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The Court considered the Minister’s position that, as a category, payments from an RRIF are not pension payments under paragraph (f) of the “pension income” definition in section 14 of the OAS Regulations and then stated, “[w]hile these arguments have merit, they fall short of being compelling in my view.” ... In the course of considering whether the lump sum payment could be an “annuity payment” (caught by paragraph (a) of the “pension income” definition) or a “ superannuation or pension payment” (caught by paragraph (f) of the “pension income” definition), the Court stated the following [underlining added]: [46] I recognize in certain cases, funds from an RRIF could be considered to be pension income. ... In light of the history and the fact that the 2007 amendments to section 14 of the OAS Act were part of an extensive package of amendment that I presume to have been carefully considered, I do not feel that this an appropriate circumstance to adopt an interpretation that departs from the language used in section 18 (and subsections 14(2) to (6)) solely on the basis that a literal interpretation would produce an absurd result. ...

No. 1056, Judge Sarchuk of this Court considered the concept of SR&ED with respect to the 1982 and 1983 taxation years. ... In that case, the TCC considered whether interest amounts in relation to a limited recourse mortgage were contingent liabilities. ...   [92]     The witness asserted that, in Brazil, three-month transactions are considered short-term transactions, three- to six-month transactions are considered medium‑term, and those longer than six months are considered long-term. ...

The justifications advanced by the government have been considered in the infringement stage of this analysis and the finding that the threshold infringes s. 3   essentially amounts to a conclusion that it is inconsistent with the values of Canadian democracy.  ... The essence of this submission is that a certain type of outcome, considered from a non-partisan perspective, is better suited to our system of democracy.  ... The question of whether the challenged limitations of those rights were consistent with Canada’s democratic values therefore naturally fell to be considered in connection with s. 1   of the Charter  .   105                            Only on one previous occasion has this Court considered a challenge under s. 3   of the Charter   to legislation that regulated the electoral process without literally denying anyone the right to vote or to be a candidate.  ...

However, a finding that a bona fide non-tax purpose is lacking, taken alone, should not be considered conclusive evidence of abusive tax avoidance. ... The source state’s claim to tax passive income is considered weaker in comparison to that of the residence state because generating such income is assumed to require few public services from the source state. ... However, Parliament struck the balance it considered proper between certainty and fairness to the tax system as a whole. ...

They merely claim that those discussions considered the exchange of information “without any limitation on unnamed [persons requirements]” (Applicant’s Additional Memorandum at paras 10–11). ... Justice Rennie is describing a set of principles considered by Parliament in the elaboration of subsection 231.2(3). The mere fact that these principles were considered does not make them the purpose of the provision. ...

The general canons of construction must be considered and the meaning of words determined from a consideration of all relevant statutory or regulatory provisions. ... The amount of a terminal loss that the taxpayer is permitted but failed to take under this section must be considered as depreciation allowed for the purposes of the calculation of the undepreciated capital cost of such property. ... The meaning of the word “acquired” as used in subsection 20(5) was fully considered by my brother Cattanach, J in MNR v Wardean Drilling Limited, [1969] 2 Ex CR 166; [1969] CTC 265; 69 DTC 5194. ...

.); (7) neither in section 30 nor in any other section of the Income Tax Act is there a definition of “a life insurance corporation”; (8) no regulations have been passed pursuant to the enabling provisions of section 117(b) of the Act “prescribing the evidence required to establish facts relevant to assessments under this Act” and the facts alleged and proved therefore are no guide as to what should be considered in coming to a conclusion as to what are the necessary constituent elements of a business of a corporation to qualify it as a “life insurance corporation” within the meaning of section 30 of the Act; (9) if Parliament had meant to qualify section 30 of the Act with either the word “sole” or “exclusive” or the word “predominant” or with equivalent words in relation to the business of a “life insurance corporation”, or to have it apply only to the life insurance part of the whole business of such a corporation as the appellant, it would have said so, as it did, for example, in section 13, section 83A(2), section 83A(3), section 83A(3a), section 83A(3b) and section 83A(3c) of the Income Tax Act; and finally (10) it is not the function of the Court to add words in interpreting the words of a statute. ... It is submitted that if companies such as the Appellant were not considered by Parliament to be life insurance corporations within the meaning of the 1968 Act, subsection 90A(22) would not have been enacted to apply to companies such as the Appellant. ... The fact that it did so, it seems to me, will have to be considered independently in disposing of the ultimate question raised by this appeal, namely, whether or not that amount was correctly included in the appellant’s 1969 other-than-life insurance income. ...

Definition of Trust 104 (1) In this Act, a reference to a trust or estate (in this subdivision referred to as a “trust”) shall, unless the context otherwise requires, be read to include a reference to the trustee, executor, administrator, liquidator of a succession, heir or other legal representative having ownership or control of the trust property, but, except for the purposes of this subsection, subsection (1.1), subparagraph (b)(v) of the definition “disposition” in subsection 248(1) and paragraph (k) of that definition, a trust is deemed not to include an arrangement under which the trust can reasonably be considered to act as agent for all the beneficiaries under the trust with respect to all dealings with all of the trust’s property unless the trust is described in any of paragraphs (a) to (e.1) of the definition “trust” in subsection 108(1). ... Definition of ‘disposition” subsection 248(1) – Referenced by Respondent 248(1) “disposition” of any property, except as expressly otherwise provided, includes (a) any transaction or event […], (b) […] by which, (i) where the property is a share, […], in it, the property is in whole or in part redeemed, acquired or cancelled, […] (v) a trust, that can reasonably be considered to act as agent for all the beneficiaries under the trust with respect to all dealings with all of the trust’s property (unless the trust is described in any of paragraphs (a) to (e.1) of the definition “trust” in subsection 108(1)), ceases to act as agent for a beneficiary under the trust with respect to any dealing with any of the trust’s property, […] (c) any transfer of the property to a trust […] but does not include (e) any transfer of the property as a consequence of which there is no change in the beneficial ownership of the property, except where the transfer is (i) from a person or a partnership to a trust for the benefit of the person or the partnership, (ii) from a trust to a beneficiary under the trust, or (iii) from one trust maintained for the benefit of one or more beneficiaries under the trust to another trust maintained for the benefit of the same beneficiaries, (f) any transfer of the property as a consequence of which there is no change in the beneficial ownership of the property, where […] […] D. ... In Prévost Car, a case heard in Quebec where the civil code was applicable and considered, the Court grappled with the term “beneficial owner” in the context of Section 116 assessments where tax treaties specified differing rates of withholding tax. ...

The only question remaining for decision, therefore, is whether, when dividing the partnership profit at the end of its 1984 fiscal period, in accordance with the agreement just described, the $200,988.97 amount should be considered as an expense to be deducted from the appellant’s share of the cash flow pool, as the payments were made by him, or if it should be considered a cost of establishing the hedge and therefore to be taken into account in computing the hedge pool profit or loss. ... Its significance for present purposes is that if the amount is to be considered an expenditure from the cash flow pool then the appellant can take it into account in computing his share of the partnership income for 1984. ...

  [20]     In reaching this conclusion, Noël, J. also considered the taxpayer's level of involvement in the company's management and financial operations:   In the case at hand, the plaintiff had a special knowledge of the market in which Orell shares were traded. ...   [47]     The effect of changing the way in which a transaction has been reported was one of the factors considered by Rip, J. ...   [51]     Considered in light of the factors in Vancouver Art Metal Works, the evidence persuades me that Mr. ...