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Canada, 2005 SCC 54, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601, at para. 10). [19]   Paragraph 135(2)(a) of the Act provides that subsection 135(1) (which imposes a duty on wine) does not apply to wine “produced in Canada and composed wholly of agricultural or plant product grown in Canada”. [20]   As part of his analysis related to the requirement that the wine be “composed wholly of agricultural or plant product grown in Canada”, the Tax Court Judge considered all of the other ingredients there were added to create the final product that was packaged. ... For example, if the effect of one interpretation offends the legislative purpose but the effect of another interpretation does not, the latter may be preferable to the former. [22]   As part of this interpretation process, whether the presence of added water or other ingredients in the final product would disqualify a wine from the exemption is a matter that should be considered in deciding how to interpret the particular provision. [23]   Although the Crown objected to the Tax Court Judge considering the other ingredients in analyzing the interpretation of the exemption, the Crown included, in paragraph 8 of its memorandum, an illustration, drawn to scale, of the entire contents of the packaged wine that shows the contents and their percentages by volume, broken down into 6 categories: Water (|||||||||| %) Bulk Spirits (|||||||||| %) [Sugar] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| (|||||||| %) Bulk wine (|||| %) Other ingredients (|||||||| %) Apple juice concentrate (|||||||| %) [24]   This illustration shows that, according to the Crown, the item (apple juice concentrate) that results in the disqualification of the product, is [a small percentage of the final product] |||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||. ... Such food ingredients and food additives are considered incidental ingredients in the wine and the origin of these ingredients will not otherwise disqualify the wine from the excise duty exemption. [27]   The distinction between primary and incidental ingredients is not present in paragraph 135(2)(a) of the Act. ...

The evidence supporting the finding is presented as being: annual sales in Canada ($105,000 in 2012; $193,000 in 2013; $255,000 in 2014); labels bearing the DO GHAZAL & Design mark were attached to the products sold in Canada; commercial invoices for shipments of tea from the opponent to Canada between July 29, 2012 and June 13, 2014. [12]   Since was discharged the initial burden on the opponent of showing that the DO GHAZAL & Design trade-mark had become known in Canada sufficiently to negate the distinctiveness of the Mark, the Registrar went on to consider whether there would be confusion between the marks, because 164 must then show that the Mark is adapted to distinguish its goods from those of Akbar. [13]   The Registrar assessed confusion, taking into consideration all of the relevant surrounding circumstances, including the factors listed in section 6(5) of the Act: What to be considered Éléments d’appréciation 6(5) In determining whether trademarks or trade names are confusing, the court or the Registrar, as the case may be, shall have regard to all the surrounding circumstances including 6(5) En décidant si des marques de commerce ou des noms commerciaux créent de la confusion, le tribunal ou le registraire, selon le cas, tient compte de toutes les circonstances de l’espèce, y compris : (a) the inherent distinctiveness of the trademarks or trade names and the extent to which they have become known; a) le caractère distinctif inhérent des marques de commerce ou noms commerciaux, et la mesure dans laquelle ils sont devenus connus; (b) the length of time the trademarks or trade names have been in use; b) la période pendant laquelle les marques de commerce ou noms commerciaux ont été en usage; (c) the nature of the goods, services or business; c) le genre de produits, services ou entreprises; (d) the nature of the trade; and d) la nature du commerce; (e) the degree of resemblance between the trademarks or trade names, including in appearance or sound or in the ideas suggested by them. e) le degré de ressemblance entre les marques de commerce ou les noms commerciaux, notamment dans la présentation ou le son, ou dans les idées qu’ils suggèrent. [14]   Starting with the degree of resemblance, the Registrar acknowledges that the two trade-marks are identical in appearance and sound, as well as in the ideas suggested by the marks. ... [My emphasis.] [42]   Justice Noël considered the evidence presented in E. ... All relevant evidence may be considered which tends to establish non-distinctiveness” (pp. 58-59). ...

Lamarche’s pension benefits represent the substantive issue to be considered by the Court in this judicial review. [15]   Concerned that his pension benefits were being improperly calculated, Mr. ... Among the objectives underlying this rule are preventing fragmentation of the administrative process and piecemeal and premature court proceedings, as well as ensuring that the administrative decision-maker’s findings being considered by the reviewing court are suffused with the benefit of expertise, legitimate policy judgments, and valuable regulatory experience (see CB Powell at para 32). [23]   In my view, taking into account the aforementioned principles, the appropriate exercise of my discretion is to decide this application for judicial review on its merits. ... Applying those principles, I have considered the arguments advanced by Mr. ...

The cumulative loss for the period from 2008 to 2014 inclusive would be about $440,000 if one considered the business use of the home expenses. [9]   The Appellants' tax returns as of the end of the 2017 taxation year show an amount of $103,860 of deferred expenses for business use of the home available to be carried to future years. ... One will have to examine all relevant factors to determine whether the activity is undertaken in a sufficiently commercial manner to be considered a source of income. [50]   There is no exhaustive list of factors to consider and the factors that are relevant may differ depending on the nature of the activity in question. Among the factors that are normally to be considered are the profit and loss experience of past years, the taxpayer’s training, the taxpayer’s intended course of action and the capability of the venture to show a profit. ...

I commend him on his exploration of this issue. [70]   The issue has been considered before in this Court. ... In effect, his submission was that the notice of appeal is to be disregarded and the only document to be considered in a Tax Court appeal is the reply filed by the Crown. [45]   Further, in Mr. ... Eisbrenner does not indicate on what basis he is alleging that the invoices were not invoices that came from the pharmaceutical manufacturing companies or that the bank statements were not statements that came from the Bank of Cyprus. [60]   The CRA auditor testified with respect to the process that he followed to obtain these documents and this was considered by the Tax Court Judge in his ruling. ...

Foroglou’s appeal by approximately 25 months. [7] Since the Application should not have been brought in the first place, this delay was unnecessary. [53]   However, to the extent that the delay is a factor that should be considered when determining costs, the costs in question would be costs in respect of Mr.  ... To the extent that the Court considered new issues, those issues arose as a result of the Minister bringing the Application rather than from any action on Ms. ... In those circumstances, I would have considered awarding a small amount of costs to Ms. ...

MNR, 91 DTC 511 (TCC), Watson, DTCJ considered whether an amount paid by the taxpayer appellant’s former employer into a trust established for the appellant was taxable as a retiring allowance in the year of payment into the trust, or, were the trust an EBP, taxable in a subsequent year when the sum would be distributed from the trust. ... Had an EBP not been found, the amount to be paid would have been considered taxable in the hands of the employee in the year of payment into the trust- as a retiring allowance, a paragraph 6(1)(a) benefit or a subsection 56(2) indirect payment. [14]   Lastly as to general context of EBPs, in MNR v. ... Baker’s position is that none of the trustees also or alternatively considered any aspect of his twelve years (2000 to 2012) of service as D2L’s head employee (president and CEO). ...

One of the factors that I considered in reaching that decision was Mr. ... Similarly, the Respondent does not have a duty to inform the Court of such issues. [52]   Even if I had been aware of these new issues, I would not have considered them when determining the likelihood of Mr. ... I have considered the alleged abuses that actually relate to the Appellants’ appeals and have concluded that there is no abuse of process. ...

(b) any amount receivable by the taxpayer in respect of property sold or services rendered in the course of a business in the year, notwithstanding that the amount or any part thereof is not due until a subsequent year, unless the method adopted by the taxpayer for computing income from the business and accepted for the purpose of this Part does not require the taxpayer to include any amount receivable in computing the taxpayer 's income for a taxation year unless it has been received in the year, and for the purposes of this paragraph, an amount shall be deemed to have become receivable in respect of services rendered in the course of a business on the day that is the earlier of (i) the day on which the account in respect of the services was rendered, and (ii) the day on which the account in respect of those services would have been rendered had there been no undue delay in rendering the account in respect of the services. [41]   There is no definition of “amount receivable” in the Act and its use in paragraph 12(1)(b) has been considered in relatively few cases, none of which are directly on point. [42]   In noting that there was no statutory definition of “receivable” in MNR v John Colford Contracting Company Ltd, [22] Kearney J. of the Exchequer Court asserted that one should seek to find the ordinary meaning of the word “receivable”, but found that the Shorter Oxford dictionary definition “contribute[d] little towards a solution” (page 441) and stated as follows: In the absence of a statutory definition to the contrary, I think it is not enough that the so-called recipient have a precarious right to receive the amount in question, but he must have a clearly legal, though not necessarily immediate, right to receive it. [23] [43]   Although in earlier cases, the test appears to have been applied in income tax cases resulting from expropriation, it has been adopted and applied in several other cases, including Maple Leaf Mills Ltd v MNR, [24] Commonwealth Construction Co v The Queen [25] and The Queen v Huang & Danczkay Ltd. [26] [44]   In Maple Leaf Mills, [27] the Supreme Court of Canada stated that it accepted the test expressed in Colford without question and wrote: This test is the one this Court has applied in income tax cases resulting from expropriations; for an amount to become receivable in any taxation years, two conditions must coexist:   (1) a right to receive compensation; (2) a binding agreement between the parties or a judgment fixing the amount.   ... A condition precedent to the creation of a legal right to demand payment effectively bars the accrual of income until the condition is fulfilled, but the possible occurrence of a condition subsequent to the creation of a liability is not grounds for postponing the accrual. [33] [Emphasis added.] [50]   Hence, an amount accrues to a taxpayer when conditions precedent are fulfilled and conversely does not accrue and is not receivable if conditions precedent remain unsatisfied. [51]   The Federal Court of Appeal considered the meaning of “receivable” in Huang and, after asserting that the test was adopted without question in Maple Leaf Mills, wrote as follows: “ Colford  does not require that for an amount to be receivable, there be an immediate right to receive payment.” [34] In Huang, the Court found that the corporate taxpayer’s right to receive the amounts of the promissory notes and mortgages, arose from the limited partnerships making and signing the notes and mortgages, and “[w]ith these notes and mortgages being given, the right to receive the amounts in question became absolute.” [35] [52]   The circumstances of this appeal are unlike those in Huang where the right to receive the amounts in question became absolute at the time of the signing of the promissory notes and mortgages and where the right of set-off did not convert these absolute obligations into contingent ones. [36] Also, unlike the circumstances in Commonwealth Construction, the amounts to be paid by LEO were not absolute and under no restriction, but rather, they were subject to a condition precedent. [53]   According to the portion of the Allocation Agreement entered into evidence, Lockwood did not have an uncontested right to the payment of the second portion of the finder’s fee, this right being conditional on LEO meeting the expenditure target of $26,208,000. ... As mentioned earlier, there was no evidence at trial regarding the moment when LEO reached the target amount of $26,208,000 in expenditures, nor was there any evidence of how not meeting certain benchmarks would have affected the payment of the finder’s fee. [56]   In Commonwealth Construction, the Federal Court of Appeal also considered the question of the year in which amounts were properly to be included in income. ...

The Minister does not seek to have the affidavit struck under Rule 81 but rather to have the Court drawn an adverse inference from EEIGI’s failure to provide an affidavit sworn by the associate lawyer who is purported to have knowledge of the information sharing that is the subject of the Respondent’s Affidavit. [19]   At the hearing, I asked the Minister’s counsel to identify whether there were particular components of the evidence contained in the Respondent’s Affidavit, relevant to the disputed issue of the notice provision sought by EEIGI, that the Minister considered should be afforded little weight.   ... However, for the sake of good order, I confirm that I have considered and am satisfied that the Minister has met these requirements. [24]   As explained by the Federal Court of Appeal in Minister of National Revenue v Lee, 2016 FCA 53 at para 6 (in the context of the equivalent provision of the ITA), the Court must be satisfied that: the person against whom the order is sought was required under the applicable statutory provisions (in the ETA, s 288 or 289) to provide the access, assistance, information or documents sought by the Minister; although the person was required to provide the information or documents sought by the Minister, he or she did not do so; and the documents or information sought is not protected from disclosure by solicitor-client privilege as defined within the statute. [25]   Based upon the Minister’s affidavit evidence and written submissions, I am satisfied that these requirements are met. ... Moreover, in Tomchin v Canada, 2015 FC 402, which considered arguments under ss 7 and 13 of the Charter related to protection against self-incrimination, Justice Manson relied on Jarvis in concluding that such protection constrains only the use that may be made of compelled information in a subsequent proceeding against the person concerned, not the collection and sharing of that information (at para 27). [33]   The Minister also submits that EEIGI is raising hypothetical Charter arguments in the context of speculative concerns about dissemination and use of the Required Information. ...