Bond
C.J.S.C.:—For
the
sake
of
precision
I
set
forth
at
length
the
joint
factum
or
case
as
submitted:
‘The
facts
which
give
rise
to
the
question
of
law,
the
question
of
law
involved
and
the
conclusions
of
the
parties
are
as
follows,
that
is
to
say:
"‘1.
On
October
28,
1940,
a
contract
(hereinafter
called
the
‘Construction
Contract’)
was
made
between
the
intervenant,
the
plaintiff
and
American
Locomotive
Co.,
wherein
it
was
agreed,
amongst
other
things,
that
the
plaintiff
:
“
(a)
would
sell,
transfer,
make
over
and
assign
unto
the
intervenant
the
premises
therein
described
forming
part
of
the
premises
of
the
plaintiff
located
at
Longue
Pointe
in
the
City
of
Montreal;
and
"(b)
would
construct
thereon,
for
and
on
behalf
of
the
intervenant
and
as
his
Agent
and
at
his
expense
and
subject
to
the
supervision,
direction
and
control
of
the
intervenant
through
the
Honourable
the
Minister
of
Munitions
and
Supply,
a
new
plant
(hereinafter
sometimes
called
the
‘new
plant’)
to
remain
the
property
of
the
intervenant
and
to
be
capable
of
producing
gun
carriages
and
tanks;
the
whole
as
more
completely
and
exactly
appears
from
the
terms
of
the
said
Construction
Contract,
and
deleted
copy
of
which,
with
the
consent
of
the
parties
hereto,
is
filed
herewith
as
ex.
P-1.
"2.
On
October
23,
1940,
a
contract
(hereinafter
called
the
‘Production
Contract’)
was
made
between
the
intervenant,
the
plaintiff
and
American
Locomotive
Co.,
wherein
it
was
agreed
amongst
other
things,
that
the
plaintiff,
acting
on
behalf
of
the
intervenant
and
as
his
agent
and
with
the
co-operation
and
assistance
of
American
Locomotive
Co.,
shall
administer,
manage
and
operate
the
new
plant
and
shall
produce
therein
for
the
account
of
the
intervenant,
gun
carriages
and
tanks,
at
a
reasonable
fee
per
gun
carriage
and
per
tank,
respectively,
the
whole
aS
more
completely
and
exactly
appears
from
the
terms
of
the
said
Production
Contract,
a
deleted
copy
of
which,
with
the
consent
of
the
parties
hereto,
is
filed
herewith
as
ex.
P-2.
"3.
The
said
new
plant
is,
and
has
always
been
the
property
of
the
intervenant
and
the
defendant
was
so
informed
by
the
Deputy
Minister
of
Munitions
and
Supply
by
his
letter
referred
to
in
para.
18
hereof
and
filed
herewith
as
ex.
P-14.
"‘4.
The
said
new
plant
is
‘administered,
managed
and
operated
by
the
plaintiff,
with
the
co-operation
and
assistance
of
American
Locomotive
Co.,
in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
said
Production
Contract
ex.
P-2.
"5.
On
demand
by
the
plaintiff,
November
7,
1941,
the
land
upon
which
the
new
plant
was
located
and
which
formed
part
of
original
lot
No.
21
of
the
official
plan
and
book
of
reference
of
the
cadastre
of
the
Parish
of
Longue
Pointe
in
the
County
of
Hochelaga
was
properly
subdivided
in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
the
Civil
Code
of
the
Province
of
Quebec
to
form
Lot
No.
2210
of
Original
Lot
No.
21
of
the
official
plan
and
book
of
reference
of
the
cadastre
of
the
Parish
of
Longue
Pointe
in
the
County
of
Hochelaga,
as
appears
by
the
said
plan
filed
as
ex,
P-3.
"6.
On
February
27,
1942,
the
plaintiff
by
deed
of
sale
in
authentic
form,
confirmed
the
sale
to
the
intervenant
of
the
said
land
known
as
Lot
No.
21-2210
of
the
official
plan
and
book
of
reference
of
the
Parish
of
Longue
Pointe
in
the
County
of
Hochelaga,
the
whole
as
more
completely
and
exactly
appears
from
the
terms
of
the
said
deed
of
sale
made
between
the
plaintiff
and
the
intervenant
on
February
27,
1942,
before
Mtre.
Joseph
C.
B.
Walsh
under
No.
13263
of
his
minutes,
a
duly
certified
copy
of
which,
in
notarial
form,
is
filed
herewith
as
ex.
P-4.
"17.
On
February
28,
1942,
the
said
deed
of
sale,
a
duly
certified
copy
whereof
in
notarial
form
is
filed
herewith
as
ex.
P-4,
was
duly
registered
under
No.
518606
of
the
Registration
Division
of
Montreal.
"
"
8.
On
the
valuation
roll
for
the
year
beginning
on
the
1st
of
May
1941,
the
plaintiff
was
entered
as
proprietor
of
civic
No.
5781
Notre
Dame
St.
East
and
5790-5910
Notre
Dame
East
for
cadastral
No.
P-21
and
P-27
and
the
valuation
roll
was
as
follows:
land
$368,400,
building
$775,600,
rails
$6,000,
motive
power
$50,000
and
as
a
neutral
for
school
tax,
at
values
as
follows:
land
and
building
$1,144,000,
rails
$6,000,
motive
power
$50,000,
as
appears
by
a
copy
of
the
valuation
roll
filed
as
ex.
P-5,
and
by
the
plan
filed
as
ex.
P-16.
"9.
On
the
real
estate
assessment
roll
for
the
municipal
fiscal
year
beginning
on
May
1,
1941,
the
plaintiff
was
billed
to
the
amount
of
$35,858.59
according
to
the
valuations
mentioned
in
the
preceding
paragraph
as
increased
in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
s.
34
of
c.
73
of
the
Statutes
of
Quebec,
1941,
the
whole
as
appears
by
the
bill
filed
as
ex.
P-7,
and
the
details
filed
as
ex.
P-6.
"‘10.
On
September
30,
1941,
the
bill
mentioned
in
the
preceding
paragraph
was
paid
by
the
plaintiff.
(‘11.
On
or
about
February
19,
1941,
a
permit
was
issued
by
the
defendant
upon
the
application
of
Sutherland
Construction
Co.
for
work
to
be
done
in
connection
with
the
new
plant,
as
appears
by
a
copy
of
such
permit
filed
herewith
as
ex.
P-9.
^12.
On
or
about
May
5,
1941,
a
permit
was
issued
by
the
defendant
upon
the
application
of
L.
G.
0
‘Gilvie
&
Co.
Ltd.
for
work
to
be
done
in
connection
with
the
new
plant,
as
appears
by
a
copy
of
such
permit
filed
herewith
as
ex.
P-10.
"‘13.
On
November
10,
1941,
the
assessors
gave
notice
to
the
chief
assessor
that
they
had
assessed
the
new
building
and
the
motive
power
in
the
name
of
the
plaintiff
on
Notre
Dame
St.,
No.
5781
on
Cadastral
No.
P-21,
at
$1,264,200
for
the
new
building
and
$138,600
for
the
motive
power,
as
appears
by
a
copy
of
the
said
notice,
ex.
P-11.
(14.
The
Chief
Assessor
referred
the
said
valuation
to
the
Board
of
Revision
of
Valuations
according
to
art.
375a
of
the
charter
of
the
defendant.
(‘15.
On
November
20,
1941,
the
secretary
of
the
Board
of
Revision
of
Valuations
advised
the
plaintiff
of
the
said
valuation,
and
to
appear
within
a
delay
of
fifteen
days,
before
the
said
Board,
as
appears
by
a
copy
of
the
said
notice,
ex.
P-12.
"16.
On
November
28,
1941,
Mr.
John
E.
L.
Duquet
of
counsel
for
the
plaintiff,
attended
before
the
chairman
and
one
of
the
members
of
the
Board
of
Revision
of
Valuations
and
protested
against
the
valuation
of
the
new
building
and
the
motive
power
in
the
name
of
the
plaintiff,
either
as
owner,
occupant
or
otherwise,
informing
the
said
chairman
and
member
of
the
said
Board
of
the
situation
with
respect
to
the
new
building
and
motive
power
under
the
provisions
of
the
Construction
Contract
P-1,
and
the
Production
Contract,
P-2,
whereupon
the
chairman
and
the
said
member
of
the
said
Board
informed
Mr.
Duquet
that
the
jurisdiction
of
the
Board
of
Revision
of
Valuations
extended
only
to
the
fixing
of
the
amount
of
the
valuations,
that,
if
the
amount
of
the
valuation
of
the
new
building
and
motive
power
were
not
contested,
they
would
be
fixed
at
the
amount
set
forth
in
the
notice
by
the
assessors
to
the
chief
assessor,
ex.
P-11,
and
that
any
contestation
of
the
right
of
the
defendant
to
tax
the
plaintiff
with
respect
to
the
new
building
and
motive
power
would
have
to
be
discussed
with
the
chief
assessor.
<4
17.
On
November
26.
1941.
a
letter
was
sent
to
the
Board
of
Revision
of
Valuations
on
behalf
of
the
plaintiff
by
M.
Kearney,
Duquet
&
MacKay,
Attorneys,
informing
the
Board
that
the
new
plant
and
motive
power
were
the
property
of
the
intervenant
and
were
operated
by
the
plaintiff
for
and
on
behalf
of
the
intervenant
as
manager
under
the
said
Production
Contract
P-2,
the
whole
as
more
completely
and
exactly
appears
by
the
terms
of
the
said
letter,
a
copy
of
which
is
filed
herewith
as
ex.
P-13.
^18.
On
December
1,
1941,
the
Deputy
Minister
of
Munitions
and
Supply
acting
for
and
on
behalf
of
the
intervenant
advised
the
secretary
of
the
Board
of
Revision
of
Valuations
of
the
terms
under
which
the
new
plant
was
constructed
and
operated,
drawing
to
the
attention
of
the
Secretary
that
the
new
plant
was
the
property
of
the
intervenant,
that
the
plaintiff
had
no
rights
therein
either
as
owner,
lessee,
occupant
or
otherwise
and
that
the
plaintiff
was
operating
the
new
plant
for
the
account
of
the
intervenant,
the
whole
as
more
completely
and
exactly
appears
by
the
terms
of
the
said
letter
addressed
by
the
Deputy
Minister
of
Munitions
and
Supply
to
Albert
Perusse,
secretary
of
the
Board
of
Revision
of
Valuations,
dated
December
1,
1941,
a
copy
of
which
is
filed
herewith
as
ex.
P-14.
"19.
On
December
3,
1941,
the
secretary
of
the
Board
of
Revision
of
Valuations
acknowledged
receipt
of
the
letter
of
M.
Kearney,
Duquet
&
MacKay
dated
November
26,
1941,
as
appears
by
a
copy
of
the
letter
of
acknowledgement
filed
as
ex.
P-15.
"‘20.
On
December
4,
1941,
the
secretary
of
the
Board
of
Revision
of
Valuations
acknowledged
receipt
of
the
letter
of
the
Deputy
Minister
of
Munitions
and
Supply
dated
December
1,
1941,
as
appears
by
a
copy
of
the
letter
of
acknowledgement
filed
as
ex.
P-16.
"
"
21.
On
December
4,
1941,
the
secretary
of
the
Board
of
Revision
of
Valuations
referred
to
the
chief
assessor
the
letters
received
from
M.
Kearney,
Duquet
&
MacKay
and
from
Mr.
Pettigrew,
Deputy
Minister
of
Munitions
and
Supply,
filed
herewith
as
exs.
P-13
and
P-14
respectively,
as
appears
by
the
letter
addressed
by
Albert
Perusse,
secretary
of
the
Board
of
Revision
of
Valuations
to
A.
E.
Hulse,
chief
assessor,
dated
December
4,
1941,
a
copy
of
which
is
filed
herewith
as
ex.
P-17.
"‘22.
On
December
4,
1941,
the
chief
assessor
replied
to
the
letter
of
M.
Kearney,
Duquet
&
MacKay
filed
herewith
as
ex.
P-13,
as
appears
by
the
said
reply,
a
copy
of
which
is
filed
as
ex.
P-18,
the
defendant,
however,
admitting
that
the
said
reply
filed
as
ex.
P-18,
does
not
make
proof
of
the
facts
therein
alleged
with
respect
to
the
explanations
given
to
the
chief
assessor
by
Mr.
Duquet
in
view
of
the
contention
of
the
plaintiff
that
the
explanations
given
to
the
chief
assessor
by
Mr.
Duquet
were
misunderstood
or
misinterpreted
by
the
chief
assessor,
and
that
such
explanations
confirmed
the
facts
set
forth
in
this
joint
factum
or
case.
"‘23.
On
December
8,
1941,
the
Deputy
Minister
acknowledged
receipt
of
the
letter
of
the
secretary
of
the
Board
of
Revision
of
Valuations
dated
December
4,
1941,
as
appears
by
the
letter
of
acknowledgement,
a
copy
of
which
is
filed
as
ex,
P-19.
(24.
On
December
9,
1941,
M.
Kearney,
Duquet
&
Mackay
sent
a
letter
to
the
Board
of
Revision.
declaring
that
the
plaintiff
does
not
contest
the
valuation,
but
contests
the
right
to
assess
the
said
company,
as
more
completely
and
exactly
appears
by
the
terms
of
the
said
letter,
a
copy
of
which
is
filed
herewith
as
ex.
P-20.
4<
25.
On
December
9,
1941
M.
Kearney,
Duquet
&
MacKay
sent
a
letter
to
the
chief
assessor
contesting
the
right
to
assess
the
plaintiff
as
more
completely
and
exactly
appears
by
the
terms
of
the
said
letter,
a
copy
of
which
is
filed
herewith
as
ex.
P-21.
"‘26.
On
December
11,
1941,
the
chief
assessor
sent
a
letter
to
M.
Kearney,
Duquet
&
MacKay
giving
his
reasons
for
assessing
the
plaintiff
as
appears
by
his
letter
filed
as
ex.
P-22.
(27.
On
December
12,
1941,
the
Board
of
Revision
of
Valuations
issued
a
certificate
for
the
fiscal
year
1941-1942
fixing
the
valuation
of
the
new
building
at
$1,264,200
and
motive
power
$13,600,
and
indicating
that
the
new
building
and
motive
power
were
ready
to
be
occupied
on
November
1,
1941,
as
appears
by
the
certificate
filed
as
ex.
P-23.
"‘28.
On
December
12,
1941,
the
secretary
of
the
Board
of
Revision
of
Valuations
advised
Mr.
Pettigrew,
Deputy
Minister
of
Munitions
and
Supply,
of
the
decision
of
the
said
Board,
as
more
completely
and
exactly
appears
by
a
copy
of
a
letter
filed
as
ex.
P-24.
"‘29.
On
December
12,
1941,
the
secretary
of
the
Board
of
Revision
of
Valuations
advised
M.
Kearney,
Duquet
&
MacKay
of
the
decision
of
the
said
Board,
as
more
completely
and
exactly
appears
by
copy
of
letter
filed
as
ex.
P-25.
"30.
On
December
18,
1941,
the
chief
assessor
advised
in
writing
the
Director
of
Finance
that
the
new
building
and
motive
power
of
the
plaintiff
on
lot
cadastral
P-21
have
been
assessed
as
follows:
Building
$1,264,200,
motive
power
$13,600,
as
appears
by
the
certificate
of
the
Board
of
Revision
of
Valuations
No.
364,
ex.
P-26,
and
the
original
roll
was
amended
as
appears
by
copy
of
the
said
roll
filed
as
ex.
P-27.
"‘31.
The
new
building
and
motive
power
were
added
by
the
Director
of
Finance
on
his
real
estate
assessment
roll
in
the
name
of
the
plaintiff
according
to
the
certificate
of
the
chief
assessor
for
181
days,
from
November
1,
1941,
to
April
30,
1942,
at
$18,934.78,
as
appears
by
the
bill
produced
as
ex.
P-28,
and
the
details
filed
as
ex.
P-8.
"
"
32.
On
April
10,
1942,
the
chief
assessor,
issued
a
certificate
No.
692
to
the
Director
of
Finance
for
the
business
tax
at
No.
0781
Notre
Dame
St.
East
with
respect
to
the
new
building
and
motive
power
from
November
1,
1941,
to
April
30,
1942,
as
appears
by
the
certificate
of
the
chief
assessor
filed
as
ex.
P-29.
^33.
The
Director
of
Finance
entered
on
his
tax
roll
for
business
tax
with
respect
to
the
new
building
and
motive
power,
the
name
of
the
plaintiff
from
November
1,
1941
to
April
30,
1942,
according
to
the
certificate
of
the
chief
assessor
for
the
amount
of
$3,425.22
as
appears
by
the
bill
filed
as
ex.
P-30.
"
'34.
On
the
valuation
roll
for
the
fiscal
year
beginning
May
1,
1942,
the
plaintiff
was
entered
as
occupant
of
the
building,
motive
power
and
land,
being
lot
cadastral
No.
21,
subdivision
No.
2210,
owned
by
the
intervenant
and
the
said
property
was
valued
as
follows:
land
$99,100,
building
$1,264,200,
motive
power
$13,600,
and
for
school
purpose
as
neutral
at
$1,376,900,
as
appears
by
the
copy
of
the
roll
filed
as
ex.
P-31,
and
by
the
plan
filed
as
ex.
P-32.
"35.
On
the
real
estate
assessment
roll
the
plaintiff
was
billed
at
the
sum
of
$41,141.77
as
occupant
of
the
new
building,
motive
power
and
land,
being
lot
cadastral
No.
21,
subdivision
No.
2210,
as
appears
by
copy
of
the
said
roll
filed
as
ex.
P-33.
"36.
On
the
business
tax
roll
the
plaintiff
was
billed
at
the
sum
of
$6,850.44
with
respect
to
the
new
building,
motive
power
and
land,
being
lot
cadastral
No.
21,
subdivision
No.
2210,
for
the
year
1942-1943,
as
appears
by
copy
of
the
said
bill
filed
as
ex.
P-34.
"37.
The
defendant
is
claiming
from
the
plaintiff
the
following
taxes:
"(a)
Property
taxes
on
the
new
building
and
"‘(d)
Business
tax
on
the
same
property
as
herein
|
motive
power
from
1st
of
November
1941
|
|
|
to
April
80th
1942
|
$18,934.78
|
|
"(b)
Business
tax
on
the
same
property
as
herein
|
|
|
before
mentioned
in
subparagraph
(a)
here
|
|
|
of,
for
the
same
period
|
3,425.22
|
|
"(c)
Property
tax
on
the
land,
building
and
|
|
|
motive
power
on
lot
21,
subdivision
2210,
as
|
|
|
occupant
of
the
property
of
the
intervenant
|
|
|
for
the
municipal
fiscal
year
commencing
|
|
|
May
1st
1942
|
41,141.77
|
|
before
mentioned
in
subparagraph
(c)
here
|
|
|
of
for
the
same
year
|
6,850.44
|
with
interest
at
the
rate
of
5%
from
the
date
when
those
taxes
were
due.
"‘37A.
The
foregoing
paragraphs
are
not
intended
to
be
interpretative
of
exs.
P-1
to
P-34
both
inclusive
which
speak
for
themselves
and
must
be
interpreted
according
to
their
own
terms.
"‘38.
The
defendant
contends:
"‘(a)
That
for
the
period
from
November
1,
1941
to
April
30,
1942,
the
new
building
and
the
said
motive
power
were
built
on
the
property
of
the
plaintiff,
Lot
P-21,
that
the
same
were
occupied
by
the
plaintiff
for
commercial
and
industrial
purposes,
and
are
therefore
subject
to
municipal
taxation
in
the
hands
of
the
plaintiff
by
the
defendant
in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
the
charter
of
the
defendant,
and
that
the
plaintiff
doing
business
at
the
said
new
plant
is
also
subject
to
the
business
tax
for
the
same
period
in
accordance
with
By-law
1642.
"‘(b)
That
for
the
municipal
fiscal
year
beginning
May
1,
1942,
the
said
new
building,
the
said
motive
power
and
the
said
land
known
as
Lot
No.
21-2210,
are
the
property
of
the
intervenant,
but
that
the
same
are
occupied
by
the
plaintiff
for
commercial
and
industrial
purposes
and
are
therefore
subject
to
municipal
taxation
in
the
hands
of
the
plaintiff
by
the
defendant,
in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
the
charter
of
the
defendant
and
more
particularly
s.
362a
thereof
and
the
taxing
by-laws
of
the
defendant
passed
in
accordance
therewith,
being
By-law
No.
1704
of
the
defendant,
and
that
the
plaintiff
doing
business
at
the
new
plant
is
also
subject
to
the
business
tax
for
the
same
period
in
accordance
with
By-law
No.
1642;
and
subsidiarily
:
"
(i)
That
the
plaintiff
should
pay
to
the
defendant
the
muni-
cipal
taxes
on
immoveable
property
claimed
by
the
defendant
as
hereinbefore
set
out
with
respect
to
the
said
new
building
and
the
said
motive
power
for
the
period
from
November
1,
1941,
up
to
April
30,
1942;
and
the
business
taxes
on
the
said
place
of
business
for
the
same
period
;
"‘(ii)
That
the
plaintiff
should
pay
to
the
defendant
the
municipal
taxes
on
immoveable
property
claimed
by
the
defendant
as
hereinbefore
set
out
with
respect
to
the
said
new
building,
the
said
motive
power
and
the
said
land
known
as
Lot
No.
21-2210
for
the
period
from
May
1,
1942
to
April
30,
1943,
and
the
business
taxes
on
the
said
place
of
business
for
the
same
period
and
thereafter
so
long
as
the
plaintiff
is
found
to
occupy
the
said
new
building,
motive
power
and
land
for
commercial
or
industrial
purposes.
(39.
The
plaintiff
and
the
intervenant
deny
the
contentions
of
the
defendant
and
contend:
«(a)
That
for
the
period
from
November
1,
1941,
to
April
30,
1942,
the
new
building
and
the
said
motive
power
were
the
property
of
the
intervenant
and
were
not
occupied
by
the
plaintiff
for
commercial
or
industrial
purposes
or
otherwise
and
are
therefore
not
subject
to
municipal
taxation
in
the
hands
of
the
plaintiff,
either
as
owner,
occupant
or
otherwise
and
that
the
plaintiff
was
not
doing
business
at
the
said
new
plant
and
is
not
subject
to
the
business
tax
for
the
same
period.
«(b)
That
for
the
municipal
fiscal
year
beginning
May
1,
1942,
the
said
new
building,
the
said
motive
power
and
the
said
land
known
as
Lot
No.
21-2210
are
the
property
of
the
intervenant
and
that
the
same
are
not
occupied
by
the
plaintiff
for
commercial
or
industrial
purposes
or
otherwise
and
are
therefore
not
subject
to
municipal
taxation
in
the
hands
of
the
plaintiff
by
the
defendant,
either
as
owner,
occupant
or
otherwise,
and
that
the
plaintiff
does
not
do
business
at
the
new
plant
and
is
not
subject
to
the
business
tax
for
the
same
period;
and
subsidiarily
:
«
(1)
That
the
plaintiff
is
not
bound
to
pay
to
the
defendant
the
municipal
taxes
on
immoveable
property
claimed
by
the
defendant
as
hereinbefore
set
out
in
para.
38
hereof
with
respect
to
the
said
new
plant
and
the
said
motive
power
for
the
period
from
November
1,
1941,
up
to
April
30,
1942,
nor
the
business
tax
on
the
said
place
of
business
for
the
same
period;
"
(ii)
That
the
plaintiff
is
not
bound
to
pay
to
the
defendant
the
municipal
taxes
on
immoveable
property
claimed
by
the
defendant
as
hereinbefore
set
out
in
para.
38
hereof
with
respect
to
the
said
new
plant,
the
said
motive
power
and
the
said
land
known
as
Lot
No.
21-2210
for
the
period
from
May
1,
1942
to
April
30,
1943,
nor
the
business
taxes
on
the
said
place
of
business
for
the
same
period
nor
for
any
period
thereafter.
<f
40.
The
question
of
law
to
be
decided
by
this
Honourable
Court
upon
the
facts
as
hereinbefore
set
out
is
whether
the
contention
of
the
plaintiff
as
hereinbefore
stated
in
para.
39
hereof
or
the
contention
of
the
defendant
as
hereinbefore
stated
in
para.
38
hereof
is
well
founded
in
law
in
whole
or
in
part.
<4
41.
The
intervenant
is
interested
herein
and
has
become
a
party
to
these
proceedings
to
hear
judgment
rendered
and
any
recommendations
which
may
be
made
by
this
Honourable
Court.
"
42.
The
documents
submitted
herewith
as
exs.
P-1
and
P-2
are
confidential
by
order
of
the
intervenant.
"WHEREFORE
the
parties
hereto
conclude
and
ask
that
judgment
be
rendered
upon
the
foregoing
submission,
and,
in
the
event
of
a
finding
in
whole
or
in
part
in
favour
of
the
plaintiff,
that
order
be
given
to
the
defendant
to
amend
its
valuation
and
assessment
roll
and
its
tax
roll
in
such
manner
as
may
be
appropriate,
and
in
the
event
of
a
finding
in
favour
of
the
defendant
that
judgment
be
rendered
condemning
the
plaintiff
to
pay
to
the
defendant
such
of
the
taxes
hereinbefore
mentioned
as
this
Honourable
Court
may
determine
to
be
due
by
the
plaintiff
to
the
defendant
with
interest
on
each
item
at
5%
from
the
time
when
such
taxes
respectively
became
due,
and
that
order
be
given
to
the
appropriate
official
of
this
Honourable
Court
to
return
ex.
P-1
and
ex.
P-2
to
the
plaintiff
without
giving
access
thereto
to
any
party
other
than
the
parties
to
this
submission,
the
whole
upon
such
terms
and
conditions
as
to
costs
as
this
Honourable
Court
may
see
fit
to
determine.”
From
the
above
submission
it
will
be
seen
that
(more
briefly
resumed)
in
October,
1940,
the
plaintiff
company,
a
duly
organized
and
continuing
company,
agreed
to
sell
to
the
intervenant
a
certain
block
of
land
in
the
City
of
Montreal
for
an
agreed
nominal
consideration,
and
the
plaintiff
further
undertook,
with
the
co-operation
and
assistance
of
the
intervenant
to
design,
construct
and
equip
thereon
a
new
plant
suitable
for
the
production
of
certain
war
material.
The
plaintiff
was
authorized
to
incur
and
pay
on
behalf
of
the
intervenant,
and
as
its
agent,
all
costs
necessary
or
incidental
to
the
performance
of
the
agreement
subject
to
such
control
of
the
Minister
of
Munitions
and
Supply
of
Canada
‘‘as
he
may
desire
to
exercise
with
respect
thereto
‘
The
intervenant
agreed
to
pay
to
the
plaintiff
all
proper
and
reasonable
costs
and
expenses
incurred
by
the
company
plaintiff
including
"‘such
administrative
and
general
overhead
expenses,
as
in
the
opinion
of
the
Minister,
might
be
properly
apportionable
to
the
performance
of
this
agreement’’—which
would
seem
to
indicate
that
this
was
not
the
exclusive
occupation
of
the
plaintiff
company.
The
intervenant
acknowledged
and
agreed
that
the
plaintiff
company
was
acting
on
behalf
of
the
Government
and
as
its
agent,
and
it
was
stipulated
that
the
title
to
the
new
plant
and
equipment,
as
well
as
material
on
hand,
should
be
vested
in
the
Government
which
has
assumed
all
risks
and
liabilities
incidental
to
such
ownership.
Provision
was
also
made
in
the
agreement
for
the
terms
upon
which
the
plaintiff
company
might
re-acquire
the
land
in
question,
for
the
same
consideration,
and
also
the
new
plant
and
equipment
in
preference
to
anyone
else.
The
Government
undertook
to
pay
to
the
plaintiff
(in
addition
to
the
costs
provided
for)
a
fee
per
each
item
produced,
or
in
other
words,
the
remuneration
provided
for
by
the
Government
to
the
company
plaintiff,
was
on
a
basis
of
costs,
and
in
addition
thereto
an
agreed
fee
per
item
on
production
and
satisfactory
inspection.
On
November
7,
1941,
the
land
so
to
be
conveyed
under
the
agreement
for
sale
was
surveyed
and
entered
upon
the
cadastral
plan
under
a
new
and
distinct
number
or
subdivision
number.
It
was
not
until
February
27,
1942,
that
a
formal
deed
of
sale
to
the
intervenant
was
executed
and
registered
on
the
following
day.
The
real
estate
taxes
for
the
year
beginning
on
May
1,
1940,
and
ending
on
April
30,
1941,
have
been
paid,
and
no
dispute
arises
under
that
head.
On
the
Real
Estate
Assessment
Roll
of
the
City
of
Montreal
of
May
1,
1941,
for
the
ensuing
civic
year,
the
plaintiff
is
entered
as
proprietor
of
civic
No.
5781
Notre
Dame
St.
East
and
5790-5910
Notre
Dame
St.
East
for
Cadastral
No.
P-21
and
P-27.
The
cadastral
number
given
to
the
land
upon
which
the
new
plant
was
located
and
which
formed
part
of
the
original
Lot
No.
21
formed
Lot
Subdivision
No.
2210
of
original
Lot
No.
21
(ex.
P-3).
The
plaintiff
was
billed
in
accordance
with
the
valuations
set
out
in
the
joint
case,
and
the
amount
thereof
was
paid
by
the
plaintiff
on
September
30,
1941
(joint
case,
paras.
8
and
10).
On
February
19,
1941,
and
May
5,
1941,
permits
were
issued
by
the
defendant
for
the
work
in
connection
with
the
new
plant
which
appears
to
have
proceeded
apace,
and
on
November
10,
1941,
the
assessors
reported
that
they
had
assessed
the
new
building
and
the
motive
power
in
the
name
of
the
plaintiff
(joint
case,
para.
13).
It
will
be
remembered
that
the
land
in
question
at
that
time
was
still
registered
in
the
name
of
the
plaintiff
company.
On
the
valuation
roll
for
the
civic
year
beginning
May
1,
1942,
the
plaintiff
was
entered
as
‘‘occupant’’
of
the
new
building,
motive
power
and
land
(Subdivision
No.
2210
of
Lot
Cadastral
No.
21,
case
para.
34),
and
charged
accordingly,
that
is,
as
occupant
thereof
(joint
case,
para.
35),
and
in
addition
thereto
the
plaintiff
company
was
also
charged
the
business
tax
with
respect
to
the
foregoing
properties.
It
should
be
observed
that
the
valuation
placed
upon
these
properties
is
not
contested
but
what
is
contested
is
the
right
to
assess
in
respect
thereto,
and
that
is
now
the
subject
of
the
present
controversy.
Two
distinct
periods
have
to
be
considered,
namely:
(1)
That
from
November
1941
to
April
30,
1942,
when
the
assessment
was
imposed
in
November
1941,
upon
the
new
building
and
the
motive
power,
the
land
on
which
the
buildings
were
erected
and
the
motive
power
house
was
still
registered
in
the
name
of
the
plaintiff,
and
indeed,
the
sale
was
not
formally
completed
until
the
end
of
February,
1942,
although
it
is
agreed
that
the
defendant
had
been
advised
of
the
foregoing
transactions
in
November
and
December
1941.
It
is
true
that
the
registered
owner
is
the
reputed
owner,
but
the
maxim
aedificium
solo
cedit
is
not
always
applicable,
for
there
may
be
ownership
of
buildings
as
distinguished
from
ownership
of
the
land
on
which
the
buildings
are
constructed
(2
Mignault,
pp.
493
and
494;
Lacombe
v.
Brunet
(1905),
14
Que.
K.B.
465).
Whatever
right
the
defendant
may
have
had,
or
may
still
have,
to
assess
the
plaintiff
as
occupant”
(which
I
shall
consider
under
the
second
period),
I
do
not
consider
that
in
view
of
the
full
disclosure
made
it
was
open
to
the
defendant
to
assess
the
plaintiff
as
‘‘owner’’
of
these
buildings
and
motive
power
for
the
period
presently
under
review,
thus
creating
a
real
charge
upon
the
property.
(2)
The
second
period
is
that
beginning
on
May
1,
1942,
when
the
plaintiff
was
assesed
in
respect
to
its
occupation
of
these
buildings
along
with
the
motive
power
under
art.
362a
of
the
Charter.
The
word
‘‘occupant’’
as
used
in
the
Charter
of
the
City
of
Montreal
is
defined
in
s.
1
(h)
as
follows:
""The
word
"occupant’
shall
mean
any
person
who
occupies
an
immovable
in
his
own
name,
otherwise
than
as
proprietor,
usufrac-
tuary
or
institute,
and
who
enjoys
the
revenues
derived
from
such
immovable”.
It
is
true
that
by
the
contracts
the
plaintiff
is
designated
as
the
‘‘agent’’
of
the
intervenant,
but
it
is
almost
trite
to
say
that
it
is
not
the
name
given
to
a
contract
by
the
parties
thereto
which
necessarily
defines
its
true
character.
That
has
to
be
ascertained
otherwise.
(Montreal
L.,
H.
&
P.
Co.
v.
Quinlan,
[1929],
3
D.L.R.
568,
S.C.R.
385).
In
the
present
instance,
the
situation,
created
by
contract
between
the
defendant
and
intervenant,
in
no
way
resembles
that
which
arose
in
the
case
of
Halifax
v.
Halifax
Harbour
Com’rs,
[1935],
1
D.L.R.
657,
S.C.R.
215,
nor
in
the
ease
of
Recorder^
Court
v.
Can.
Broadcasting
Corp.,
[1941]
2
D.L.R.
551,
70
Que.
K.B.
65.
In
both
of
those
eases,
the
corporations
were
expressly
incorporated
for
the
purpose
of
exercising
certain
powers
as
an
instrumentality
of
government.
They
were
said
to
be
‘‘emanations
of
the
Crown’’,
and
by
virtue
of
the
very
statutes
creating
them
they
were
constituted
agents
of
the
Crown
and
invested
with
peculiar
powers
and
attributes.
The
Commissioners
are
a
public
body
appointed
by
the
Crown
and
hold
office
during
pleasure;
their
occupation
is
for
the
purpose
of
managing
and
administering
a
public
harbour
the
property
of
the
Crown;
their
powers
are
derived
from
a
statute
of
the
Parliament
of
Canada,
the
surplus
of
revenue
after
providing
for
costs
of
services
and
the
interest
on
the
debenture
debt
goes
into
a
sinking
fund
under
the
direction
of
the
Minister.
The
services
contemplated
are
not
only
public
services
in
the
broad
sense
but
also
in
the
strictest
sense,
Government
services.
The
occupation
of
the
Government
property
with
which
they
are
concerned
is,
an
occupation
by
persons
"using”
that
property
exclusively
in
and
for
the
service
of
the
Crown
(see
the
observations
to
that
effect
by
Sir
Lyman
P.
Duff
C.J.C.
in
Halifax
v.
Halifax
Harbour
Com’rs,
[1985],
1
D.L.R.
657
at
pp.
664-5,
S.C.R.
215
at
pp.
226-7).
In
the
case
of
the
Radio
Broadcasting
Corporation,
the
Governors
are
likewise
appointed
by
the
Governor
in
Council
and
are
removable
by
him
for
cause;
their
salaries
are
fixed
by
the
statute,
and
the
powers
they
exercise
are
subject
to
the
control
of
the
Minister.
All
monies
derived
belong
to
the
Government.
In
the
case
now
under
consideration,
all
that
has
occurred
is
that
an
ordinary
commercial
corporation
has
received
assistance
from
the
Government
in
order
to
facilitate
and
expedite
the
execution
of
certain
wartime
contracts.
Similar
examples
of
such
governmental
assistance
can
be
found
in
subsidies,
grants,
exemptions,
special
depreciation
and
other
instances
of
like
nature.
Here,
the
Government
provided
the
funds
for
the
new
buildings
and
motive
power,
taking
the
precaution
of
first
acquiring
the
land
but
making
provision
for
the
re-conveyance
of
the
whole
to
the
plaintiff
on
the
execution
of
the
contracts
on
terms
set
out.
It
is
true
that
the
plaintiff
is
designated
as
‘‘agent’’,
but,
as
I
have
pointed
out,
that
is
not
conclusive.
The
plaintiff
company,
then
engaged
in
manufacturing,
undertook
to
manufacture
certain
objects
for
the
intervenant
according
to
specifications,
and
certain
control
was
vested
in
the
Minister
enabling
him
to
supervise
the
work,
control
the
expenses,
and
to
reject
where
necessary.
But
the
Construction
Contract,
by
art.
6,
expressly
provides
as
regards
‘‘control’’
as
follows
:—
"Control
AND
SUPERVISION.
The
Company
shall,
subject
to
such
supervision,
direction
and
control
as
the
Minister
may
from
time
to
time
in
writing
advise
the
Company
that
he
desires
to
exercise,
have
full
control
over
the
design,
construction
and
equipment
of
the
new
plant,
the
selection
of
contractors
and
subcontractors
and
the
type
of
contract
to
be
made
with
them,
the
selection
and
purchase
of
construction
materials,
machinery,
tools
and
other
equipment
and
over
all
other
matters
incidental
to
the
full
completion
of
the
new
plant.
‘
‘
If
it
is
necessary
to
find
a
name
for
such
a
contract,
I
should
say
it
was
one
of
lease
and
hire
of
work
rather
than
a
contract
of
agency
(C.C.
1667,
1683,
1684).
As
pointed
out
in
Mignault,
vol.
7,
pages
238
and
following,
the
distinction
is
sometimes
very
difficult
to
make
between
these
two
forms
of
contract,
but
in
any
event
the
plaintiff
is
an
ordinary
commercial
corporation
carrying
on
business
in
its
own
interests
and
that
of
its
shareholders
for
a
fixed
remuneration,
and
in
the
execution
of
such
contract
it
occupied
these
new
buildings
and
uses
the
motive
power
provided
for
it
by
the
intervenant.
Looking
at
the
contract
as
a
whole,
I
am
satisfied
the
plaintiff
is
not
an
"‘agent’’
or
"‘serv-
ant’’
of
the
Crown,
(Montreal
L.,
H.
&
P.
Co.
v.
Quinlan,
[1929],
3
D.L.R.
568,
S.C.R.
385;
Planiol
&
Reipert,
vol.
11,
No.
774).
In
this
connection,
Manning
"‘Assessment
&
Rating”,
2nd
ed.,
p.
189,
has
this
to
say:
‘‘The
test
has
been
put
upon
this
basis,
‘that
a
servant
may
occupy
a
tenement
of
his
master’s,
not
by
way
of
payment
for
his
services,
but
for
the
purpose
of
performing
them;
it
may
be
that
he
is
not
permitted
to
occupy,
as
a
reward,
in
the
performance
of
his
Master’s
contract
to
pay
him,
but
required
to
occupy
in
the
performance
of
his
contract
to
serve
his
master’.
In
the
former
case
he
is,
and
in
the
latter
he
is
not,
ratable.
The
real
test
is
who
occupies
the
lands?
Is
it
the
master
or
the
servant?
And
as
to
that
the
nature
of
the
premises
occupied
and
whether
the
apartments
are
really
separated
from
the
exempt
lands
of
the
master
is
material.”
See
also
Hyde
on
Rating,
7th
ed.,
No.
122,
p.
127,
where
it
is
pointed
out
that
the
tax
is
not
exigible
where
the
property
is
in
the
occupation
of
the
Crown
by
itself
or
by
its
servants
whose
occupation
amounts
to
the
occupation
of
the
Crown.
The
plaintiff
company
elects
its
own
directors,
appoints
its
own
personnel,
receives
and
applies
to
its
own
uses
any
profits
or
surplus
realized
as
would
an
independent
contractor
(see
Construction
Contract
para.
23).
The
control
reserved
to
the
Minister
relates
only
to
the
satisfactory
execution
of
the
contract
according
to
its
terms.
In
the
case
of
A.-G.
Can.,
A.-G.
B.C.
and
C.N.P.R.
Co.
v.
Vancouver,
[1943]
C.T.C.
74,
it
was
held
that
a
person
may
be
subject
to
a
tax
in
personam
because
he
is
an
occupier
of
land
not
itself
taxable.
The
Legislature
may
authorize
the
imposition
of
such
a
personal
tax
even
if
based
upon
the
value
of
buildings
or
leaseholds
owned
by
the
Crown
(per
McDonald
C.J.B.C.,
at
p.
517);
and
see
also
Smith
v.
Vermilion
Hills,
30
D.L.R.
83,
[1916]
2
A.C.
569;
and
also
Montreal
v.
A.—G.
Can.
and
A.-G.
Que.
(1922),
70
D.L.R.
248,
[1923]
A.C.
136;
Fraser
v.
Montreal
(1914),
23
Que.
K.B.
242.
This
is
what
has
occurred
in
the
present
instance,
for
by
s.
362a
of
the
Charter
of
the
City
of
Montreal,
the
Legislature
has
expressly
authorized
the
imposition
of
just
such
a
tax.
It
is
not
a
tax
upon
Crown
property
which
would
be
admittedly
contrary
to
the
B.N.A,
Act
as
also
the
provisions
of
the
Interpretation
Act,
R.S.Q.
1941,
e.
1,
s.
42.
To
my
mind
it
is
quite
irrelevant
to
say
that
the
tax
will
fall
upon
the
Crown,
which
is
prohibited.
It
may
well
be
that
under
the
terms
of
the
contract
between
the
plaintiff
and
the
intervenant
the
incidence
of
the
tax
may
be
upon
the
intervenant.
But
that
is
not
the
result
of
the
imposition
of
the
tax
but
rather
the
result
of
a
contract
to
that
effect.
Parties
may,
by
contract,
change
their
rights
inter
se,
but
those
rights
(or
liabilities
remain
unchanged
as
against
a
third
party,
e.g.
the
taxing
authority.
In
the
case
of
Montréal
V.
La
Société
Administration
Générale
(1925),
38
Que.
K.B.
521,
Sir
Mathias
Tellier
C.J.
(as
he
later
became)
said,
at
p.
528:
"
‘
On
se
retranche
derrière
la
clause
du
bail
que
j’ai
reproduite
ci-haut,
et
on
dit:
‘Si
la
Cour
fait
droit
à
l’action,
c’est
la
Couronne
qui,
à
cause
de
la
dite
clause,
va
se
trouver
tenue
de
payer
les
taxes’.
A
cela,
je
réponds:
Il
n’est
rien
demandé
à
la
Couronne.
La
demanderesse
ne
pourrait
rien
lui
demander.
S’il
a
plu
à
la
Couronne
d’assumer
les
obligations
de
ls
succession
François
Benoit,
cela
la
regarde,
et
la
demanderesse
n’a
rien
à
y
voir.
Pour
la
demanderesse,
ce
qui
est
stipulé
dans
le
bail,
au
sujet
des
taxes,
est
res
inter
alios
acta”.
This,
it
seems
to
me,
is
the
view
clearly
expressed
in
the
case
of
Montreal
V.
A.-G.
Can.
and
A.-G.
Que.,
70
D.L.R.
248,
[1923]
A.C.
136
where
it
was
held:
""as
the
tenant
was
liable
only
so
long
as
his
occupancy
continued
the
taxation
was
in
respect
of
his
interest
as
lessee,
and
accordingly
was
not
a
tax
on
Crown
lands
so
as
to
be
ultra
vires
under
s.
125
of
the
British
North
America
Act,
1867”.
It
has
been
contended
that
that
case
may
be
distinguished
because
Lord
Parmoor
said,
at
p.
251
D.L.R.
p.
141
A.C.,
"‘No
copy
of
the
by
laws
was
attached
to
the
case,
but
it
was
assumed
throughout
the
argument
that
they
had
been
made
in
due
form’’.
But
in
answer
to
this,
it
must
be
pointed
out
that
the
tax
in
question
is
not
imposed
by
by-law
but
it
is
imposed
by
an
Act
of
the
Legislature
of
the
Province
of
Quebec,
namely:
the
Charter
of
the
City
of
Montreal,
s.
362a,
which
is
the
crucial
article
reading
as
follows:
‘‘The
exemptions
enacted
by
Article
362
shall
not
apply
either
to
persons
occupying
for
commercial
or
industrial
purposes
buildings
or
lands
belonging
to
His
Majesty
or
to
the
Federal
and
Provincial
Governments,
or
to
the
Board
of
Harbor
commissioners,
who
shall
be
taxed
as
if
they
were
the
actual
owners
of
such
immovables
and
shall
be
held
to
pay
the
annual
and
special
assessments,
the
taxes
and
other
municipal
dues.
"‘If
the
occupant,
whose
name
appears
on
the
valuation
roll,
quits
before
the
1st
of
May
the
premises
leased,
he
shall
not
be
held
to
pay
the
taxes
imposed
for
the
year
beginning
on
the
1st
of
May.
"‘If
the
immovable
becomes
occupied
for
the
purposes
mentioned
in
this
article
by
another
person,
either
on
the
1st
of
May
or
on
another
date
during
the
fiscal
year,
the
name
of
such
person
shall
be
entered
on
the
roll.
"‘In
the
case
of
any
other
property
belonging
to
the
Federal
or
Provincial
Governments
or
to
the
National
Harbour
Board,
and
becoming
occupied
on
or
after
the
1st
of
May
by
any
other
persons
for
commercial
or
industrial
purposes,
the
director
of
finance,
on
receipt
of
a
certificate
to
that
effect
from
the
board
of
revision,
shall
enter
on
the
real
estate
assessment
roll
the
name
of
such
new
occupant,
who
shall
pay
the
taxes
imposed
for
the
current
fiscal
year,
according
to
the
valuation
shown
on
the
said
certificate.
"‘In
all
such
cases,
the
provisions
of
Article
375a
shall
apply
to
this
article,
mutatis
mutandis’’.
The
by-laws
merely
give
effect
to
it
by
fixing
the
rate
or
amount
of
such
assessment.
It
is
true
again
that
the
by-law
speaks
of
the
imposition
of
an
assessment
"‘on
taxable
immovables”,
and
it
is
contended
on
behalf
of
the
plaintiff
that
since
the
premises
were
the
property
of
the
intervenant
they
were
not
""
taxable
immovables’’.
The
answer
to
that,
however,
I
should
say,
was
that
the
exemptions
mentioned
in
the
Charter
do
not
apply
to
occupants
of
Crown
property,
and
the
present
tax
now
disputed
is
a
tax
upon
the
occupancy
of
certain
Crown
lands,
and
the
Charter
expressly
makes
such
occupancy
taxable.
(Fraser
v.
Montreal,
23
Que.
K.B.
242).
Within
its
proper
sphere
the
Legislature
is
supreme,
and
there
has
been
no
attempt
in
the
present
instance
by
the
Legislature
to
transcend
that
sphere
by
taking
Crown
property
as
such.
It
is,
I
repeat,
the
occupation
by
the
plaintiff
in
the
performance
of
a
commercial
undertaking
that
is
taxed,
and
even
if
the
incidence
of
such
tax
rests
ultimately
upon
the
intervenant
that
results
not
from
the
original
imposition
of
the
tax
but
as
a
result
of
the
assumption
thereof
under
the
contract
by
the
intervenant,
if
indeed
that
be
the
true
result
as
to
which
I
express
no
opinion.
I
have
carefully
considered
the
case
of
Can.
Locomotive
Co.
and
C.N.R.
v.
Kingston
(
[1942]
C.T.C.
280)
decided
in
the
County
Court
of
the
County
of
Frontenac,
Ontario.
The
facts
are
strikingly
similar,
but
the
case
appears
to
have
been
decided
under
the
provisions
of
the
Ontario
Assessment
Act,
R.S.O.
1937,
c.
272.
I
reach
the
conclusion
that
for
the
period
now
under
review,
that
is
from
May
1,
1942,
the
plaintiff
is
subject
to
the
tax
imposed
as
"‘occupant’’.
There
remains
to
be
considered
the
business
tax
which
is
likewise
a
personal
tax
authorized
by
art.
363
of
the
Charter
and
given
effect
by
By-law
No.
1642.
By
this
article
of
the
Charter,
the
city
is
authorized
"‘to
impose
and
levy
by
by-law
a
tax
to
be
called
the
‘business
tax’
on
all
trades,
manufactures,
financial
or
commercial
institutions’’.
As
I
have
already
reached
the
conclusion
that
the
plaintiff
carries
on
an
occupation
falling
within
the
terms
of
the
article
in
question,
and
is
not
a
servant
of
the
Crown
exempting
it
from
liability,
it
follows
that
the
plaintiff
is
liable
for
such
business
tax.
Considering
that
as
respects
the
claim
of
the
defendant
for
the
sum
of
$18,934.78
"‘Property
taxes
on
the
new
building
and
motive
power
from
1st
of
November
1941
to
April
30th
1942”,
the
said
claim
is
directed
against
the
plaintiff
as
"
"
proprietor
”
and
not
as
occupant”;
Doth
reject
the
said
item.
Considering
that
as
respects
the
three
following
items,
the
defendant
has
established
its
right
thereto
against
the
plaintiff
as
""occupant”,
namely
i6
(b)
Business
tax
on
the
same
property
as
hereinbefore
mentioned
in
subparagraph
(a)
hereof,
for
the
same
period
$3,425.22;
(c)
Property
tax
on
the
land,
building
and
motive
power
on
Lot
21,
subdivision
2210,
as
occupant
of
the
property
of
the
Intervenant
for
the
municipal
fiscal
year
commencing
May
1st
1942
.
.
.
.
$41,141.77
;
(d)
Business
tax
on
the
same
property
as
hereinbefore
mentioned
in
subparagraph
(c)
hereof
for
the
same
year
.
.
.
.
$6,850.44”;
Doth
condemn
the
plaintiff
to
pay
to
the
defendant
the
said
sums:
$3,425.22,
$41,141.77
and
$6,850.44,
together
with
inter-
est
at
the
rate
of
5%
from
the
date
when
the
said
taxes
respectively
were
due,
add
also
the
costs
of
the
present
action.
Doth
dismiss
the
intervention
except
as
to
the
foregoing
item
of
$18,934.78,
and
doth
recommend
that
the
intervenant
pay
to
the
defendant
the
costs
upon
such
intervention.
And
doth
order
the
Prothonotary
of
this
Court
to
return
to
the
plaintiff
exhibits
Nos.
P-1
and
P-2
without
giving
access
thereto
to
any
party
other
than
the
parties
to
the
present
submission.
Judgment
for
defendant.
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