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Groscki’s actions fall entirely within the definition of a legal representative in possession and control of EMI Macao’s property who, as legal representative: (1) under subsection 159(1), is jointly liable for EMI Macao’s unpaid tax liability during the currency he possessed and controlled the property and/or; (2) under subsection 159(3), failed to obtain a clearance certificate or pay the tax liability owing prior to distributing the property under his possession and control. d)     The necessary elements of section 159 (i) The statute [40]          A useful excerpt of the relevant subsections of section 159 and the relevant definition section within the Act are as follows: (1) Person acting for another 159 (1) For the purposes of this Act, where a person is a legal representative of a taxpayer at any time, (a) the legal representative is … liable with the taxpayer (i) to pay each amount payable under this Act by the taxpayer at or before that time and that remains unpaid, to the extent that the legal representative is at that time in possession or control, in the capacity of legal representative, of property that belongs or belonged to, or that is or was held for the benefit of, the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s estate, and (ii) to perform any obligation or duty imposed under this Act on the taxpayer at or before that time and that remains outstanding, to the extent that the obligation or duty can reasonably be considered to relate to the responsibilities of the legal representative acting in that capacity; and … (2) Every legal representative (other than a trustee in bankruptcy) of a taxpayer shall, before distributing to one or more persons any property in the possession or control of the legal representative acting in that capacity, obtain a certificate from the Minister, …, certifying that all amounts (a) for which the taxpayer is or can reasonably be expected to become liable under this Act at or before the time the distribution is made, and … have been paid …. ... In the absence of facts and circumstances that indicate a trustee and beneficiary relationship, it does not appear that the lawyer or law firm acting on behalf of a client in a commercial transaction would be considered to be a “legal representative” as defined in subsection 248(1) of the Act. … However, under subparagraph 159(1)(a)(i), a legal representative’s liability is limited to the property in his or her possession or control, in the capacity of legal representative, at the time that an amount becomes payable under the Act. [47]          In turn, the relevant excerpt from the Technical Note provides as follows: (say a parent corporation that wound up its subsidiary and acquired its assets) … The liability of the legal representative acting in good faith is limited to the property in the possession and control of the legal representative when that person is called upon to make a payment on behalf of the taxpayer, or to any proceeds of disposition and replacement property obtained by the legal representative from that property. … For example, a representative who has a general power of attorney will have broader responsibilities than one whose authority is limited to certain assets of the taxpayer. e)      Analysis and Findings [48]          As a third party liability and collection mechanism, section 159 has critical components which must be present before the provision is engaged. ... Conclusions [57]          If the present context includes only examples of deceased persons, but the extended purpose is thought to be expanded through the Interpretation Bulletin and Technical Note, then dissolution (or cessation) and liquidation must be considered. ...

This motion record sought a finding of contempt against Fromstein for failing to respond appropriately in the First Letter to a pair of Requirements to Provide Information and Documents dated April 20, 2010, that were sent to Fromstein. [21]   Bradwick argues that the First and Second Letters were made available to the public by the Minister, and with the tacit approval of Fromstein, and therefore they were considered non-confidential by both of them. ... I also gave Bradwick an opportunity to reply in writing to the Minister’s responding submissions on the new argument. [25]   In its responding submissions, the Minister objects to Bradwick’s new argument on the basis that the failure to have raised it earlier in accordance with the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106, prejudices the Minister as the auditor who was responsible for Bradwick’s audit, Guy Rocheleau, is now retired and no longer available to respond to Bradwick’s assertions. [26]   The Minister’s objection can be valid only to the issue of the Minister’s or Fromstein’s intent that the letters be considered non-confidential. ... Similarly with regard to Fromstein and the Fromstein Corporations, it is possible that they considered the letters to contain non-confidential information. ...

When the evidence is considered as a whole, it appears to me that the Appellant and the owner-operators have formed a joint venture to carry on a taxi passenger service business. [124] The parties operate the business together. ... The relative weight of each will depend on the particular facts and circumstances of the case. [130] [53]   In addition to the Wiebe Door factors, a jurisprudential trend has emerged where the subjective intentions of the parties must also be considered. ... Furthermore, the remittance of EI premiums suggests that initially the Appellant-Intervenor was considered by the Appellant as an employee.   ...

The reason for this is that these organizations have built up worldwide reputations for credibility over the years, such that reports issued by them are recognized for their “general reputation for credibility” (Mahjoub at para. 72). [55]   Considered to be not only credible, but also independent, sources, there reports are used regularly and with good reason, by decision-makers at all levels in the field of immigration (Bakir at paras. 33-35; Sittampalam FC at para. 64; Mahjoub at para. 73). [56]   But what must be remembered above all, as this Court reminded us in Ndabambarire, is that while they may not be the best evidence, these sources of information are generally acknowledged to have sufficient probative weight to meet the burden of proof set out at section 33 of the Act, which requires, from what I recall, that the belief on which reasonable grounds to believe that the facts, acts or omissions set out in section 34 occurred, are occurring or may occur, be founded on more than mere suspicions, without having to meet the higher burden of proof on a balance of probabilities applicable in civil matters (Ndabambarire at para. 36). [57]   It suffices, Mugesera tells us, that reasonable ground to believe will exist “where there is an objective basis for the belief which is based on compelling and credible information” (Mugesera at para. 114), which does not require, in particular, that it be based on corroborated information. In fact, in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v USA, 2014 FC 416, this Court judged that the Supreme Court, in Mugesera, had waived the requirement for corroboration that had previously held sway: [23]   The Court in Mugesera described the need for information (evidence) that on an objective basis (as measured by the reasonable person assessing the probative value of the evidence) can be considered compelling (persuasive) and credible (reliable as to its source). ... The ID considered both documents, in which it noted the ambivalence as to certain actions conducted by FESCI, but these carried little weight compared to the evidence as a whole. [69]   After having consulted both documents, I cannot conclude, in light of the evidence as a whole, that the ID’s decision to assign these very little weight was unreasonable. [70]   Lastly, at the hearing of this case the applicant, still in the hope of undermining the reliability and credibility of the documentary evidence produced by the respondent, questioned the methodology used in drafting the report in Exhibit C-8, by Human Rights Watch, published in October 2011 and detailing the impunity of the post-electoral crimes committed in Côte d’Ivoire. ...

Paragraph 21 reads as follows: [21] Counsel for the Respondent relied on a decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in which Kiteley J. considered a rule similar to our Rule 170.1:  Treats Inc. v. ... Canada [31] decision, the FCA cautioned that “[c]are must be taken not to import the pronouncements in Hryniak uncritically, thereby improperly amending” the subject matter of rules of the courts. [32] This Court believes that i t is in this light that Hryniak must be considered. ... To the Court’s knowledge, the courts have not yet determined whether, for the purpose of the application of the ETA, the constituent elements (services) of a supply made under a contract between a supplier of a service and a recipient could be considered as part of a single supply made to another recipient.   ...

It would be particularly troubling for Section 302 and Section 165(7) to have that effect when the reassessment or additional assessment results in an amended notice of appeal that raises new issues, statutory provisions, facts or arguments that need to be considered and addressed in the reply, [22] or, as in this case, where a change to the amount in dispute affects the procedure that governs the appeal. [46]   Section 165(7) and Section 302 provide procedural relief which must be distinguished from the substantive appeal rights. [23] The purpose of Section 302 and Section 165(7) is fulfilled without any need for an abridgement in timelines of the nature suggested by the Appellant. ... No provision of the TCC Act, the ETA IP Rules or the GP Rules addresses whether an amended notice of appeal filed in reliance of Section 302 is to be considered a notice of appeal in respect of the reassessment or additional assessment or an amended pleading for the appeal previously filed. ... Because the Appellant purported to elect to have the GP Rules apply in the Amended Notice of Appeal, [32] it seems unlikely that she would seek to make that election. [58]   In my view, the differences between the general and informal procedure rules regarding the form of notice of appeal and service of the notice of appeal further highlight why an amended notice of appeal filed pursuant to Section 302 should be considered an originating document for purposes of establishing the timelines for filing the reply. [59]   Under the GP Rules, the notice of appeal must be in Form 21(1)(a), which requires particular details including matters not required in a notice of appeal for an appeal governed by the informal procedure rules. ...

It does not support a claim that any similar decision is an indication of a closed mind or an apprehension of bias. [82]   I have considered the other arguments advanced by the Applicant, and examined the extensive documentary record he submitted in support of his claim. ... These have been considered in the analysis of this question. [85]   The Applicant requested two orders: one to protect his identity, by either referring to him as “Mr. ... In this case, I have considered a number of factors, including: the result, the importance and complexity of the matter, the conduct of both parties including the number of procedural motions that were brought – including motions to pre-empt the hearing of the matter brought by the Respondent which had the effect of lengthening the proceedings, the fact that the Applicant represented himself, and also the fact that the Applicant made a number of serious claims against the individual officer involved in this matter, which claims were not supported by evidence and were dismissed in their entirety. [101]   In assessing all of these factors, I have decided not to award any costs in this matter. ...

The Applicant notes that subsection 229(1) has only been considered in two decisions, which were interrelated. ... This was upheld on appeal ([2011] FCAFC 142), and leave to appeal was denied ([2011] HCATrans 344). [33]   To a similar effect, the European Court of Justice also considered a case where a taxation authority withheld a portion of a net tax refund, and found that the relevant legislation did not authorize the authority to defer the refund pending the examination of the taxpayer’s return (Mednis v Valsts, [2012] ECJ C-525/11 at para 33). [34]   Finally, the Applicant argues that the other elements of the Apotex test for mandamus are satisfied: the CRA has a duty to pay it the refunds; it has satisfied the prerequisites to trigger the statutory duty and the CRA has not offered a reasonable justification for its failure to pay; there is no other adequate alternative remedy available; the order will have practical value because the delay in receiving the refund is having a dramatic impact on the Applicant’s business; and, an order for the CRA to pay the net tax refund is warranted by equity and the balance of convenience. ... Because the respondent had only issued an interim assessment and therefore the final amount due or owing had not been determined, there was a live issue between the parties and so the application was considered on its merits. [73]   Justice O’Keefe concluded that the first element of the Apotex test was met. ...

While a failure to inquire may be evidence of recklessness or criminal negligence, as for example, where a failure to inquire is a marked departure from the conduct expected of a reasonable person, wilful blindness is not simply a failure to inquire but, to repeat Professor Stuart’s words, “deliberate ignorance”. 50 The subjective nature of the wilful blindness standard also means that the personal attributes of the individual may be considered in determining whether the individual is wilfully blind. [40] Therefore, wilful blindness will be established if the respondent proves, on a balance of probabilities, that Mrs. ... The Queen, [17] this Court enumerated a number of circumstances that can be considered “red flags”: i) the magnitude of the advantage or omission; ii) the blatantness of the false statement and how readily detectable it is; iii) the lack of acknowledgment by the tax preparer who prepared the return in the return itself; iv) unusual requests made by the tax preparer; v) the tax preparer being previously unknown to the taxpayer; vi) incomprehensible explanations by the tax preparer; vii) whether others engaged the tax preparer or warned against doing so, or the taxpayer himself or herself expresses concern about telling others [42] These are only examples of circumstances that can be taken into consideration by the Court. ... It might well be that in some circumstances these situations can be considered “red flags”, but it is not the case here. ...

Thomson stated he never considered a trust agreement, letter of credit or other mechanism to ensure ability to pay the Part VIII tax liability but reiterated he felt the stock market investments, especially in Butler Mountain, would raise enough money to pay the tax bill. ... The liability of directors under Part VIII should be considered in a different light than the strict application of the due diligence required to ensure that source deductions of employees are remitted. ... M.N.R., [1992] 1 C.T.C. 2124, 92 D.T.C. 1066, The Honourable Judge Bonner of the Tax Court of Canada, considered the taxpayer's due diligence defence as a director of a corporation known as Atlantis and at pages 2126-27 (D.T.C. 1068) of his judgment stated: With regard to the failure of Atlantis to make the payment due under subsection 195(2) of the Act on or before the last day of December, 1984, the appellant testified that his understanding was that Part VIII tax was payable at or after the company’s year end and that if qualifying research was underway when the tax would otherwise have been due under subsection 195(2), the expenditures on such research would ultimately reduce the Part VIII tax liability. ...