the judgment of Channell, J.: “Whether the assignment of his share by one partner to another operates to dissolve the partnership may be said to be at the present time a matter of very considerable doubt. It is stated at p. 583 of the 5th edition of Lindley on Partnership, which was published before the Partnership Act, in 1890, that in the ease of a partnership at will the assignment by a member of an ordinary firm of his share in its operates as a dissolution of the partnership; but in the editions published since the Act the editors indicate that it is their opinion that the Act has made a difference in this respect, because the Act mentions certain specific cases in which a partnership is to be considered to be dissolved, and the assignment of partnership shares is not included amongst them. ...