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Since no notice of appeal was filed within this 180-day-period and no application to extend the time to file a notice of appeal was filed within one year from the end of this 180-day-period, the time to appeal the “determination” could not be extended. [18] The Tax Court Judge then considered the application for a rebate of the GST that was paid. ... F-7 limits the powers of this Court in this appeal to dismissing the appeal, giving the decision that the Tax Court should have given, or referring the matter back to the Tax Court with such directions as are considered appropriate. ... Canada, 2018 FCA 119, confirmed that procedural and jurisdictional provisions applicable to the ETA will apply even if a claim is based on constitutional rights and treaty rights of Indigenous peoples: [4] … In private, personal claims such as this, procedural and jurisdictional provisions apply and must be obeyed even where the constitutional rights and treaty rights of Indigenous peoples are asserted … [28] Therefore, the procedural and jurisdictional provisions applicable to bringing an appeal to the Tax Court under the ETA must be considered and applied. ...

Applicable Legal Principles [37] Rule 84(2) of the Federal Courts Rules provides that a party who has cross-examined the deponent of an affidavit filed in an application may not subsequently file an affidavit in that application, except with the consent of all other parties or with leave of the Court. [38] As applications are summary proceedings that should be determined without undue delay, the discretion of the Court to permit the filing of additional material should be exercised with great circumspection [see Mazhero v Canada (Industrial Relations Board), 2002 FCA 295 at para 5]. [39] The following factors must be considered and weighed by the Court in determining whether to grant leave: (i) the relevance of the proposed evidence; (ii) whether the proposed evidence was available and/or could be anticipated as being relevant prior to the cross-examinations; (iii) absence of prejudice to the opposing party; (iv) whether the proposed evidence assists the Court in making its final determination; and (v) whether the proposed evidence serves the interests of justice [see Janssen-Ortho Inc v Canada (Health), 2009 FC 1179 at para 9; Pfizer Canada Inc v Rhoxalpharma Inc, 2004 FC 1685 at para 16; Havi Global Solutions LLC v IS Container PTE Ltd, 2020 FC 803 at paras 6 and 33, 39-40 [Havi]; NOCO Company, Inc v Guangzhou Unique Electronics Co, Ltd, 2023 FC 208 at para 59]. [40] The factors noted above are not discrete, mandatory requirements. Rather, they are factors that must be considered by the Court and weighed when determining whether to exercise the Court’s discretion to grant leave. ... I find that the inclusion of this evidence is a clear attempt by the Respondents to improperly remedy a deficiency in their evidentiary record. [64] Having considered and weighed the various factors, I am not satisfied that the Respondents have demonstrated that the Court should exercise its discretion to grant them leave to file the Grater Affidavit. ...

[30] [37] Where the activity: (a) appears to be clearly commercial, (b) contains no personal or hobby element, and (c) the evidence is consistent with the view that the activity is conducted for profit, then a source of income exists for the purposes of the Act. [31] However, where the activity could be considered a personal pursuit, then one must ask if the activity is being carried on in a sufficiently commercial manner so as to be a source of income. [32] VI. ... Porisky’s views on taxation might be considered the start-up phase. Once the appellants realized there was significant interest, they marketed the information and created a system by which to earn revenue from it. [41] It is clear that by 2004, Paradigm was a profit-making activity conducted in a manner consistent with objective standards of business-like behaviour. ... Partnership Act states that a partnership is “the relation which subsists between persons carrying on business in common with a view of profit.” [34] In addition, a person’s receipt of a share of the profits of a business is proof in the absence of evidence to the contrary that the person is a partner in the business. [35] [47] In order for there to be a partnership for tax purposes, the provincial definition of “partnership” must be satisfied. [36] The same three ingredients are considered essential across the common law jurisdictions: (a) a business, (b) carried on in common, and (c) with a view to profit. [37] [48] With respect to apportionment, the starting point is that partners hold equal interests, subject to any express or implied agreement. [38] In addition, allocating partnership interest based on business-related criteria (e.g. work performed, capital invested) makes sense where close family members representing one economic unit are involved such as a spouse or children, and tax planning appeared to be a key factor in the allocations. [39] VIII. ...

Both litigants have considered the transfer as valid and binding on the parties. It appears from the above quotations that, in order to be valid and binding, the transfer made in 1925 must necessarily be related and linked to the ante-nuptial contract of March, 1913, whereby was created the obligation and indebtedness of the future husband to his future wife, and the deed of conveyance of the 28th March, 1925, which evidences the payments, satisfaction and discharge of this pre-nuptial obligation cannot be considered apart from the other, as they must, to be valid and legal under the law of Quebec, form but one complete non-severable transaction. ... The expression "‘right accrued” or "‘right acquired” in paragraph (c) of subsection 2 of section 38 of the English Interpretation Act has been considered in several cases, some of which are reviewed in Hosie v. ...

‘“The Honourable the Minister of National Revenue, having duly considered the facts as set forth in the Notice of Appeal and matters thereto relating hereby affirms the said assessment on the ground that while the company was incorporated and commenced operations during the year 1932 there was no actual change in ownership of the assets purchased or taken over from Pioneer Investment Company Limited, by Home Service Company Limited (of which the taxpayer is a subsidiary) and set up in the books of the taxpayer at appreciated values; that in the exercise of the statutory discretion, a reasonable amount has been allowed for depreciation and that the assessment is properly levied under the provisions of the Income War Tax Act.’’ ... Omitting the facts set forth in the notice of appeal and notice of dissatisfaction, which it is useless to repeat, the statement of claim says in substance as follows: the machinery, delivery equipment, furniture and fixtures in question herein were acquired by the appellant as follows: (a) all the machinery, delivery equipment, furniture and fixtures, save the coupés and the truck body, were acquired from Home Service Company Limited for the sum of $162,032.83; the articles so acquired had formerly been the property of Pioneer Laundry & Dry Cleaners Limited, a company other than the appellant, and had been purchased by Home Service Company Limited; (b) the following items were purchased as follows: one Willys-Knight coupé on May 17, 1932, from Consolidated Motors Limited for $815; one truck body on July 14, 1932, from Pioneer Carriage Company Limited for $230.75; one Essex coupé on November 22, 1932, from Consolidated Motors Limited for $286.50: by section 5 of the Income War Tax Act the Minister was empowered to allow such amount or amounts as he should consider reasonable for depreciation in value of such assets of the taxpayer as were used in its business, and the Minister was charged with the duty to allow for depreciation such amount or amounts as were reasonable in view of the diminution in value of such assets during the taxation year; the said section did not confer upon the Minister the right to deprive taxpayers of the right to deduct proper sums of depreciation from their respective incomes; prior to the incorporation of the appellant the Minister, in compliance with said section 5, did regularly allow taxpayers in the form of annual percentage deductions, on certain of their assets used in their business, certain annual allowances for depreciation as follows: on machinery, plant, etc. 10% of the cost; on furniture and fixtures: 10% of the cost; on motor cars and trucks subject to heavy wear; in the first year 25% ef their cost; in the second, third and fourth years 20% of their cost; in the fifth and subsequent years such further depreciation as might be allowed after reconsideration; on horses and wagons- 10% of their cost; on or about July 7, 1933, the appellant filed with the Inspector of Income Tax, a return of its total income earned in the taxation year ending March 31, 1933; in its return the appellant claimed as deductions from its income certain sums totalling $17,775.55, representing depreciation of its machinery, delivery equipment, furniture and fixtures, at rates not exceeding the rates theretofore fixed by the Minister; the amounts so claimed by the appellant and the rates applied by it in respect thereto were as follows: on February 19, 1935, the Commissioner sent to the appellant a notice of assessment in which he improperly disallowed the sum of $17,520.47 of the amounts claimed by the appellant for depreciation, to wit: the sum of $135.25 for depreciation of horses and wagons, the sum of $574.07 for depreciation of furniture and fixtures, the sum of $14,131.15 for depreciation of machinery and the sum of $2,680 of the sum of $2,935.08 for depreciation of delivery trucks, allowing therefor only the sum of $255.08; and the Commissioner improperly asserted that the appellant’s taxable income for said fiscal year amounted to $12,893.30, and improperly assessed the appellant with the sum of $1,611.66 as the tax thereon; the allowance of $255.08 being estimated as follows: Amount of depreciation Rate claimed claimed horses and wagons 10% $ 135 25 delivery trucks- 20% 2,935 08 furniture and fixtures 10% 574 07 machinery 10% 14,131 15 $17,775 55 25% for 10 months on $815 $186 77 25% for 8 months on $230.75 38 46 25% for 5 months on $286.50 29 85 $255 08: on or about March 9, 1935, the appellant appealed from the assessment and on May 30, 1935, the Minister made a decision affirming said assessment on the grounds previously set forth; the appellant admits that it was incorporated and commenced operations during the year 1932 but, save as aforesaid, denies each and every allegation of fact set out in the said decision; it denies in particular: (a) that Pioneer Investment Company Limited disposed of its assets to Home Service Company Limited and that the shareholders of these two companies are the same; (b) that Home Service Company Limited incorporated the assets of Pioneer Laundry & Dry Cleaners Limited into the records of the appellant at appreciated values or any values at all; (c) that the Minister ever considered the facts set forth in the notice of appeal; (d) that there was no actual change in the ownership of the assets herein when they were purchased by the appellant; (e) that the said assets were set up in the books of the appellant at appreciated values; (f) that any reasonable amount has been allowed by the Minister for depreciation; in the alternative, the appellant says that the Minister, having exercised the power conferred upon him by section 5, had no power to take away or reduce the allowances given to the appellant in respect to depreciation after the appellant had claimed said allowances in its return; on or about June 24, 1935, the appellant sent to the Minister a notice of dissatisfaction; on November 28, 1935, the Minister issued his reply to the said notice whereby he again affirmed the said assessment; in so far as the reasons given by the Minister in his reply differ from those given by him in his decision, they are unauthorized by the Act and are invalid; in further reference to the Minister’s reply the appellant admits that section 5 provides that income shall be subject to deduction of such reasonable amount as the Minister in his discretion may allow for depreciation; it admits that the appellant is a legal entity different from any other legal entity as alleged in said reply; save as aforesaid, it denies each and every allegation of fact set forth in said reply and in particular denies that the Minister, in allowing the appellant the sum of $255.08, as depreciation, exercised a discretionary power in a reasonable manner; on the contrary it says that the sum of $255.08 was an allowance for depreciation in respect only of the coupés and truck body; it denies that the discretion exercised by the Minister was exercised solely in the determination of a question of fact and that the Court has no jurisdiction to decide whether the deduction for depreciation allowed by the Minister was or was not reasonable; the Minister, having exercised the power conferred upon him by section 5, did not, after the appellant had in its income tax return claimed the depreciation allowances allowed by the Minister, have the power to take away or reduce the said allowances. The statement of defence contains, among others, the following allegations: the respondent is not charged by section 5, subsection 1(a), with the duty to allow depreciation in any specific manner, but rather is empowered to exercise his discretion in determining what is a reasonable amount to allow in respect of depreciation of the assets of each taxpayer; such statutory provision for depreciation does not confer any right upon the taxpayer to deduct any sum other than that allowed under said section; if there were any customary allowances made in previous years to taxpayers in respect to depreciation of certain types of assets, which is not admitted, such apparent customary practice is the result of the exercise of the Minister’s discretion in respect to taxpayers of similar conditions and circumstances; the respondent admits that the appellant in its return claimed the amounts alleged for depreciation but denies that any rates had previously been fixed in regard to the appellant or to any taxpayer; in disallowing the sum of $17,520.47, the Commissioner, duly authorized delegate of the Minister, properly exercised the discretion conferred by section 5 subsection 1(a); in answer to the allegation that the Minister did not consider the facts of the case, the respondent states that by section 75, subsection 2, the Commissioner may be authorized to exercise such of the powers conferred upon the Minister as the latter may determine and that such authorization was duly given to the Commissioner who, in accordance therewith, considered the facts and levied the assessment appealed from and further affirmed such assessment by the decision of the 30th of May, 1935; the respondent denies that the discretionary power given by section 5, subsection 1(a) was or could have been exercised previous to the assessment of the taxpayer’s return and consequently that any rights in respect to depreciation could accrue to the taxpayer previous to such assessment; the respondent further denies that the appellant could in any event acquire any right to a fixed rate of depreciation by the fact that a certain rate had usually been allowed in previous years to other taxpayers or to the appellant in respect of similar assets, since income for the purposes of the Act means the annual net profit or gain of a particular taxpayer and such annual income is subject to an annual deduction of such amount for depreciation as is determined in accordance with section 5, subsection 1(a); the respondent denies the allegation or implication of the appellant that any customary practice of the respondent in allowing for depreciation at uniform rates as between taxpayers of like conditions and in respect of particular types of assets did constitute an anticipatory exercise of the discretionary power aforesaid in respect to any particular taxpayer before his return had been assessed; the determination of a reasonable allowance for depreciation is a matter left to the discretion of the Minister; such discretion has been properly exercised in regard to the appellant and an allowance of $255.08 was made in respect of the taxation year ending March 31, 1933; such allowance having been made in conformity with the Act, no jurisdiction lies with the Court to decide upon the amount thereof; but, should the Court have such jurisdiction, the amount allowed should be confirmed as reasonable in view of the facts; and the Court should confirm the disallowance of any claim for depreciation upon assets which, for the purpose of the Act, previous to the claim herein, had already fully depreciated. ...

Two distinct periods have to be considered, namely: (1) That from November 1941 to April 30, 1942, when the assessment was imposed in November 1941, upon the new building and the motive power, the land on which the buildings were erected and the motive power house was still registered in the name of the plaintiff, and indeed, the sale was not formally completed until the end of February, 1942, although it is agreed that the defendant had been advised of the foregoing transactions in November and December 1941. ... I have carefully considered the case of Can. Locomotive Co. and C.N.R. v. ... There remains to be considered the business tax which is likewise a personal tax authorized by art. 363 of the Charter and given effect by By-law No. 1642. ...

There are, however, many cases in the United Kingdom, in which the terms, as they appear in the Income Tax Acts of Great Britain, have been considered, that are helpful. ... Sojourning is the temporary, from day to day stay of a transient or visitor, whereas residing implies a regular and usual relationship. 'The cases, as it will be seen, really carry one no further than the dictionary, and, in the main, are but useful illustrations of the circumstances under which a person may be considered as residing or ordinarily resident in a place or country. ... The words ^ordinarily resident” have been considered in a number of cases. ...

The decision of the Minister on the appeal to him was given in the following terms: “The Honourable the Minister of National Revenue having duly considered the facts as set forth in the Notices of Appeal and matters thereto relating hereby affirms the said Assessments on the ground that Section 6(2) of the Act provides that the Minister may disallow any expense which he in his discretion may determine to be in excess of what is reasonable for the business carried on by the taxpayer; that in the exercise of such discretion he has determined that the salaries paid or credited to four employees of the taxpayer were to the extent of $1,050.00 in 1940 and $1,811.50 in 1941 in excess of what is reasonable for the business carried on by the taxpayer and has disallowed as an expense of the taxpayer the said amounts so determined and therefore the Assessments are accordingly affirmed under and by reason of the provisions of the said section 6(2) and other provisions of the Income War Tax Act in that respect made and provided.” ... Davis J. clarified the position when he held that the Commissioner, acting for the Minister, had exercised a discretion upon what he considered to be wrong principles of law and said, at page 8: ‘‘it is the duty of the Court in such circumstances to remit the case, as provided by sec. 65(2) of the Act, for a reconsideration of the subject matter, stripped of the application of these wrong principles. ’ ’ It would, I think, be a reasonable inference from his statements as a whole that Davis J. was of the opinion that, if the Minister on his reconsideration of the matter exercised his discretion on proper legal principles, the quantum of his allowance for depreciation would not concern the Court, but this is a matter of inference of his opinion only, since the question was not before him for judicial decision. ... It is clear that Robson J. considered that the allowance of a merely nominal sum was not the exercise of the discretion contemplated by section o(a) at all. ...

There is, however, evidence of sufficient contentious matters requiring to be settled, and adjustments to be considered, to justify the executors in placing the matter in the hands of counsel for advice and direction as they did. ... That conclusion was founded upon what were considered to be principles laid down in De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited v. ... were considered. In San Paulo (Brazilian) Ry. Co. v. Carter, [1896] A.C. 31, and De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. v. ...

The Agent also considered the Applicant’s argument that he had been off work for 14 consecutive days due to COVID-19 reasons and had not made $1,000 of employment income during that time. [24] In concluding that Mr. ... She ultimately determined that “if TP chose to take medication as precautionary but at the time did not have covid or known exposure, this is a choice and not a loss or reduction of employment hours directly related to pandemic.” [37] I have carefully considered this finding, together with the minimal medical documentation submitted by the Applicant. ... In Mitchell v Canada (Attorney General), 2023 FC 858, my colleague Madam Justice Go considered the case of a woman who had been put on COVID leave because of her underlying health condition. ...