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Thus, he argues that the Applicant is relying on overly-general assertions of privilege, which are considered to be insufficient to ground a proper privilege. ... (Bryant, Evidence in Canada at para 15.44) [35]   According to the Respondent, the proper approach is to follow Wang v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2016 FC 493 [Wang], in which Justice Mactavish listed the following factors to be considered in the balancing exercise: 1.   ... The procedure and outcome of such an exercise must always be considered in the context of the litigation at hand. [45]   Thus, having dealt with the question of class privilege, let us now address the essential components of a section 37 application so that the Judicial Review Applications can eventually come to fruition. ...

We have received and considered those submissions. [76]   I accept that the Supreme Court has instructed reviewing courts that they are supposed to supplement the reasons of administrative decision-makers in some circumstances, in effect participating in the reasons-giving process: Delta at para. 23. [77]   But there is a limit to our participation. ... Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2011 SCC 61, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 654: namely that reviewing courts do not have carte blanche to draft reasons for the administrative decision-maker. [78]   Alberta Teachers tells us that it is one thing for reviewing courts to interpret reasons in light of the record and conclude that—despite silence in the reasons on certain matters—the matters must have been considered and dealt with in a certain way. ... This covers off the situation where despite the administrator’s silence in the reasons on certain matters, the context shows that the matters must have been considered and dealt with in a certain way. ...

Gadwa, for his part, appealed Justice Strickland’s finding that he engaged in corrupt elections practices. [12]   In June 2016, the Kehewin Council considered a complaint of malfeasance and neglect of duty or misconduct against Mr. ... However, the Court also considered there was no justification for the noncompliance and there was a need for deterrence, among other factors. ... I have also considered and find them to be reasonable. This amount insures that, to the extent possible, the Applicants are not out of pocket for what they have done to ensure the proper enforcement of the November 10, 2017 Order. [60]   There is no need to assess the amount owing, given my assessment of its reasonableness. ...

The Appellant further argues that any ambiguity in the legislation should be resolved in favour of the Appellant. [18]   While the Respondent acknowledges that Livingston is binding on this Court, the Respondent nonetheless argues that the principles set out by the Federal Court of Appeal in Livingston must be considered in light of the applicable legislation and the relevant facts in this case. ... In my view, to be able to trace a corporation’s liability to its director under section 227.1 and then ultimately to the director’s spouse under section 160 is an extraordinary remedy, and one that should only be applied if expressly permitted by law. [56]   While none of the above authorities specifically considered the interaction between a derivative assessment under section 227.1 followed by a derivative assessment under section 160 of the Act, they speak directly and unequivocally to the timing of a director’s liability under section 227.1 of the Act, and conclude that liability arises at the time that the preconditions in subsection 227.1(2) have been satisfied. [57]   As noted by the parties in their submissions, there are a number of cases in which this Court specifically considered the joint operation of a section 160 assessment (or section 325 of the ETA) with a section 227.1 director’s liability assessment (or section 323 of the ETA): White v Canada (“ White No.1 ”), [39] Filippazzo v R, [40] and Pliskow v R. [41] [58]   In each of those cases, the Court determined that the liability of a director arose or was crystallized at the time that the corporation failed to remit the required source deductions or GST, which happened to coincide with the taxation year in which the properties were transferred by the directors to the non-arm’s length transferees. As a consequence, the section 160 assessments (or the equivalent under the ETA) were upheld as the transferees became jointly and severally liable for the transferor’s liability up to and including the year of transfer. [59]   In White No.1, a case predating the above jurisprudence regarding section 227.1 of the Act, Justice Mogan of this Court found that the appellant’s spouse, who was a director of the corporation at the time when the corporation incurred a significant Part VIII tax liability in 1984, had a “matching liability” [42] in that same year and consequently the appellant transferee was liable under section 160 of the Act in respect of the property transferred from the appellant’s spouse in 1984. [60]   In Filippazzo, the Court considered exactly the same argument as was raised in the case at bar, [43] and found without much explanation that: The time the liability of Carlogero Filippazzo arose [was] on the date of the failure to remit source deductions as required by the Act in 1987 and 1988 and not the date the certificate was registered in the Federal Court. ...

It then sent the Court sealed information that it considered to be protected by the ongoing investigation privilege in order to explain this change in position to the Court. ... In the balancing exercise, the disclosure must be considered in light of the actual circumstances, taking into account, among other things, the conditions that might accompany it: s. 39.1(8)   CEA  . ... Once it has been determined that the issue is central to the proceeding, the importance of the information to that issue must then be considered. ...

To do so, I must look to the words of the statutes, and interpret them with regard to their object, text, the context of the provisions considered together, in addition to potential issues of absurdity, redundancy, or unfairness (Medovarski v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration); Esteban v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 539 at para 8).   ... It is not necessary to reproduce these provisions in full, though I would note the following particular passages, with my emphasis: 10. […] (6) A sponsorship application that is not made in accordance with subsection (1) is considered not to be an application filed in the prescribed manner for the purposes of subsection 63(1) of the Act. […] 12. ... In other words, the “prescribed manner” requirement more clearly set forth in subsection 10(6) of the IRPR is a condition to be considered an applicant under subsection 63(1) of the IRPA, rather than an individual requirement to enjoy a right of appeal under the IRPA, just as being a member of the classes of persons set forth in subsection 63(2) to 63(5) of the IRPA is also insufficient to enjoy a right of appeal. [48]   With this in mind, an appeal to the IAD is subject to a condition precedent, that is, a negative decision rendered by the relevant decision-maker (a visa officer), as is the case for each of subsections 63(1) through 63(5) of the IRPA. [49]   In principle, a right of appeal cannot be said to accrue, arise, vest, or “crystallize” before the decision subject to an appeal has been made.   ...

Notice of Appeal [18]   632’s Notice of Appeal identifies the issues to be decided as: (a)   Can the principal reason for the agreement of the partners of Action LMS LP to share partnership income and losses pro rata, based on the number of units held by each partner, reasonably be considered to be the reduction or postponement of the tax that might otherwise have been or become payable under the Act? ... The Queen, 2016 TCC 171, 2016 DTC 1145 [Paletta], Justice Owen highlighted that observation, reviewed the cases, considered the current iteration of Rule 58 anew in the context of the revisions to Rule 58 and found even if one of the possible outcomes in subsection 58(2) was not met, the Rule could still be used as a question should not automatically fail to meet the requirement in that subsection because one possible answer to the question would not lead to one or more of the desired results. [23] Instead, that aspect should be factored into the Court’s consideration of whether it should exercise its discretion to grant such an Order. ... The Queen, 2018 TCC 29, [2018] GSTC 13, it claimed the Minister considered different transactions than the ones in the original reassessment. ...

The Federal Court should have considered whether Mr. Brake’s pleadings stated a reasonable cause of action. [58]   Wells is based on the particular evidentiary record filed and the specific claims pleaded. ... It passes muster under the requirement in Rule 334.16(1)(a). [60]   The Federal Court considered the damages claims to be premature and did not assess whether they disclose a reasonable cause of action (at para. 58). Elsewhere it held that “decisions respecting the public law remedies sought need to be determined first before the private law claims are considered, for only then will the class of members with private law claims be identifiable” (at para. 68). [61]   This was an error of law. ...

However, the Federal Court of Appeal expressed concern that the trial judge had considered the business expenses on a global basis rather than having had regard to the particular expenses and Mr. ... In making that assessment, the CRA reports consider vacancy rates, market data for comparable rentals where available, and other factors where considered appropriate, such as a cost and income analysis. ... Peach acquired in 2011 and therefore not considered in his prior appeal. ...

The taxpayer’s intention must be considered in the light of all the circumstances. [77]   The respondent argues that the appellant was unable to provide the Court with the identities of the actual shareholders and officers and was therefore unable to meet its burden of proof, which was to demonstrate its intention at the time each lot was acquired. [78]   In support of its allegations, the respondent submits that the evidence submitted by the appellant to establish who its shareholders were was produced after Mariette Tremblay and Ginette Lauzon’s management companies were created in 2009. ... Even if the acquisitions of the lots covered by the memorandum are considered to constitute a single transaction as the appellant argues, the number of sales transactions for the lots remains the same, i.e. six. This does not change the periods during which these lots were held by the appellant because the appellant could not be considered the owner of the lots until the Ville de Mascouche had acquired them from third parties. ...