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The appellant has the burden to establish that he did not earn that income and he failed to do so. [26] The determination of whether a taxpayer is entitled to deduct losses from his rental activities has been considered in many courts’ decisions and depends if the taxpayer has a source of income from a business or property. [27] In Sokil v. ... Thus, where the nature of a taxpayer's venture contains elements which suggest that it could be considered a hobby or other personal pursuit, but the venture is undertaken in a sufficiently commercial manner, the venture will be considered a source of income for the purposes of the Act.... [54]... ...

The section was enacted as a measure designed to thwart the use of offshore investment funds which permitted taxpayers resident in Canada a complete escape from or indefinite deferral of tax on passive income. [1] Subsection 94.1(1) reads in part: 94.1 (1) Where in a taxation year a taxpayer, other than a non-resident-owned investment corporation, holds or has an interest in property (in this section referred to as an “offshore investment fund property’’) (a) that is a share of the capital stock of, an interest in, or a debt of, a nonresident entity (other than a controlled foreign affiliate of the taxpayer or a prescribed non-resident entity) or an interest in or a right or option to acquire such a share, interest or debt, and (b) that may reasonably be considered to derive its value, directly or indirectly, primarily from portfolio investments of that or any other nonresident entity in (i) shares of the capital stock of one or more corporations, (ii) indebtedness or annuities, (iii) interests in One or more corporations, trusts, partnerships, organizations, funds or entities, (iv) commodities, (v) real estate, (vi) Canadian or foreign resource properties, (vii) currency of a country other than Canada, (viii) rights or options to acquire or dispose of any of the foregoing, or (ix) any combination of the foregoing, and it may reasonably be concluded, having regard to all the circumstances, including (c) the nature, organization and operation of any non-resident entity and the form of, and the terms and conditions governing, the taxpayer’s interest in, Or connection with, any non-resident entity, (d) the extent to which any income, profits and gains that may reasonably be considered to be earned or accrued, whether directly or indirectly, for the benefit of any non-resident entity are subject to an income or profits tax that is significantly less than the income tax that would be applicable to such income, profits and gains if they were earned directly by the taxpayer, and (e) the extent to which the income, profits and gains of any non-resident entity for any fiscal period are distributed in that or the immediately following fiscal period, that one of the main reasons for the taxpayer acquiring, holding or having the interest in such property was to derive a benefit from portfolio investments in assets described in any of subparagraphs (b)(i) to (ix) in such manner that the taxes, if any, on the income, profits and gains from such assets for any particular year are significantly less than the tax that would have been applicable under this Part if such income, profits and gains had been earned directly by the taxpayer,... ... According to the Appellant other investments were considered. The timing and extent of those investigations were not revealed. ...

Lord Advocate^ [2] the House of Lords considered the question whether an individual was a “regular minister of a religious denomination” within the meaning of a statute which conferred exemption from compulsory military service on “a man in holy orders or a regular minister of any religious denomination”. ... I do not find the bulletin of any assistance in interpreting paragraph 8(1)(c) for it sheds no light on the con- siderations which led the author of the bulletin to conclude that such of- ficers are considered to be ministers. ... Appeal dismissed. 1 [There does not appear to be any relationship between the source of income and the deduc- tion sought in this case, but the point was not put in issue and need not be considered further. 2 211956] 3 All E.R. 129 (U.K. ...

For the purposes of this section and section 60, where a decree, order or judgment of a competent tribunal or a written agreement made at any time in a taxation year provides that an amount paid before that time and in the year or the immediately preceding taxation year is to be considered as having been paid and received pursuant thereto, the following rules apply: (a) the amount shall be deemed to have been paid pursuant thereto; and (b) the person who made the payment shall be deemed to have been separated pursuant to a divorce, judicial separation or written separation agreement from his spouse or former spouse at the time the payment was made and throughout the remainder of the year. ... L'Heureux-Dubé J.A., as she then was, dissenting because the evidence submitted did not persuade her, nonetheless considered that in the absence of proper records the taxpayer did not lose his right to present a valid defence to the assessment. ... It reads as follows: 336.4 For the purposes of this chapter, where a decree, order or judgment of a competent tribunal or a written agreement made at any time in a taxation year provides that an amount paid before that time and in the year or the preceding taxation year is to be considered as having been paid and received thereunder, (a) the amount is deemed to have been paid thereunder; and (b) the person who made the payment is deemed to have been separated pursuant to a divorce, judicial separation or written separation agreement from his spouse or former spouse to whom he was required to make the payment at the time the payment was made and throughout the remainder of the year. ...

(l) The salaries were not actually paid to Ben but were considered as accrued to him. ... As a result, the deduction of Ben’s allocation by the partnership was disallowed because Revenue Canada considered that it represented an allocation of capital. ... Rankin, and the changes in American tax law had a negative and unexpected impact on the business, no evidence was presented to show what profit the taxpayer might have earned had these events not occurred and whether the amount would have been considered substantial when compared to his professional income. ...

She claims that the amount of $786.56 received by her during the strike constituted strike pay and was therefore not to be considered as taxable income. ... It is clear and undenied that, at the time the document was signed, the parties considered that they were signing a contract and that by that contract they intended to create a relationship between themselves which would permit the plaintiff to continue to contribute to and to benefit from the provisions of The Teachers’ Superannuation Act during the strike. ... Since, during the strike, the plaintiff was in the employ of the Federation pursuant to the written agreement in issue and since the amount of $786.56 was paid to her as provided for in the agreement, it becomes unnecessary for me to decide two other questions which were argued at some length during the trial, that is to say, whether the plaintiff was filling an “office” as defined in interpretation section 248 of the Income Tax Act and whether in order to be considered an “officer” in subsection 6(3) one necessarily has to be filling an “office” as defined in section 248. ...

Learned counsel for plaintiff claims that in this last decision the Board would have treated the minimum payment as a capital gain had it not considered it to be a royalty to increase sales. In a nutshell, plaintiff submits that payments received under an agreement in writing for an exclusive right based on a minimum formula should be considered capital gain as they are not dependent upon the use of or production from property. ... But if what is sold relates to the use of land, including excavation for gravel. that is a profit a prendre, thus taxable income. whether or not the sale is considered to be a “business” (under the provisions of the old paragraph 139(1)(e) or the new subsection 248(1)). ...

He had considered the trucking requirements to be 4 acres immediately, but he had been unable to find any such parcel of property in a location that would serve his purposes adequately and efficiently. ... He needed a location quickly for his burgeoning trucking business and having considered all the other alternatives, he settled on this location. ... Decision The appeal is allowed both for the years 1971 and 1972 in order to permit any gain on the sale in 1971 of the portion of the subject property to Norman T Coulter, and any gain on the sale in 1972 of the balance of the subject property to Alliance Building Corporation Limited both to be considered on account of capital and not income. ...

The Board, however, has been urged by Mr Lougheed to find and accept such a distinction, and it is therefore incumbent upon the Board, while remaining mindful of the similarities obviously considered substantial by the respondent, to set out and weigh any contrast which can be determined from the evidence. ... There is no evidence that “Mr Mike’s” considered the amount of $7,500 unreasonably low or that ‘‘Mr Mike’s” considered there was a possibility of selling the franchise soon at a great profit. ...

Further, he contended that although certain statements had been made by the appellant in support of it, there was no evidence that the contribution to the Indian Road property had been made by the appellant’s wife, that she had not taken the witness stand to give evidence on behalf of the appellant and that even if such a contribution had been made, it could not be considered as sufficient support for her to claim a 50% interest in the Ranstone Gardens property even by way of transfer. ... First, the appellant stated that the subject property was intended to be the home for Drakos, not for himself, and the Board has been given no evidence as to why he would have changed his wishes and decided to reside there when it had not been considered as his choice in the first instance. ... There is no evidence to support a conclusion that such an exchange should be considered in any way a transfer of ownership rights from the appellant to his wife, thereby creating only the appearance, but not the reality, of her equal ownership. ...