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Because the MURB's that they considered purchasing in Vancouver were very expensive the appellant advised them that he and his wife owned units in Ontario, that 30 or 40 of his clients owned units there that cost under $50,000 per unit and that if each member of the family working in the meat business purchased a unit, substantial income would be sheltered. ... There was no suggestion that they considered selling them at the time he was recommending that the Deslauriers invest in the condominiums. ...

Full time non paid work- 3 years- Chair of the Burnaby Mental Health Committee- 5 years- Founding member Burnaby Mountain Preservation Society which saw 880 acres of land returned from SFU to Burnaby as park space- 5 years. [5] The Minister considered the value of the golf pass as a retiring allowance pursuant to paragraph 56(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act (the " Act ") or, in the alternative, the Minister submits that the Appellant received the amounts as employment income pursuant to paragraph 6(1)(a) and subsection 6(3) of the Act. [6] The Appellant submits that it was not a retirement allowance and that he was never an employee of the City of Burnaby. [7] Subsection 56(1) of the Act reads in part as follows: " Amounts to be included in income for year – Without restricting the generality of section 3, there shall be included in computing the income of a taxpayer for a taxation year, (a) pension benefits, unemployment insurance benefits, etc. – any amount received by the taxpayer in the year as, on account or in lieu of payment of, or in satisfaction of,... ... " [8] It was the Appellant's uncontradicted evidence that he received the recreational pass because he served as alderman about 25 years prior to the relevant taxation years. [9] The Respondent's primary submission was that the Appellant received a retiring allowance pursuant to paragraph 56(1)(a). [10] "Retiring allowance" is defined in subsection 248(1) of the Act as an amount received on or after retirement of a taxpayer from an office or employment in recognition of the taxpayer's long service. [11] "Employment" is defined as the position of an individual in the service of some other person (including Her Majesty or a foreign state or sovereign) and "servant" or "employee" means a person holding such a position. [12] "Office" is defined in section 248 as a position of an individual entitling the individual to a fixed or ascertainable stipend or remuneration and includes a judicial office, the office of a minister of the Crown, the office of a member of the Senate or House of Commons of Canada, a member of a legislative assembly or a member of a legislative or executive council and any other office, the incumbent of which is elected by popular vote or is elected or appointed in a representative capacity and also includes the position of a corporation director, and "officer" means a person holding such an office. [13] In order for the benefit amount to be considered a "retiring allowance", the Appellant must have received it in the year in lieu of payment of or in satisfaction of a retiring allowance. ...

Thirdly, it appears that additions are not to be considered. The only items that are considered are the renovations or alterations of "the building that existed immediately before the renovation or alteration was begun". ...

"; (d)         the alleged sewing income reported by the appellant during the years at issue amounted to $2,035 and $1,284, respectively; (e)         the appellant began operating his alleged business in 1992, at which time he had no expertise in the field; (f)          Linda Fortin and the appellant are the parents of a child born in November 1992; (g)         during the years at issue, the appellant paid so-called wages to just one person, Linda Fortin; (h)         the so-called wages paid by the appellant to Linda Fortin during the years at issue amounted to $9,668 and $10,383, respectively; (i)          the so-called wages paid by the appellant to Linda Fortin were paid yearly over an unbroken period of employment of 14 consecutive weeks; (j)          Linda Fortin allegedly worked 744 hours during the 14 weeks of her period of employment from June 16 to September 28, 1992; (k)         Linda Fortin allegedly worked 763 hours during the 14 weeks of her period of employment from May 17 to August 17, 1993; (l)          the sewing machine was owned by the worker, Linda Fortin; (m)        the sewing work was done in the dwelling of the worker, Linda Fortin, and the appellant paid her $1,800 for the use of the said dwelling each year; (n)         the motor vehicle expenses claimed by the appellant were considered to be unwarranted because it was Louise Jacques who was in charge of picking up, delivering and returning the materials; (o)         the appellant has not shown that there was a reasonable expectation of profit from the sewing activities for the 1992 and 1993 taxation years; (p)         the so-called wages paid to the appellant during the years at issue are unreasonable having regard to the income generated; (q)         the hours allegedly worked by Linda Fortin are unreasonable having regard to the sewing work performed. [5]      At the hearing, the appellant admitted the facts alleged in subparagraphs (a) to (k) and (m) and denied the facts alleged in subparagraphs (l) and (n) to (q). [6]      During those two years, did the appellant incur the expenses that were claimed each year with respect to the sewing activities for the purpose of gaining or producing income from a property or business? ... The Queen, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 480, sets out the following factors: The following criteria should be considered: the profit and loss experience in past years, the taxpayer's training, the taxpayer's intended course of action, the capability of the venture as capitalized to show a profit after charging capital cost allowance. ...

As a mother, she wished through this magnanimous act to help support an initiative of her son's, believing that he would be equal to the challenge. [14]     Having become a victim of her own generosity, the appellant realized that her contribution might have harmful effects on her own financial situation by jeopardizing the very source of some of her income, since she had had to mortgage a number of her properties when she provided the security. [15]     In order to keep and safeguard the source of that income, the appellant consolidated the debts relating to the properties she had provided as security, in order to render her obligations-considerably increased by the payments resulting under the security contract-more realistic and reasonable. [16]     The payments made under the security contract during the years at issue were not expenses that could be considered business investment losses. [17]     The appellant's financial assets were never linked with those of her son's business. ... This fact does not suffice for her appeal to be allowed, since the payments made do not satisfy the conditions for being considered and treated as business investment losses. [19]     Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. ...

John's, Newfoundland, on January 15, 1998, pursuant to the Informal Procedure of this Court concerning the Appellant's 1994 taxation year. [2] The issues in this appeal are: a) whether the Appellant is entitled to a deduction for moving expenses in relation to his trip to British Columbia in 1994; b) whether the Minister of National Revenue (the "Minister") properly considered social assistance payments made to the Appellant's spouse in reassessing the Appellant's claim for the spousal amount. [3] The Respondent submits that the Appellant was not entitled to a deduction for moving expenses as allowed by subsections 62(1) and 62(3) of the Income Tax Act (the " Act ") in that he did not establish his ordinary residence in British Columbia as a result of having commenced employment in that province. [4] The Appellant, at this hearing, stated that he is not contesting the Minister's assessment pertaining to the social assistance payments of $4,320 which were properly included in the income of the Appellant's spouse for the 1994 taxation year in accordance with paragraph 56(1)(a) of the Act. [5] In reassessing the Appellant the Minister made the following assumptions of facts which the Appellant admitted or denied: "(a) the Appellant went to British Columbia during the 1994 taxation year in search of employment; (denied) (b) while in British Columbia during the 1994 taxation year, the Appellant worked for employers in North Vancouver, Surrey, Abbotsford and Coquitlam; (admitted) (c) the Appellant returned to Newfoundland prior to the end of 1994; (admitted) (d) on his 1994 income tax return, the Appellant indicated that his place of residence of December 31, 1994, was Newfoundland; (admitted) (e) the Appellant's spouse continued to reside in Newfoundland and her child tax credit payments continued to be directed to a Newfoundland address; (admitted) (f) the Appellant's third child was born in Newfoundland on December 21, 1994; (admitted as amended) (g) the Appellant did not provide any documentation in support of his claim that his family accompanied him to British Columbia; (denied) (h) the Appellant did not move to British Columbia as a result of a change in employment nor did he establish his ordinary residence in British Columbia; (denied) (i) the Appellant is not entitled to claim moving expenses in relation to his trip to British Columbia; (denied) (j) the Appellant's spouse received social assistance payments of $4,320 in Newfoundland during 1994; (ignored) (k) the social assistance payments were considered part of the net income of the Appellant's spouse; for purposes of determining the Appellant's entitlement to the spousal amount. ...

This provision does not apply in this situation because the Appellant did not pay for a full-time attendant nor did she pay for full-time care in a nursing home. [10]          The second provision of the Act which should be considered is paragraph 118.2(2)(b.1). ... On the facts that were presented to the Court the Appellant does not come within the plain meaning of the words contained in paragraph 118.2(2)(b) or paragraph 118.2(2)(b.1) of the Act. [12]          In reaching this conclusion I have considered and I agree with the following decisions:                 Flumerfelt v. ...

R. [1] In that case the learned trial judge considered the question of vitamins and supplements and found that they were prescribed by a physician. ... That was a case where the Court was apparently satisfied that the items were purchased at a pharmacy. [5]            This issue was considered by Bowman A.C.J. in Banman v. ...

Dussault, J.T.C.C. [1]      This is an appeal from an assessment made by the Minister of National Revenue (the "Minister") under section 160.1 of the Income Tax Act (the " Act") in respect of the 1999 taxation year. [2]      In his income tax return for the 1999 taxation year, the appellant erroneously considered a federal dividend tax credit of $269.91 appearing on a T5 form as being an amount of tax withheld at source. ... Where at any time the Minister determines that an amount has been refunded to a taxpayer for a taxation year in excess of the amount to which the taxpayer was entitled as a refund under this Act, the following rules apply: (a)         the excess shall be deemed to be an amount that became payable by the taxpayer on the day on which the amount was refunded; and (b)         the taxpayer shall pay to the Receiver General interest at the prescribed rate on the excess (other than any portion thereof that can reasonably be considered to arise as a consequence of the operation of section 122.5 or 122.61) from the day it became payable to the date of payment. [8]      The Minister is entitled to make a special assessment with respect to an excess refund by virtue of subsection 160.1(3), which reads: (3)         Assessment. ...

Wilson to represent the Appellant in its appeal. [6]            In her submission counsel for the Respondent outlined the criteria that have been considered by Courts before leave can be granted under rule 30(2). ... Whether the officer is also the director and sole shareholder of the corporation. [7]            I believe that counsel for the Respondent is correct in the summary that she prepared outlining the criteria that should be considered before leave can be granted under rule 30(2). [8]            During the hearing of the application, Mr. ...