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Sections 1 and 12 of Part V of Schedule VI provide specific and strict requirements that must be met for a sale to be considered an export sale and consequently, a zero-rated supply under the Act. [24]   Section 142 is the general provision used to determine whether a supply is deemed to be made inside or outside of Canada. ... Justice Lafleur gave examples of situations where insufficient evidence was provided to prove exportation; for example, when a rider to a Bill of Lading is provided without the actual Bill of Lading, or when the Bill of Lading is defective (e.g., not stamped, not dated, or incomplete, the Appellant’s name is missing) or when documents are provided but cannot be traced to the sale of the supply purportedly exported. [32]   In the case at bar, I am of the view that the Appellant has not provided the Court with sufficient and reliable evidence showing that the subject vehicles were exported by the Appellant from Canada to Nigeria. [33]   The following is a list of factors that I have considered in arriving at my decision: a.   ...

There is no obligation on the Minister’s delegate to reach any particular conclusion, nor can such relief be claimed as of right: Jenkins v Canada (Revenue), 2007 FC 295 at para 13 [Jenkins]. [42]   In reviewing a decision of the Minister’s delegate made under subsection 220(3.1) of the ITA, it has been held that “[t]he Court’s role is not to reweigh the evidence … but rather to examine if the Minister’s Delegate 'properly considered the evidence before [her] and that the decision was not based on considerations irrelevant or extraneous to the statutory purpose”: Easton v Canada (Revenue Agency), 2017 FC 113 at para 43 [internal citations omitted]. ... (f) undue delays in resolving an objection or an appeal, or in completing an audit. [47]   When relief is requested based on any of the situations enumerated in paragraph 23, the factors set out in paragraph 33 of the Guidelines are to be considered when determining whether to cancel or waive penalties and interest. ...

The Court is not entitled to reweigh the evidence, and so long as there is some evidence in support of the findings, the factual conclusions are not subject to being set aside unless in the clearest of cases (Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa,   2009 SCC 12; Njeri v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 291 at para 12). [16]   With respect to the Court’s approach to the quality of reasons, it is well understood that the Court must first seek to supplement the reasons before it seeks to subvert them, and the Officer is presumed to have considered all of the evidence (Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses' Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board),   2011 SCC 62 at para 12). ... And also he must have some ability to tell me what is in his mind or in his proposal that he is going to implement his plan, his proposal, he should have the knowledge and information, details to tell me what he's going to do and it is realistic that he can do it on his own. [39]   Moreover, I do not accept that “ability” should be considered absent the requirement to demonstrate the “intention” to carry through on a proposed future project to make a series of television films in Canada. ...

Moreover, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé observed that underlying all the factors to be considered when determining the duty of fairness required “is the notion that the purpose of the participatory rights contained within the duty of procedural fairness is to ensure that administrative decisions are made using a fair and open procedure, appropriate to the decision being made and its statutory, institutional, and social context, with an opportunity for those affected by the decision to put forward their views and evidence fully and have them considered by the decision-maker.” [24]   The Supreme Court in Baker identified five factors recognized in the jurisprudence that are relevant to determining what is required by the duty of procedural fairness in any case.   ...

The Court considered Taro’s arguments and concluded that an order directing the common hearing of invalidity issues would not necessarily result in Apotex having its judgement at the same time as Taro, just as the converse would not guarantee that Taro would be first to come to market. ... There is a significant interest in avoiding the risk of inconsistent decisions, in particular where the schedule that is currently set can be adhered to by all of the defendants, even if doing so imposes an added burden on Taro and Sandoz. [32]   Having carefully considered the submissions of the parties, I have concluded that it is in the interests of justice to add Taro and Sandoz as defendants in the hearing of common issues currently set for Teva and Apotex. ...

The reason is very simple: in the electoral context, granting an interlocutory injunction is essentially equivalent to a final decision, without the Court being able to render a considered decision on the merits. ... The fact that he waited until the very last moment to bring a motion is a factor that may be considered in assessing the balance of convenience: Cardinal v Cleveland Indians Baseball Company Limited Partnership, 2016 ONSC 6929, at paragraphs 69 to 73. [50]   In sum, I find that granting the injunction sought would impose significant inconvenience on the Opitciwan First Nation and its members, while Mr. ...

While the moving party must always put his or her best foot forward, the assessment of the merits of the underlying application may be based on a record and submissions that had to be prepared under significant time pressures, the exposition of the grounds for judicial review may necessarily be only a preliminary one, and the Court may not have much time for reflection. [26]   If the moving party does meet this elevated threshold at the first stage of the test, the anticipated result on the merits should be borne in mind when the second and third stages of the test are considered (RJR-MacDonald at 339).   ... Since these additional details go beyond the information that was before the officer when she made her decision, I have not considered it in assessing the merits of the proposed grounds for judicial review.   ...

Factors to be considered include: whether the conduct was planned and deliberate; the intent and motive of the defendant; whether the defendant persisted in the outrageous conduct over a lengthy period of time; whether the defendant concealed or attempted to cover up its misconduct; the defendant’s awareness that what he or she was doing was wrong; and whether the defendant profited from its misconduct. [50]   Applying these principles to the present case, I am not satisfied that an award of punitive damages is appropriate. ... It sought to quantify those costs at $15,000.00 but offered no evidence in support of that quantification, submitting only that this figure is less than its actual costs. [52]   At the hearing of this motion, the Court afforded the Plaintiff an opportunity to provide post-hearing written submissions on appropriate quantification of lump sum party-and-party costs, to be considered in the event the Court decided to award the Plaintiff costs on that basis. ...

[21]   Canada noted, and I agree, that the request for an Order granting the Applicants media accreditation is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court under the Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7: See Xie v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), (1994) 75 FTR 125 at para 17, Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development) v Rafuse, 2002 FCA 31 at paras 8 and 9, Canada (Attorney General) v Burnham, 2008 FCA 380 at para 11, Canada (Human Resources Development and Social Development) v Layden, 2009 FCA 14 at paras 10 to 15, and Adamson v Canada (Human Rights Commission), 2015 FCA 153 at para 62, leave to appeal refused, [2015] SCCA 380. [22]   The parties were informed at the commencement of the hearing that the motions would be considered only with respect to the request that the Court order the Commission to grant the accreditation that was sought. [23]   The motions before the Court are mandatory interlocutory injunctions, as they are in the nature of an injunction directing the Respondent Commission to do something. ... There is no suggestion that these are the only factors a court may consider: (i)   The nature of the decision being made and the process followed in making it; (ii)   The nature of the statutory scheme and the terms of the statute pursuant to which the decision-maker operates; (iii)   The importance of the decision to those affected; (iv)   The legitimate expectations of those challenging the decision regarding the procedures to be followed or the result to be reached; and (v)   The choices made by the decision-maker regarding the procedure followed. [43]   As the Supreme Court noted in para 22, “underlying all these factors is the notion that the purpose of participatory rights contained within the duty of procedural fairness is to ensure that administrative decisions are made using a fair and open procedure, appropriate to the decision being made and its statutory, institutional, and social context, with an opportunity for those affected by the decision to put forward their views and evidence fully and have them considered by the decision-maker.” [44]   The Commission submits that an analysis of the Baker factors points to these Applicants being “owed fairness that fell in the lower end of the spectrum.”   ...

The RPD is presumed to have considered all of the evidence before it, and the RPD’s reasons demonstrated a thorough review of the evidence including the Applicant’s testimony as to risk in Basra and the objective country conditions concerning the situation for Shia Muslims. ... He submits that, at a minimum, the RAD was required to acknowledge the existence of the letters and that failing to do so raises questions as to whether that evidence was considered in the making of the decision. [36]   I note that an appeal before the RAD is not a true de novo proceeding and, as noted above, the RAD may rely on the RPD’s credibility findings (Huruglica at paras 79, 70). ...