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(h)        Thus, effective August 1, 2004, all supplies made by the Appellant in the course of the commercial activities of his business during the period in issue constituted taxable supplies for which a 7% tax on the value of the consideration for the supply was payable by the Appellant's recipients, and the Appellant had to collect this tax and remit it to the Respondent's representatives.     ...   [9]      The arguments based on ignorance, incapacity related to medical problems, or other causes that elicit great sympathy for the Appellant, are not relevant and should not be taken into consideration in determining the merits of the assessment ...

The Defendant engages himself to pay to the Ministère du Revenu the security of one month of alimentary pension; 5−         The amount of the alimony pension will be indexed January first of each year, according to article 590 of the Civil code of Quebec; 6−         The Defendant shall pay to the Applicant an amount of 10,000.00 $ as lump sum, payable September 17, 1999, and in consideration of this payment, the Applicant renounce to claim to the Defendant all form of alimony pension in the future. ... This is obvious from a comparison of the situation before and after the agreement of September 15, 1999. [9]      Before, the appellant was paying his wife $200 per week plus varying amounts for electricity, mortgage taxes and so forth, and was also voluntarily paying $400 per month for the two children. [10]     Commencing on October 1, 1999 the obligation to pay rent, hydro, telephone and so forth came to an end, the obligation to pay $200 per week to his wife ceased in consideration of a lump sum payment of $10,000 and the obligation to pay such things as rent, hydro etc. was replaced by an alimentary pension for the children of $575 per week. ...

Christina Tari Counsel for the Respondent: Craig Maw____________________________________________________________________ ORDER           Upon motion made by counsel for the appellant for an Order under section 58 of the Tax Court of Canada Rules (General Procedure) for a determination, before hearing, of a question;           And upon reading the Affidavit of Michelle Julfs, filed;           And upon consideration of the oral and written submissions of counsel for the parties;           The application is dismissed. ... That position is stated in the notice of motion as follows: "... that the appellant did not make a gift pursuant to subsection 18.1(1) of the Income Tax Act because the appellant received consideration or material benefits in each year in the forms of (i) a loan, and (ii) a tax receipt. ...

./2           And upon consideration of the oral and written submissions of counsel for the parties;             And upon consideration of the written submissions of counsel for the parties upon the request by counsel for the respondent for a reconsideration of the Order of the Court dated June 22, 2006;             It is ordered that the respondent be allowed to make the amendments sought to the extent set out in the Reasons for Order and in the Supplemental Reasons for Order and that the Order of this court dated March 17, 2006, setting a timetable for the further steps in the appeal be vacated and the parties are directed to communicate with the court within 30 days of the final disposition of this motion to set a new timetable.   ...

The overall picture must be taken into consideration. As stated by Major J. in Sagaz, a trial judge should consider the answer to the question "whose business is it". [9]      In applying the Wiebe Door tests, I believe the control test is inconclusive. ... In answering the question whose business was it, I have no difficulty in concluding that it was the Appellant's business. [10]     While DiToro was an expert trainer and needed little or no instruction direction, the Appellant controlled where he trained, who he trained and what equipment he used. [11]     As stated, while the intention of the parties must be taken into consideration, the factual existing relationship must be determined particularly as in this instance the parties' intention differs. ...

In addition, he had no record of the various routes travelled by the drivers, who were often required to change routes, depending on seniority. [7]      The overall weekly remuneration was not in dispute; moreover, both the employer and the Appellant gave exactly the same testimony on this point. [8]      The Appellant stated that, at first, he had not paid attention to the number of hours of work, since the weekly salary suited him; he did whatever work was to be done, without asking any questions. [9]      He began to more closely examine the assessment of the number of hours shown on his pay stub from the moment one co-worker mentioned to him that it could potentially have an impact on his entitlement to Employment Insurance benefits. [10]     He then began making requests to his employer to correct the number of hours entered in the payroll so that his pay statement would show the actual number of hours of work, not 20 hours. [11]     The employer refused to take action because, following a union accreditation, the parties had started to negotiate a labour agreement, which precluded any change or amendment to the working conditions of the employees concerned by the eventual collective agreement. [12]     The employer, like the Appellant, expressly admitted that, at the time of hiring, the consideration of $300 a week had been the fundamental issue and that the agreement had in fact concerned mainly that issue, while acknowledging that the number of hours that that required had been a more secondary matter. [13]     Lastly, the parties admitted that the hourly wage paid for the specific work (making special trips) not included in the overall consideration of $300 had been set at $10. [14]     That hourly wage thus corresponded more to the assessment of the Appellant, according to whom the weekly salary of $300 was paid to him for 26 hours of work, the equivalent of an hourly wage of $11.50. [15]     If it had been 20 hours of work, as the Respondent determined, that would have represented an hourly wage of $15. [16]     Based on that assessment, the Appellant would have received one-third less salary when he had to make special trips, which is not very logical. ...

  [7]      Although the introductory comments by the Appellant’s agent do not constitute sworn testimony, counsel for the Respondent indicated that there was no challenge to their veracity, and I have taken them into consideration in my conclusion ... I have a great deal of sympathy for the taxpayer because his conduct was most honourable and deserving of substantial consideration. ...

The special circumstance and consideration involves the nature of the business and being part of an international company, my frequent travels on business trips, therefore, justifies delay in making this application. ... However, the fact that one or more related corporations may be reassessed at some time in the future is not a consideration that brings this case within subsection 167(5) of the Act. [6]      Before dismissing the application, I would simply note that if Mr. ...

Since I am not satisfied that the reassessment was in fact sent pursuant to the requirements of the Act, I must find that the Minister never sent the Appellant the result of his consideration of the Appellant's Notice of Objection. ... In this case, the Minister had already made an assessment; it is only the Minister's consideration of the objection that must be made with all due dispatch ...

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT Dussault, J.T.C.C. [1]     This is an appeal from an assessment made under section 160 of the Income Tax Act (the " Act "). [2]     In making that assessment, the Minister of National Revenue (the "Minister") made the assumptions of facts stated in subparagraphs 4(a) to (u) of the Reply to the Notice of Appeal, which read as follows: [TRANSLATION] (a)         on October 13, 1998, Robert Thibault became a tax debtor for the 1995 taxation year, owing the sum of $29,156.35; (b)         on October 4, 1995, a notarial contract of sale was drawn up and registered under number 203 287 at Richmond on October 6, 1995; (c)         by that contract, Robert Thibault sold the appellant an immovable located at 67 and 69 Rue Lavoie, Bromptonville, Quebec J0B 1H0 (hereinafter the "property") for the sum of $69,500; (d)         in 1995, the municipal value of the property was $92,700; (e)         the property is a rental property; (f)          the vendor of the property, Robert Thibault, is the de facto spouse of Maryse Vigneault, the appellant's sister; (g)         the appellant reported rental income from a property located at 67 and 69 Rue Lavoie in Bromptonville in his income tax returns for the 1996 and 1997 taxation years: 1996 1997 Gross rental income $11,220 $6,060 Rental expenses $ 9,570 $5,800 Net rental income $ 1,650 $    260 (h)         in 1997, Yves Vigneault sold the property for $70,000; (i)          on March 26, 1999, a notice of assessment in the amount of $23,200 bearing number 13143 was issued to Yves Vigneault under subsection 160(1) of the Act; (j)          under subsection 160(1) of the Act, the benefit was calculated as follows: Municipal assessment of 67 and 69 Rue Lavoie $92,700 Yves Vigneault's purchase price $69,500 Benefit $23,200 (k)         the total of all amounts that the transferor was required to pay under the Act, during or in respect of the taxation year during which the property was transferred or in any previous taxation year, amounted to $29,156.35 as of October 13, 1998; (l)          the fair market value (hereinafter the "FMV") of the property sold being greater than the consideration paid by the appellant, and the difference between the FMV and the consideration paid by the appellant being at least equal to Robert Thibault's tax debt, the Minister considered the appellant jointly and severally liable for the tax debt of $23,200 of Robert Thibault, the transferor of the property; (m)        Robert Thibault declared bankruptcy on October 30, 1998; (n)         the transferee and transferor are jointly and severally liable to pay the tax owed by the transferor at the time of the transfer. [3]     Counsel for the respondent acknowledged that the property's market value was $80,000 and not $92,700 at the time of the transfer in 1995, such that the amount assessed under section 160 of the Act must be reduced by $23,200 to $10,500 if the assessment proves to be well founded in other respects. [4]     The appellant claims that he did not become the owner of the property in question in 1995 and that Robert Thibault is still the owner despite the notarial contract dated October 4, 1995. ...