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As Justice Leonard Mandamin explained in Wloch v Canada (Revenue Agency), 2010 FC 743 at para 21: [21] […] at issue is whether the reviewer considered the appropriate factors in arriving at his decision. ...   [59]            The Respondent argues that adequacy of reasons needs to be considered in the context of, “the day-to-day realities of administrative agencies and the many ways in which the values underlying the principles of procedural fairness can be assured,” (Baker, above, para 44).  ...   [60]            While I accept that the Decision Reviewer is under certain administrative constraints, and Parliament has given the CRA the authority to set out procedures in order to make these decisions in an efficient fashion, he is still obliged to provide reasons that assure the Applicants that he considered their submissions and allows them to decide whether to exercise judicial review (Ragupathy v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FCA 151, [2007] 1 FCR 490).  ...

If it is Crown land, the related issue is whether it can still be considered as reserve land in accordance with the definition of “reserve” in Ontario Regulation 649/93 to the Ontario Tobacco Tax Act, RSO 1990, c T 10. ... Application for judicial review within 30 days [22]            In response to the respondent’s submissions that this application was made well beyond the time limits set out in subsection 18.1(2) of the Federal Courts Act, the applicant argues that the 30 day time limit must be considered in the context of the respondent’s ongoing conduct rather than from a specific point in time. [23]            The applicant appears to advance three arguments regarding the time limit. ... It is also necessary to determine whether the decision-maker is “exercising or purporting to exercise jurisdiction or powers conferred by or under an Act of Parliament or by or under an order made pursuant to a prerogative of the Crown…” which does not include powers conferred under a provincial statute. [33]            The respondent submits that to determine whether the First Nation falls within the definition, the two-step analysis established in Anisman must be considered: it must be determined what jurisdiction or power the body or person seeks to exercise; and then the source or the origin of the jurisdiction or power which the body or person seeks to exercise must be determined (Anisman, above, at para 29). ...

No unreasonable delay [41]            It remains to be determined, however, whether the time it has taken, up to now, to complete the investigations into the applicants’ complaints and issue the reports on the Commissioner’s findings can be considered to be an unreasonable delay. [42]            In Conille v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 F.C. 33, at para. 23 [Conille], the Federal Court established that the following three conditions must be met for a delay to be considered unreasonable: the delay has been longer than the necessary delay normally required by the nature of the process and for conducting the proceedings in question; the applicant and his or her counsel are not responsible for the delay; and the administrative tribunal has not provided satisfactory justification for the delay. [43]            It should be added that, as the Supreme Court stated in Blencoe, at para. 122, the determination of whether a delay has become inordinate depends on, among other things, the nature of the case and its complexity, the facts and issues, the purpose and nature of the proceedings. [44]            It is common ground that the applicants and their legal counsel are not responsible for the delay. [45]            However, based on the analysis of the evidence in the record and considering the provisions of the AIA, I am of the opinion that the applicants have not shown that the delay in processing their complaints exceeds the time required for the Commissioner to conduct an investigation. ... Although this is a contextual factor to consider, I nonetheless note that delays attributable to a government institution’s limited resources or to a growing volume of complaints cannot be considered as an explanation that could justify a delay that would otherwise be unreasonable (Dragan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2003] 4 F.C. 189, at para. 57 [Dragan]). [50]            It is also important to place the longer investigation time in the more specific context of the complaints filed by the applicants. ...

It ultimately found that these two positions at the Agency’s national headquarters – the “National Specialist, Meat Processing Program” and the “Senior Staff Veterinarian” positions – involved responsibilities “for work at a national level,” requiring more extensive knowledge and a broader strategic understanding of national issues and “had a direct impact on operations at the Agency level having functional orientations on the [subject positions], as described in their work descriptions.” [12]      Under the “Evaluation” heading, the Committee strove to demonstrate, by comparing the work description for the Subject Position to the work description for BMP-5, supra, BMP-4 (District Veterinarian) and BMP-8 (Veterinary Drugs Evaluator) positions, that the two factors at issue – Kind of Assignments and Complexity of Work, were correctly evaluated at the VM-03 level. [13]      It should be noted that the Committee did not consider it relevant to contact the two designated management representatives because one of the Committee members, Nicole Bouchard-Steeves, [translation] “had extensive knowledge of the work performed by the complainants and was considered a subject matter expert.” ... I must therefore ask myself, as the applicants have asked me to do, whether the decision rendered by the Committee is affected by the same flaws as those which led the Court to find that the Committee’s decision was procedurally unfair, having considered the 2010 Grievance. ... I note here that an agreement was reached on the work description for the Subject Position pursuant to a work description content grievance raised under the collective agreement binding the applicants and the Agency. [24]      As in Allard, the issue to be resolved here is whether the Committee modified the work description and found, as the Committee that adjudicated the 2010 Grievance, that it should dismiss the grievance before it, or whether it has simply considered the information before it to ensure that it understands the nature of the applicants’ duties. [25]      In Allard, De Montigny J. noted that the management representatives who had been called before the Committee had not simply modulated the applicants’ responsibilities to take into account the context in which the activities in the work description were performed, but had in many respects challenged the very nature of these activities. ...

The Applicant did not report the $15,000 contribution referred to in F above; he considered it could have been reported in respect of either his 2009 or 2010 taxation year tax returns; J.                    ... This case is to be considered on the basis of the reasonableness of the answers given to the following two questions that were before the delegate: 1.                   ...

With regards to Kerry Canada’s argument that the Second CA Request should be considered an implied waiver, the Decision states: Implied Waivers Our review of the facts and circumstances of the case has resulted in our conclusion that CRA has no legal basis on which to reassess the 2002 and 2003 years beyond their respective statute-barred dates as per section 152(4)(c) of the Income Tax Act. [72]   I find that the reasons provided in the Decision were inadequate. ... Therefore, the jurisprudence cited by the Respondent does not assist in supporting the Decision as reasonable. [73]   I have also considered the Rule 317 materials provided to Kerry Canada. ... Nicotera considered whether Kerry Canada had provided an implied waiver for the 2002 and 2003 taxation years. ...

Reasonable grounds to believe require “something more than mere suspicion, but less than the standard applicable in civil matters of proof on the balance of probabilities” and will exist where “there is an objective basis for the belief which is based on compelling and credible information” (Mugesera v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 40 at paras 114-117; see also Hadian at para 17)). [41]   A number of recent decisions of this Court have considered the scope of paragraph 34(1)(d) of the IRPA in the context of individuals who were associated with research institutions that worked on the Iranian government’s nuclear programs (Moghaddam v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1063 (Moghaddam); Hadian, supra). ... I am mindful of the principle set out by the SCC in Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62 (Newfoundland Nurses) that the reasons given by a decision-maker must be read together with the outcome of a case and that a decision must be considered in light of the evidentiary record to determine whether the result falls within the range of possible outcomes. ... Analysis – Threats against the YDM bloggers [48]   As stated above, the ID comprehensively summarized and considered both parties’ submissions in the Decision. ...

The crux of that case lies in the reality that “no school is likely to be considered by all parents to be equal or better than its neighbours in every respect” (École Rose‑des‑vents at paragraph 38). The Supreme Court was therefore required to decide on the factors to be considered in assessing equivalence and, in that context, described the concept of the “reasonable parent”, possibly adapted by Air Canada at the hearing to describe the expectations of the [translation] “average reasonable Francophone” (École Rose‑des‑vents at paragraph 40). In concrete terms, the Supreme Court considered whether all of the circumstances would dissuade “reasonable parents” from enrolling their children in a minority language school. ...

The evidence supporting the finding is presented as being: annual sales in Canada ($105,000 in 2012; $193,000 in 2013; $255,000 in 2014); labels bearing the DO GHAZAL & Design mark were attached to the products sold in Canada; commercial invoices for shipments of tea from the opponent to Canada between July 29, 2012 and June 13, 2014. [12]   Since was discharged the initial burden on the opponent of showing that the DO GHAZAL & Design trade-mark had become known in Canada sufficiently to negate the distinctiveness of the Mark, the Registrar went on to consider whether there would be confusion between the marks, because 164 must then show that the Mark is adapted to distinguish its goods from those of Akbar. [13]   The Registrar assessed confusion, taking into consideration all of the relevant surrounding circumstances, including the factors listed in section 6(5) of the Act: What to be considered Éléments d’appréciation 6(5) In determining whether trademarks or trade names are confusing, the court or the Registrar, as the case may be, shall have regard to all the surrounding circumstances including 6(5) En décidant si des marques de commerce ou des noms commerciaux créent de la confusion, le tribunal ou le registraire, selon le cas, tient compte de toutes les circonstances de l’espèce, y compris : (a) the inherent distinctiveness of the trademarks or trade names and the extent to which they have become known; a) le caractère distinctif inhérent des marques de commerce ou noms commerciaux, et la mesure dans laquelle ils sont devenus connus; (b) the length of time the trademarks or trade names have been in use; b) la période pendant laquelle les marques de commerce ou noms commerciaux ont été en usage; (c) the nature of the goods, services or business; c) le genre de produits, services ou entreprises; (d) the nature of the trade; and d) la nature du commerce; (e) the degree of resemblance between the trademarks or trade names, including in appearance or sound or in the ideas suggested by them. e) le degré de ressemblance entre les marques de commerce ou les noms commerciaux, notamment dans la présentation ou le son, ou dans les idées qu’ils suggèrent. [14]   Starting with the degree of resemblance, the Registrar acknowledges that the two trade-marks are identical in appearance and sound, as well as in the ideas suggested by the marks. ... [My emphasis.] [42]   Justice Noël considered the evidence presented in E. ... All relevant evidence may be considered which tends to establish non-distinctiveness” (pp. 58-59). ...

Lamarche’s pension benefits represent the substantive issue to be considered by the Court in this judicial review. [15]   Concerned that his pension benefits were being improperly calculated, Mr. ... Among the objectives underlying this rule are preventing fragmentation of the administrative process and piecemeal and premature court proceedings, as well as ensuring that the administrative decision-maker’s findings being considered by the reviewing court are suffused with the benefit of expertise, legitimate policy judgments, and valuable regulatory experience (see CB Powell at para 32). [23]   In my view, taking into account the aforementioned principles, the appropriate exercise of my discretion is to decide this application for judicial review on its merits. ... Applying those principles, I have considered the arguments advanced by Mr. ...