Garon,
T.C.j.:—The
appeals
of
the
four
appellants
were
heard
on
common
evidence.
Three
of
the
appellants
were
represented
by
counsel,
and
the
fourth,
Pierre
Daneau,
acted
for
himself.
In
the
case
of
the
appellant
Raymond
Brisson,
his
appeal
deals
with
the
1983
taxation
year
only.
Pursuant
to
an
assessment
dated
June
19,
1987,
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
added,
as
unreported
income,
the
sum
of
$10,455.36,
which
he
had
received
from
his
employer,
the
Société
Saint-
Germain
Transport
Ltée,
and
allowed
travelling
expenses
in
the
amount
of
$4,147.08.
That
assessment
also
imposed
penalty
under
subsection
163(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act")
in
respect
of
the
unreported
income,
in
the
amount
of
$432.13.
With
respect
to
the
appellant
Denis
Coderre,
he
appealed
assessments
for
the
1980
and
1981
taxation
years,
dated
August
4,
1987.
By
these
assessments,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
added,
as
unreported
income,
the
sum
of
$9,174.44
for
the
1980
taxation
year
and
the
sum
of
$2,584.84
for
the
1981
taxation
year.
For
the
1980
taxation
year,
the
Minister
deducted,
in
computing
the
appellant's
income,
the
sum
of
$4,704.88
as
travelling
expenses.
No
amount
was
deducted
for
travelling
expenses
for
1981.
Penalties
in
the
amount
of
$316.45
and
$105.76
were
imposed
for
the
same
two
years,
under
subsection
163(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
With
respect
to
the
appellant
Pierre
Daneau,
his
appeal
deals
with
the
1980,
1981,
1982
and
1983
taxation
years.
By
assessments
dated
June
25,
1987,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
added,
as
unreported
income,
the
amounts
hereinafter
set
out
in
respect
of
the
years
indicated,
and
deducted
the
following
amounts
for
travelling
expenses
for
those
same
years:
Taxation
year
|
Unreported
income
|
Travelling
expenses
allowed
|
1980
|
$7,461.61
|
$3,222.49
|
1981
|
$8,735.88
|
$4,641.90
|
1982
|
$8,206.54
|
$4,909.25
|
1983
|
$8,539.22
|
$5,489.25
|
The
respondent
imposed
penalties
on
the
appellant
Pierre
Daneau
under
subsection
163(2)
of
the
Act,
cited
above,
for
the
four
taxation
years
in
question,
in
the
following
amounts
for
the
years
indicated:
1980
|
$320.83
|
1981
|
$382.02
|
1982
|
$384.50
|
1983
|
$413.98
|
Finally,
the
appellant
Daniel
Marcoux
appealed
the
assessments
dated
July
6,
1987
for
the
1981,
1982
and
1983
taxation
years.
In
those
assessments,
the
respondent
added
the
following
amounts
for
the
years
in
question
as
unreported
income,
and
deducted
the
amounts
shown
in
the
following
table
for
travelling
expenses:
Taxation
year
|
Unreported
income
|
Travelling
expenses
allowed
|
1981
|
$4,778.48
|
$2,162,25
|
1982
|
$5,576.21
|
$4,389.16
|
1983
|
$8,197.23
|
$5,230.72
|
The
following
penalties
were
imposed
under
subsection
163(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
in
respect
of
the
appellant
Daniel
Marcoux
for
the
taxation
years
indicated
below:
1981
|
$211.56
|
1982
|
$255.38
|
1983
|
$370.53
|
During
the
taxation
years
in
issue
for
each
of
the
appellants,
the
appellants
were
employed
as
truck
drivers
by
the
Société
Saint-Germain
Transport
Ltée,
the"
company".
The
company
operated
a
goods
transport
business,
and
it
is
also
not
disputed
that
the
appellants’
duties
during
the
years
in
question
required
them
to
travel
long
distances
On
a
regular
basis.
Specifically,
in
performing
their
work,
they
had
to
go
regularly
to
the
United
States
and
to
various
places
in
Canada,
particularly
in
the
western
provinces.
The
appellants’
employer's
establishment
during
the
relevant
years
was
located
in
Saint-Germain
de
Grantham,
a
municipality
located
near
Drum-
mondville
in
Quebec.
This
was
the
place
where
the
appellants
reported
for
work
to
drive
the
company's
trucks,
which
were
used
to
transport
goods.
I
should
explain
the
manner
in
which
the
appellants
were
paid
during
the
years
in
question.
First,
each
of
the
appellants
received
total
remuneration
computed
on
the
basis
of
mileage.
The
mileage
rate
varied
during
the
period
in
question
in
respect
of
the
various
appellants.
At
certain
times
it
was
$0.13,
then
$0.15
and
finally
$0.17.
Out
of
this
total
remuneration,
part
was
paid
in
the
form
of
a
cheque
after
the
employer
had
made
the
appropriate
source
deductions.
T-4s
were
issued
by
the
employer
in
respect
of
that
part
of
the
remuneration
only.
This
portion
of
the
remuneration
was
entered
into
the
company's
payroll.
The
rest
of
the
remuneration
was
paid
to
the
appellants
directly
in
cash.
It
was
understood
that
each
driver
was
to
cover
the
travelling
expenses
relating
to
his
work.
It
is
the
cash
amounts
received
by
each
appellant
in
the
years
in
question
which
were
added
to
the
income
of
each
of
them
by
the
above-mentioned
assessments.
Moreover,
but
only
exceptionally,
the
appellants
were
reimbursed
in
part
for
additional
travelling
expenses
which
occurred
in
unforeseen
circumstances.
For
example,
mention
was
made
of
the
case
of
a
truck
driver
who
had
to
wait
several
days
in
the
course
of
a
trip
as
a
result
of
a
decision
by
the
company
to
take
delivery
of
other
merchandise.
There
is
also
the
situation
in
which
a
truck
was
out
of
service
or
had
to
be
put
out
of
service
as
a
result
of
mechanical
difficulties.
All
the
appellants
included
in
their
income
what
was
sometimes
called
the
base
salary,
indicated
by
a
T-4.
In
addition,
the
appellants
claimed
deductions
for
certain
expenses
relating
to
their
travel
for
purposes
of
their
work,
on
the
ground,
at
least
according
to
certain
appellants,
that
their
expenses
during
the
years
in
question
exceeded
the
cash
amounts
received.
Analysis
In
the
light
of
these
facts,
we
should
first
say
that
the
appellants
did
not
rely
on
subparagraph
6(1)(b)(vii)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Counsel
for
the
three
appellants,
in
my
view
correctly,
stated
in
response
to
a
question
by
the
Court
that
he
was
not
relying
on
this
provision.
The
amounts
received
in
cash,
if
we
assume
that
they
were
composed
of
allowances
within
the
meaning
of
that
provision,
were
not
computed
by
reference
to
time
actually
spent
by
the
employees
travelling
away
from
the
area
where
their
employer's
establishment
was
located,
but
rather
by
reference
to
the
distance
travelled
or,
in
other
words,
on
a
mileage
basis.
Thus
at
the
hearing
of
these
appeals
the
appellants
did
not
dispute
that
the
amounts
received
in
cash
should
be
included
in
computing
their
income
from
employment.
The
question
in
issue
before
this
Court
dealt
solely
with
the
amount
of
the
deductions
to
which
the
appellants
were
entitled
as
travelling
expenses
under
paragraph
8(1)(g)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
This
paragraph
reads
as
follows:
8.(1)
In
computing
a
taxpayer's
income
for
a
taxation
year
from
an
office
or
employment,
there
may
be
deducted
such
of
the
following
amounts
as
are
wholly
applicable
to
that
source
or
such
part
of
the
following
amounts
as
may
reasonably
be
regarded
as
applicable
thereto:
(g)
where
the
taxpayer
was
an
employee
of
a
person
whose
principal
business
was
passenger,
goods,
or
passenger
and
goods
transport
and
the
duties
of
the
employment
required
him,
regularly,
(i)
to
travel,
away
from
the
municipality
where
the
employer's
establishment
to
which
he
reported
for
work
was
located
and
away
from
the
metropolitan
area,
if
there
is
one,
where
it
was
located,
on
vehicles
used
by
the
employer
to
transport
the
goods
or
passengers,
and
(ii)
while
so
away
from
such
municipality
and
metropolitan
area,
to
make
disbursements
for
meals
and
lodging,
amounts
so
disbursed
by
him
in
the
year
to
the
extent
that
he
has
not
been
reimbursed
and
is
not
entitled
to
be
reimbursed
in
respect
thereof.
The
Minister
of
National
Revenue
acknowledged
that
the
appellants
had
incurred
travelling
expenses
in
the
context
of
their
employment.
In
fact,
in
the
years
in
question
ne
allowed
deductions
for
travelling
expenses
equal
to
20
per
cent
of
each
appellant's
total
remuneration
for
those
years.
The
appellants
argued
in
the
notice
of
appeal,
following
an
amendment
permitted
by
the
Court
at
the
beginning
of
the
hearing,
that
the
expenses
allowed
for
the
drivers
should
be
increased
to
25
per
cent
or
more,
specifically
on,
but
not
restricted
to,
the
ground
that
these
were
long
trips.
Counsel
for
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
contended
that
the
Court
should
not
increase
the
deductions
already
allowed
by
the
assessments
under
appeal
in
anyway.
In
support
of
this
submission,
he
stated,
specifically,
that
no
supporting
documents
were
provided
by
the
appellants
in
respect
of
their
expenses
for
meals
and
lodging.
The
best
evidence
rule,
he
suggested,
must
be
applied
to
this
case
in
respect
of
evidence
of
these
expenses.
He
submitted
that
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
would
be
put
in
an
untenable
position
if
a
Court
were
to
accept,
on
some
basis
or
another,
testimonial
evidence
alone.
It
would
then
be
quite
easy
for
a
taxpayer
to
dispute
assessments
where
the
issue
was
deductions
for
expenses.
We
should
therefore
examine
the
evidence.
In
the
documentary
evidence,
the
most
important
exhibit
is
undeniably
Exhibit
1-4.
This
exhibit
contains
the
information
on
the
amounts
paid
to
each
appellant,
on
a
weekly
basis,
including
the
amounts
paid
by
cheque
to
each
appellant
and
the
amounts
received
in
cash.
The
travel
sheets
provide
information
on
the
destinations,
mileage
travelled
on
each
trip,
and,
in
all
probability,
the
departure
dates.
The
specific
departure
times
and
even
the
return
dates
are
not,
it
is
true,
indicated
on
this
table.
The
number
of
weeks
during
which
each
of
the
appellants
was
travelling
is
known,
but
it
is
not
noted
in
this
written
evidence
whether
this
was
a
five-
day,
six-day
or
even
seven-day
week.
The
testimonial
evidence
supplemented
this
written
evidence.
With
respect
to
meal
expenses,
no
supporting
documents
were
submitted,
as
I
said
earlier.
I
do
not
believe
that
the
Income
Tax
Act
requires
that
supporting
documents
be
provided
in
respect
of
each
expense
item,
particularly
in
cases
where
taxpayers
spend
most,
if
not
practically
all
their
time
travelling
on
behalf
of
their
employer.
In
the
absence
of
a
legislative
provision
requiring
a
receipt
as
a
condition
for
deduction
of
an
expense,
we
must
rely
on
the
general
rules
of
evidence.
I
do
not
believe
that
the
best
evidence
rule
necessarily
applies,
in
view
of
subsection
14(2)
of
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
Act.
Nonetheless,
the
evidence
must
be
strong
enough
for
the
Court
to
be
firmly
convinced.
With
respect
to
this
evidentiary
question,
counsel
for
the
respondent
drew
the
Court's
attention
to
several
decisions
of
the
courts,
notably
in
P.
Litvinchuk
v.
M.N.R.,
[1979]
C.T.C.
3141;
79
D.T.C.
899,
W.K.
Murray
v.
M.N.R.,
[1950]
C.T.C.
7;
50
D.T.C.
723,
and
Muller's
Meats
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1969]
Tax
A.B.C.
171;
69
D.T.C.
172.
In
the
Litvinchuk
case,
supra,
it
seems
that
there
was
no
documentation
tending
to
establish
the
disbursements
made
by
the
taxpayer.
Given
the
total
absence
of
evidence,
the
Tax
Review
Board
decided,
in
that
case,
to
distinguish
it
from
Melvin
P.
Deutsch
v.
The
Queen,
[1979]
C.T.C.
217;
79
D.T.C.
5145,
in
which
the
Federal
Court
had
found
that
the
basic
information
provided
by
the
taxpayer
was
acceptable
to
some
extent.
In
the
Murray
case,
supra,
the
taxpayer's
testimony
stating
that
he
had
been
away
from
his
office,
but
not
necessarily
outside
the
city,
four
days
per
week
was
not
considered
to
be
sufficiently
probative.
Moreover,
the
judge
expressed
doubts
as
to
the
credibility
of
the
witness.
Finally,
in
the
Muller's
Meats
case,
supra,
the
context
of
the
facts
surrounding
the
deduction
of
the
expenses
was
quite
different
from
the
case
at
bar.
In
particular,
the
comments
of
the
member,
Mr.
Davis,
toward
the
end
of
his
judgment
should
be
noted;
in
short,
he
gave
a
clear
indication
that
he
could
have
accepted
sufficiently
substantial
evidence
in
the
absence
of
receipts
relating
to
those
expenses.
In
the
present
case,
we
have
relatively
precise
documentation
concerning
the
trips
taken
by
the
appellants,
and
we
have
the
testimony
of
three
of
them
dealing
with
meal
expenses.
In
the
present
case,
I
would
willingly
have
accepted
the
evidence
of
meal
expenses
during
a
sufficiently
long
period
in
a
given
region,
in
order
to
find
that
disbursements
for
equivalent
amounts
had
to
be
made
in
the
same
region
during
the
other
weeks
of
the
year
when
the
employee
had
to
travel
on
behalf
of
his
employer.
However,
no
evidence
of
this
sort
was
provided.
Moreover,
three
appellants
stated
under
oath
that
they
estimated
that
their
expenses,
on
a
daily
basis,
might
amount
to
as
much
as
$30.
In
the
circumstances,
I
am
prepared
to
accept
that
it
is
probable
that,
during
a
long
period
of
time
in
a
given
year,
meal
expenses
were
not
less
than
$22,
but
might
on
occasion
have
been
higher
than
that
amount.
Given
the
nature
of
the
evidence,
I
accept
this
minimum
amount
of
$22
for
each
of
the
days
when
the
appellants
were
travelling.
With
respect
to
lodging
expenses,
it
was
established
that
the
trucks
in
question
were
furnished
with
bunks
which
the
appellants
could
and
in
fact
did
use.
Some
of
the
appellants
stated
that
they
might
on
occasion
stay
at
motels
during
their
trips,
at
a
rate
of
about
once
or
perhaps
even
twice
a
week.
I
have
no
difficulty
in
understanding
that
some
of
the
appellants
may
have
used
this
form
of
lodging
on
occasion
during
their
trips.
With
respect
to
these
disbursements
for
lodging
which
occurred
much
more
rarely,
it
does
not
appear
unreasonable
to
me
to
require
stronger
evidence,
normally
by
means
of
receipts
or
other
supporting
documents.
Their
employer
required
such
evidence
for
its
own
purposes.
I
see
a
very
clear
distinction
from
an
evidentiary
point
of
view
between
expenses
for
meals
and
for
lodging.
For
meals,
the
only
significant
factor
of
uncertainty
relates
to
the
precise
amount
of
such
expenses,
because
it
is
clear
that
the
appellants
had
to
eat
each
day
during
their
trips.
For
lodging
expenses,
there
are
two
unknowns;
the
first
deals
with
the
frequency
of
these
occasions—which
should
not
have
exceeded
certain
reasonable
limits—and
the
other
deals
with
the
amounts
expended
on
each
such
occasion.
In
my
view,
the
evidence
in
respect
of
these
lodging
expenses
is
too
fluid
for
me
to
be
able
to
accept
it.
I
therefore
allow
no
deduction
in
respect
of
disbursements
for
lodging.
The
following
table
shows
the
number
of
working
days
in
the
year
indicated
when
each
of
the
appellants
was
on
a
trip,
the
deductions
allowed
by
this
judgment
for
meal
expenses
for
each
appellant
in
the
year
indicated,
and
the
corresponding
deductions
as
established
by
the
respondent's
assessments.
Taxation
year
|
Working
days
|
Deductions
allowed
|
Deductions
established
|
|
by
this
judgment
|
by
the
assessments
|
|
for
meal
expenses
|
for
travelling
expenses
|
Raymond
|
|
Brisson
|
|
1983
|
250
|
$5,500.00
|
$4,147.00
|
Denis
|
|
Coderre
|
|
1980
|
222
|
$4,884.00
|
$4,704.88
|
1981
|
50
|
$1,100.00
|
0
|
Pierre
|
|
Daneau
|
|
1980
|
180
|
$3,960.00
|
$3,222.49
|
1981
|
280
|
$6,160.00
|
$4,641.90
|
1982
|
290
|
$6,380.00
|
$4,909.25
|
1983
|
258
|
$5,676.00
|
$5,489.25
|
Daniel
|
|
Marcoux
|
|
1981
|
180
|
$3,751.00
|
$2,162.25
|
1982
|
270
|
$5,929.00
|
$4,389.16
|
1983
|
240
|
$5,808.00
|
$5,230.72
|
With
respect
to
the
assessment
of
penalties
imposed
on
the
appellants,
I
must
note,
first,
that
it
is
clear
that
the
appellants
were
entitled
to
deduct
certain
amounts
from
their
remuneration
as
travelling
expenses.
It
is
easily
conceivable
that
in
the
appellants’
minds
these
deductions
could
include
all
expenses
occasioned
by
the
fact
that
they
were
travelling,
such
as
highway
tolls,
truck
washing
expenses
not
paid
by
the
employer,
speeding
tickets,
showering
expenses,
and
so
on.
Moreover,
the
amounts
received
in
cash
were
not
so
high
as
to
be
disproportionate,
in
relation
to
the
reasonable
expenses
incurred
by
the
appellants
in
respect
of
their
travel,
that
it
would
have
been
unreasonable
for
them
to
believe
that
these
amounts
were
simply
an
allowance
for
travelling
expenses.
In
fact,
the
amounts
received
by
the
appellants
in
the
years
in
question
were
between
$2,500
and
$10,000,
with
an
average
of
about
$6,000
or
$7,000.
In
addition,
the
total
of
all
the
expenses
occasioned
by
the
trips
in
a
given
year,
for
a
truck
driver
working
full
time
during
the
year,
could
easily
reach
$7,000
to
$8,000.
For
example,
an
employee
who
worked
300
days
per
year,
or
an
average
of
six
days
per
week,
as
was
the
case
for
some
of
the
appellants,
could
easily
incur
expenses
amounting
to
$30
per
day,
which
would
give
a
total
of
$9,000
per
year.
There
is
every
reason
to
believe
that
the
appellants
did
not
know
in
the
years
in
question
that
the
Income
Tax
Act
permitted
them
to
deduct
only
expenses
relating
to
meals
and
lodging,
and
that
the
deduction
of
any
other
expenses
was
prohibited.
It
is
also
easy
to
imagine
that
the
appellants
were
unaware
that
the
amounts
received
had
to
be
included
in
their
income,
and
that
a
deduction
could
then
be
claimed
in
computing
their
income
from
employment.
Having
regard
to
all
the
circumstances,
I
am
of
the
opinion
that
the
respondent
has
not
succeeded
in
showing
that
the
appellants
failed,
with
full
knowledge
or
in
circumstances
which
justified
imputing
a
serious
wrongdoing,
to
include
the
amounts
received
in
cash.
It
must
not
be
forgotten
that
the
system
of
remuneration
in
question
had
been
established
by
their
employer,
the
Société
Saint-Germain
Transport
Ltée,
and
that
the
truck
drivers
could
not
change
anything
about
it.
The
present
situation
is
quite
different
from
the
situation
that
was
considered
by
the
then
Chairman
of
the
Tax
Review
Board,
who
was
to
become
the
first
Chief
Judge
of
this
Court,
in
Giovanni
Marinelli
v.
M.N.R.,
[1982]
C.T.C.
2400;
82
D.T.C.
1378.
In
that
case,
the
issue
was
a
penalty
imposed
for
failure
to
include
in
income
remuneration
received
for
overtime
work.
The
decision,
also
by
Judge
Cardin,
in
Jose
Nieto
v.
M.N.R.,
[1985]
1
C.T.C.
2404;
85
D.T.C.
365,
dealt
with
a
situation
in
which
the
taxpayer
failed
to
include
a
significant
source
of
income.
Here
the
income
concerned
the
same
source
of
income
in
relation
to
which
deductions
were
authorized.
The
facts
in
the
cases
at
bar
are
also
quite
different
from
those
considered
in
Roland
Morin
v.
M.N.R.,
[1988]
2
C.T.C.
2334;
88
D.T.C.
1596.
Before
concluding
my
observations
on
the
appeals
of
the
assessments
in
question
here,
I
would
like
to
make
a
few
comments
on
the
appeals
of
the
appellant
Pierre
Daneau.
During
the
first
day
of
the
resumption
of
the
hearing
of
these
appeals,
the
appellant
Pierre
Daneau,
who
was
not
represented
by
counsel,
as
I
noted
earlier,
indicated
that
he
wished
to
withdraw
the
part
of
his
appeals
dealing
with
the
"
income
tax”
element
of
each
of
the
four
assessments
but
that
he
wanted
to
pursue
his
appeals
with
respect
to
the
assessment
of
penalties.
No
written
judgment
was
given
in
response
to
this
decision
by
the
appellant.
The
next
day,
this
same
appellant
informed
the
Court
that
he
had
changed
his
mind
and
still
wanted
to
pursue
his
appeals
on
the
“income
tax”
portion
of
these
assessments.
I
permitted
him
to
go
back
on
his
decision
and
to
continue
to
contest
the
income
tax
assessments
for
the
four
years
in
question.
In
my
view,
this
was
not
a
judicial
admission
dealing
with
facts
relevant
to
the
case,
contrary
to
what
was
argued
by
one
of
counsel
for
the
respondent,
but
rather
a
decision
on
the
part
of
the
appellant
relating
to
the
advisability
or
otherwise
of
pursuing
a
part
of
a
case.
I
therefore
believe
that
I
have
authority
to
dispose
of
the
appeals
of
the
assessments
of
the
appellant
Pierre
Daneau,
not
only
as
to
the“
penalty”
portion
but
also
as
to
the
income
tax"
portion.
It
remains
for
me
to
dispose
of
the
argument
put
forward
by
the
appellants
involving
sections
8
and
24
of
the
Canadian
Charter
of
Rights
and
Freedoms.
Counsel
for
the
appellants
Marcoux,
Coderre
and
Brisson
contended
that
the
assessments
under
appeal
are
based
on
information
obtained
in
the
course
of
an
unreasonable,
irregular,
unlawful
and
null
search,
as
it
is
described
in
paragraph
11
of
the
appendix
attached
to
the
notice
of
appeal
of
the
appellants
in
question
for
each
of
the
years
in
issue.
The
seizure
carried
out
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
on
December
19,
1985
was
particularly
attacked
on
the
ground,
specifically,
that
the
documents
which
were
the
subject
of
the
seizure
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
had
earlier
that
day
been
returned
to
the
Société
Saint-Germain
Transport
Ltée
following
a
seizure
carried
out
by
the
Royal
Canadian
Mounted
Police
for
an
alleged
offence
under
the
Criminal
Code,
defrauding
the
Employment
and
Immigration
Commission
of
certain
moneys.
That
seizure
was
quashed
by
the
Quebec
Court
of
Appeal
on
the
ground
that
the
justice
of
the
peace
did
not
have
jurisdiction
in
the
matter.
While
there
is
no
doubt
that
the
seizure
carried
out
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
was
not
the
result
of
a
coincidence,
nonetheless
it
does
not
appear
that
any
evidence
tending
to
establish
the
nullity
of
the
seizure
carried
out
by
the
Minister
of
Revenue
was
presented.
In
fact,
an
official
of
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
stated
under
oath
that
the
seizure
by
the
Minister
was
effected
pursuant
to
informations
laid
neither
by
the
Royal
Canadian
Mounted
Police
nor
by
employees
of
the
Employment
and
Immigration
Commission.
I
therefore
do
not
have
to
consider
whether
this
Court
has
jurisdiction
in
the
matter
to
grant
the
appellants
the
remedy
to
which
they
would
be
entitled
in
the
event
that
the
seizure
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
had
been
unlawful.
I
therefore
reject
the
argument
advanced
by
the
appellants.
For
these
reasons,
the
appeals
are
allowed
in
part
and
the
assessments
are
referred
to
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment
on
the
basis
that
I
indicated
earlier.
Appeals
allowed
in
part.