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The following two tests have been established and applied repeatedly: (i) the person has usurped the duties of a director by taking actions that are normally reserved for directors; and (ii) the person has represented himself or herself to third parties as a director of the corporation. [19] [25] Counsel for the appellant argues that in order for the appellant to be considered a de facto director, there would have to have been evidence that he took management actions, in this case, evidence that he [translation] “managed the cleaning business, made management decisions... decided which contracts to enter into with clients... signed the resolutions as a director”. [20] In the absence of such evidence, she argues that the appellant cannot be considered as a de facto director. ... The Queen [22] in support of her position that the appellant cannot be considered a de facto director because there is no evidence that he represented himself as a director. ...

It claims that the amounts in issue were significant and justify an increased award. [32] The Respondent does not agree indicating that the “amount at issue” is to be considered in the context of a particular taxpayer and the transaction to which it relates. ... More specifically, the Respondent argues that only the services of counsel exceeding 5% of the total time, should be considered and secondly, that time billed for work done prior to the institution of the appeal should be discounted. [40] On balance, I agree with the Respondent and find that this factor is neutral. [41] 147(3)(f) – Complexity of the Issues: The Appellant contends that applying subsection 20(12) to the so-called “tower structure” involving a web of hybrid entities was both challenging and complex. [42] The Appellant argues that the facts and legal issues applied to those concepts were extremely complicated and that they had to distinguish themselves from FLSmidth Ltd. v. ... The Court finds that this would be inadequate given its consideration of the two factors noted above. [56] All things considered, the Court concludes that an award at the lower end of the scale or 20% of solicitor-client costs (plus applicable taxes) would be more appropriate. ...

Conversely, counsel for the appellant commented: I never considered that this was something of a landmark decision of great significance. ... The key thing here — you have to understand that this is a religious school or, if you will, a mixed religious school, and if you read the facts what you find, for example, is that part of the argument or part of the subsidiary argument has to do with how much ‘Revenue’ is actually allowing them — in other words, it is a question as to whether the first $200.00... perhaps I could read it: The Society which operated the school for the children of members had obtained a ruling from the Department to the effect that any payment toward tuition exceeding $200.00 per child could be considered a gift or charitable donation...”. ... I can only assume that it it were merely expert or professional ski training that Dr Burns considered essential — in fact, a duty (see Zandstra) — he could have obtained this by simply paying for it outside CSA. ...

In the Murray case, supra, the taxpayer's testimony stating that he had been away from his office, but not necessarily outside the city, four days per week was not considered to be sufficiently probative. ... The present situation is quite different from the situation that was considered by the then Chairman of the Tax Review Board, who was to become the first Chief Judge of this Court, in Giovanni Marinelli v. ... The facts in the cases at bar are also quite different from those considered in Roland Morin v. ...

In the absence of any evidence from him, I have not considered his motivations for doing so. ... Appellant and Corco Dealt at Arm’s Length [44] The parties agree that the Appellant and Corco are not related persons within the meaning of subsection 251(2) and therefore that the only way that they could be considered to be non-arm’s length was if they were determined to be factually non-arm’s length in accordance with paragraph 251(1)(c). [45] The case law establishes that parties can be found to be non-arm’s length under paragraph 251(1)(c) if the parties act in concert without separate interests. [2] The Respondent submits that the Appellant and Corco met that test. ... She had not considered selling her shares. [48] The Appellant and Corco engaged in hard bargaining regarding the terms of the sale. ...

E-15), as amended, for the following reasons: (a) the appellant is actively involved in the operation of vending machines known as single-coin devices; (b) the respondent has not considered the technical limitations of the appellant's devices in that the vending machines cannot collect the tax from the consumer; (c) the appellant's single-coin devices cannot be programmed or their mecanisms altered and, unlike multi-coins electronic devices, it cannot collect the tax; (d) to comply with the tax, the appellant will have either to increase its prices substantially or modify its devices, which is not the objective of taxation and which, in any case, cannot be done using existing technology; (e) the appellant alone thus bears the burden of a mandate that technically it cannot perform, which means that it must pay out of its own revenue the tax which it cannot collect from the consumer; (f) when Parliament imposes taxes, permits or licences, the amounts involved result in direct cost increases of 25 to 35 percent, which is discriminatory and intolerable for the appellant; (g) collection of the sales tax in respect of this industry is discriminatory and unfair and results in improper taxation by imposing an enormous financial burden on that industry; (h) there are two substantial difficulties with the principle of taxation: the question whether it is possible for the agent to collect the tax and the fact that the agent only has an obligation to collect what would be paid by the consumer; (i) the appellant is unable to collect the amounts claimed by the respondent; (j) furthermore, on January 8, 1997, the respondent granted a credit of $28,582.27 to the appellant for the period from July 1, 1994, to June 30, 1996; (k) in the circumstances, in the event the assessment in issue is well-founded, it is imperative that the parties agree on the amount of the assessment covering the period from January 1, 1991, to June 30, 1994; 7. ... One reason might be — and I speak honestly here — these telephone companies make millions and are very important in the economy, but we who are involved in bulk vending are considered sometimes second-class citizens; we just operate peanut and candy machines. ... The first consideration should therefore be to determine the purpose of the legislation, whether as a whole or as expressed in a particular provision. 30 5.03.2 If the purpose of the Act (spirit, object, intention) is considered in the instant case, the Act provides that the tax is payable by “the recipient of the supply”, not by “every person who makes a taxable supply, as an agent” (s. 221). 31 In the instant case, because of the mechanism of the device, it was not possible in practice to charge the tax and collect it unless staggering expenses were incurred (4.01.3). ...

Haleem’s appeal was heard, the Federal Court released a decision in the matter of Onex Corporation, [12] which considered but distinguished the decision in Banff Caribou. [24] I rely on Banff Caribou only for the limited purpose of showing that decisions about whether to accept late filed elections under subsection 220(3.2) of the ITA are examples of discretionary decisions that are reviewed by the Federal Court using the reasonableness standard specified by the Supreme Court in Vavilov. ... Discretionary decisions may be based on a variety of factors not strictly set out in the tax statute, such as policy considerations. [18] That kind of decision-making is not the same as the decision to assess tax which must follow the law of the tax statute. [19] [29] It may be argued that while some decisions are discretionary, their impact on an assessment entails that they must be considered when this Court decides if the assessment is correct. That was the crux of Dow Chemical’s argument. [20] The Supreme Court disagreed and characterized that argument as significantly expanding the meaning of ‘assessment’. [21] [30] The Supreme Court considered, in great detail, the consequences of allowing this Court to consider discretionary decisions of the Minister as part of its review of tax assessments. ...

It does not encompass all cases in which a taxpayer goes from a place inside the metropolitan area to a place just outside it. [10]          A very large number of cases have considered claims made for deductions under paragraph 8(1) (g), or its predecessor subsection 11(7), both before and since Derrien, but the correctness of that decision has never been doubted. ... R., [5] the Supreme Court has yet again cautioned that there is no justification to depart from the plain meaning of statutory language and apply any of the many canons of construction unless it is first shown that the language chosen by Parliament, considered in its context within the statute as a whole, is ambiguous. ...

Only if the answer to the first question is “no” and the answer to the second question is “yes” will the amount received be considered a retiring allowance. ... I would point out, however, that general damages relating to human rights violations can be considered as being unrelated to a loss of employment ...

They therefore acted in concert with a common economic interest, so that the taxpayer in fact could not be considered to have been dealing at arm's length with the corporation. [16]     Similarly, in Gosselin, supra, two equal shareholders, although not related to each other, had, together with the corporation, common interests and were acting in concert. ... The comments of Cattanach, J., who considered the question of a directing mind in M.N.R. v. ...