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Counsel for the appellant advised the Court both parties had lost their files and as a result, no further evidence would be available to adduce at trial. [15]   Conversely, the respondent submits that the Rule 58 question should be answered in the negative because (1) absent the Judge’s error with regard to the Minister’s assessing powers when considering an objection under the Excise Tax Act, the Judge would have been able to answer the Rule 58 question; and (2) the facts before the Judge were sufficient to enable him to answer the Rule 58 question and to determine that the transactions the Minister considered when issuing the initial assessments were identical to those that the Minister considered when issuing the reassessments. ...

If I had considered the evidence in the context of the tools that are widely known and available to consumers and commuters today, I would likely have reached a different conclusion. ... The Appellant argues that the activities constituted a “progressive and systematic investigation” including adjustments to the sub‑hypothesis, followed by new testing and documentation. [24]   Consistent with the arguments noted above, the Respondent maintained that the activities included a series of unrelated tasks with “different technical goals and objectives” that should not be considered as SRED. ...

The critical issue in this appeal is whether the terms of payments between the separated or ex-spouses comply with the very specific provisions within the legislation governing deductibility of such support payments. [2]   The relevant legislation, subsections 56.1(4) and 60.1(3) of the Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c.1 (the “Act”), provides as follows (underlining added for emphasis): 56.1(4)   […]   support amount   means an amount payable or receivable as an allowance   on a periodic basis for the maintenance of the recipient   and     the recipient is the common-law partner of the payer and the   amount is receivable under an order of a competent tribunal or   under a written agreement;   60.1(3) For the purposes of this section and section 60, where a written agreement or order provides that an amount paid before that time and in the year or the preceding taxation year is to be considered to have been paid and received thereunder,   (a) the amount is deemed to have been paid thereunder; and [3]   The appellant, Mr. ... The lawyers’ letters, when considered in their totality, leave considerable doubt in any reader’s mind: where is there actual acceptance of the terms of spousal support resulting from the exchange? ...

Legal title to the home was taken in the name Aish, but the Appellant and his wife were considered to be beneficial owners of 3/8ths of the home. [6]   For both 2014 and 2015 Aish issued to the Appellant a T4 slip indicating the value of the benefit of the 5/8ths of the home as $45,000. ... LAW [8]   Subparagraphs 8(1)(c)(iii) & (iv) of the Act read as follows: Deductions Allowed 8 (1) In computing a taxpayer’s income for a taxation year from an office or employment, there may be deducted… Clergy residence (c)…the amount, not exceeding the taxpayer’s remuneration for the year from the office or employment, equal to (iii) the total of all amounts including amounts in respect of utilities, included in computing the taxpayer’s income for the year under section 6 in respect of the residence or other living accommodation occupied by the taxpayer in the course of, or because of, the taxpayer’s office or employment as such a member or minister so in charge of or ministering to a diocese, parish or congregation, or so engaged in such administrative service, or (iv) rent and utilities paid by the taxpayer for the taxpayer’s principal place of residence (or other principal living accommodation), ordinarily occupied during the year by the taxpayer, or the fair rental value of such a residence (or other living accommodation), including utilities, owned by the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s spouse or common-law partner, not exceeding the lesser of (A) the greater of (I) $1,000 multiplied by the number of months (to a maximum of ten) in the year, during which the taxpayer is a person described in subparagraphs (i) and (ii), and (II) one-third of the taxpayer’s remuneration for the year from the office or employment, and (B) the amount, if any, by which (I) the rent paid or the fair rental value of the residence or living accommodation, including utilities exceeds (II) the total of all amounts each of which is an amount deducted, in connection with the same accommodation or residence, in computing an individual’s income for the year from an office or employment or from a business (other than an amount deducted under this paragraph by the taxpayer), to the extent that the amount can reasonably be considered to relate to the period, or a portion of the period, in respect of which an amount is claimed by the taxpayer under this paragraph; ANALYSIS Standard of Statutory Interpretation [9]   As previously noted, the issue before the Court is whether the Appellant can claim clergy residence deductions under both subparagraphs 8(1)(c)(iii) and 8(1)(c)(iv). ...

The appellant incurred expenses of $63,609 in the 2016 taxation year that would be considered allowable moving expenses if the appellant was eligible to claim moving expenses. 13.   ... The Appellant’s former home in Australia remained vacant until it was sold in December 2016. [6]   The Appellant stated that when making her decision to move to Canada, she considered the expense of moving and the relief for that expense she believed she would receive in the form of a deduction from income. ...

Masson submits that the CRA should nonetheless have considered the errors, acts and/or omissions of the advisor representing him at the time of the transfer and the inaction of the notary who should have warned him of the disastrous consequences of the transactions. ... Masson’s submissions. [27]   First, it has been well established that a decision-maker is presumed to have considered all the evidence and is not required to refer to “all the arguments, statutory provisions, jurisprudence or other details the reviewing judge would have preferred” (Newfoundland Nurses at para 16). ...

Their claims were heard together, and the Principal Applicant was appointed the designated representative of Viktoria. [11]   The RPD determined that there was no nexus to a Convention ground under section 96 of the IRPA, and therefore the Applicants’ claims were considered under section 97. The determinative issues for the RPD were credibility and state protection. [12]   The RPD rejected much of the Applicants’ evidence due to a lack of credibility, finding that the Applicants had failed to establish: (i) that Lutfi was alive or present in Albania; (ii) that the person who attended Viktoria’s kindergarten had ill intent; and (iii) that the threatening phone call had occured. [13]   The RPD found that the Applicants had omitted information from their BOC, had embellished aspects of their testimony, and the Applicants’ allegations were not consistent with the documentary evidence of blood feuds in Albania. [14]   The RPD next considered state protection, and concluded that the Applicants had failed to rebut the presumption of state protection. ...

In the Respondent’s view, there is nothing to suggest that the Officer considered each piece of evidence by itself without considering the circumstances of the Applicant’s family as a broader whole. ... The Officer’s reasons demonstrate that he or she was cognizant of the challenges the Applicant and his family have faced and the ways in which they have established themselves in South Africa in determining whether a durable solution existed. [25]   The Officer reviewed the evidence holistically and considered such factors as: that the Applicant’s children attended school; that the Applicant and his family had formal asylum status; that the Applicant owned a grocery store; and that the Applicant had financially established himself in South Africa. ...

The RAD rejected the drug cartel objection as it was a generalized risk and considered the first two IFA’s. [20]   The RAD identified and discussed the two-prong test: (1) it must be satisfied that, on a balance of probabilities, there is no serious possibility of the Applicant been personally subjected to a risk to his life or risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment or the danger of torture in the part of the country in which the IFA is located; (2) conditions in the IFA must be such that it would not be unreasonable in all the circumstances, including those particular to the claimant, for the claimant to seek refuge there. [21]   Contrary to the RPD, the RAD found that the Applicant was personally targeted within the definition under section 97 of the IRPA. ... Without that special access to something the criminals wanted there was insufficient reason to believe he would have been bothered by them. [23]   The RAD considered that the union members who targeted the Applicant are all part of the local Union in Guadalajara, Jalisco State, Mexico. ...

To attempt to do so would trivialize the Charter and inevitably result in ill-considered opinions.   ... Nevertheless, I am not satisfied that this challenge can be considered properly in a complete factual vacuum.   ...