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(the 'TD Bank') granted Fleet an operating line of credit in the amount of $125,000 (the 'line of credit'); (h)            Fleet, Wilfred, the Appellant and other corporations, owned or managed by Wilfred, guaranteed the repayment of the said line of credit; (i)             the Appellant placed a collateral mortgage in favour of the TD Bank on 67 Ethelbert Street to further secure its repayment; (j)             on or about March 17, 1992, the TD Bank demanded payment of its funds from all parties concerned and the TD Bank commenced legal proceedings to collect its debt and enforce its security; (k)            the parties settled the litigation as per terms of the Settlement Agreement dated April 15, 1993; (l)             the Appellant refinanced the mortgage on 67 Ethelbert Street and paid the sum of $99,725.42 to the TD Bank from the mortgage funds to discharge her liability; (m)           the Appellant considered the sum of $99,725.42 referred to in (l) above as a business investment loss and requested to claimed (sic) an ABIL in the amount of $74,319.00 for the 1993 taxation year; (n)            the Appellant received no consideration from Fleet for giving the TD Bank her guarantee and the collateral mortgage on 67 Ethelbert Street to secure repayment of $125,000.00 operating line of credit provided by the TD Bank to Fleet; (o)            the Appellant did not give the TD Bank her guarantee and a collateral mortgage on 67 Ethelbert Street for the purpose of gaining or producing income from a business or property; (p)            the Appellant was not in the business of lending money to third parties. [2]            The evidence is that a company called Lepp Fleet Commodities Inc. was carrying on business and at all relevant times its director, president and sole shareholder was Mr. ... In settling the bank claim, the Appellant paid the sum of some ninety-nine thousand odd dollars to it, considered this sum to be a business investment loss and sought to claim it as an ABIL in her 1993 taxation year. [4]            The Appellant's difficulty with the Minister's disallowance of the ABIL is based on a misconception or misunderstanding of the underlying principles relating to the deductibility of ABILs. ...

Appeal heard on August 25, 1998, at Moncton, New Brunswick, by the Honourable Judge Alain Tardif Reasons for judgment Tardif, J.T.C.C. [1] This is an appeal concerning employment held with Seashore Fisheries Ltd. from August 29, 1994, to May 27, 1995, and from June 19, 1995, to March 30, 1996. [2] The appellant’s employment was excepted from insurable employment under the provisions of the Unemployment Insurance Act (“the Act ”) stating that employment involving persons who are related within the meaning of the Income Tax Act (sections 251 and 252) must be excepted from insurable employment unless the respondent exercises his discretion and concludes that the facts surrounding the performance of the work at issue are such that the non-arm’s-length relationship should not be considered. [3] In the case at bar, the respondent argued that the facts did not satisfy him that the non-arm’s-length relationship should be ignored. [4] At the start of the hearing, the Court clearly explained to counsel for the appellant the limits of this Court’s jurisdiction in reviewing an insurability case under paragraph 3(2)(c) of the Act, which reads as follows: (2) Excepted employment is... ... Whatever the method chosen at that stage, an appellant always has an opportunity to file or provide all the documentary evidence he or she considers relevant. [20] Generally speaking, no decision is made without the person concerned being asked to provide his or her version and the documentary evidence he or she considers useful. [21] In the case at bar, the appellant was represented by counsel and was given just such an opportunity to provide all the explanations she may have considered relevant and appropriate. ...

" [6] Each of the above criteria must be met before the employment can be considered to be insurable employment. ... La Compagnie d'immeubles Allard Ltée [1996] R.J.Q. 1566, the Quebec Court of Appeal considered the nature of a partnership contract. ...

On a motion to have the Notice of Discontinuance set aside, Brulé J. concluded that he had no such jurisdiction, as section 16.2 operated to deem the appeal to be dismissed as of the day of filing the Notice of Discontinuance. [10] In Bogie, Brulé J. referred to the Appellant's "considered decision to terminate the appeal". In the present case the Applicant made no such decision, considered or otherwise. ...

If the first addition to this building is considered to be a residential unit separate from the main house at the time the renovation began, then it would qualify as a “single unit residential complex”, and the work brought about a substantial renovation of it. If it is not considered to be a separate unit at the time the renovation began, then the effect of the work was to create a new “single unit residential complex”. ...

It is considered that subsections 1100(15) to (20) extend the philosophy of subsections 1100(11) to (14) to 'leasing properties'. [13] Therefore, in summary subsection 1100(17) defines 'leasing property' as depreciable property, other than real property, used by the taxpayer principally for the purpose of gaining or producing gross revenue that is rent or leasing revenue. ... Revenue derived from the right of a person or partnership (except the owner) to use or occupy the property, and revenue from services offered that are ancillary to such use or occupation, are considered to be rent. ...

Resolution of the uncertainty is appropriate and necessary to enable the Appellant and the Federal Court of Appeal to know with certainty the basis upon which the appeal should be considered. ... It is, therefore, inappropriate for me to re-argue the Respondent's case. [3] In view of the position taken by counsel for the Respondent, I have considered counsel's request that I clarify my Judgment, notwithstanding the absence of the Notice of Motion which Rule 65 requires, and I have concluded that the formal Judgment correctly expresses my decision in the case, but that I should issue Supplementary Reasons for Judgment to clarify the basis of the decision. ...

They were disallowed on the basis that they were either personal expenses of Réal Bernier, Agence's majority shareholder, or expenses considered to be unreasonable given the income generated by Agence. ... Bernier's income, as shareholder benefits under subsection 15(1) of the Act, the expenses claimed by Agence for the use of the bus and certain expenses paid by Agence that the Minister considered to be Mr. ...

M.N.R. et al, [1986] 1 F.C. 485, Rouleau J. stated at pages 488-489:                 Over the years, the meaning of the word "event" has been judicially considered in various and different circumstances. ... My view does not necessarily win the day for the Appellants, however, because paragraph 344(3)(a) is only the first matter to be considered. [8]            Should I draw any conclusion from the fact that the reasons for the majority in the Federal Court of Appeal and the formal judgment of that Court are silent with respect to the trial before Judge McArthur in this Court? ...

., 178 N.R. 361, Décary J.A. of the Federal Court of Appeal clearly stated that, in applying subparagraph 3(2)(c)(ii) of the Unemployment Insurance Act (now paragraph 5(3)(b) of the Employment Insurance Act), what must be considered is whether the Minister's decision "resulted from the proper exercise of his discretionary authority", and that the appellant must first present "evidence of wilful or arbitrary conduct by the Minister, evidence which is generally not easy to obtain". [7]            In Her Majesty the Queen v. ... [14]          Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, particularly the testimony, the admissions and the documentary evidence, I am satisfied that the appellants have not been able to prove on the balance of evidence that the Minister acted wilfully or arbitrarily or in a manner contrary to law in making his decisions. [15]          The appellants' employment during the periods at issue is therefore excluded from insurable employment under subsection 5(2) of the Employment Insurance Act. [16]          The appeals are dismissed and the Minister's decisions dated May 27, 1999, are confirmed. [17]          The appellants testified honestly and openly at the hearing and demonstrated that they acted in good faith when they applied for employment insurance benefits for 1997 and 1998, given that they had been making the same applications since 1989 and been considered insurable from 1989 to 1996. ...