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There is a distinction, however, in dealing with these cases and dealing with others, and that is, that farmers—and I am using the word in the wide general interpretation given to it within the Act—are given a special consideration, as I have said, under paragraph 85F(1)(a), that is given to only two classes of taxpayers: professions in the wide sense, and farmers. ...

One consideration may point so clearly that it dominates other and vaguer indications In the contrary direction. ...

Confining my consideration to the first claim, the question seems to be whether there was indeed a benefit conferred on the appellant by virtue of his contract of employment with IMC. ...

When this was done for the years under consideration, the appellant’s name appeared as the one-half owner of the property and consequently vis-a-vis a third party, as is the Minister herein, the appellant was such an owner. ...

In deciding the appeal, it must be taken into consideration that the persons involved in the transactions were in the real estate business at large. ...

There cannot be any comparison between the cost of demolition of the appellant’s buildings and those of Emco because the Emco buildings were so large that the cost had to be taken into consideration, whereas in the present appeal the cost was so nominal that it could not disturb the apportionment estimated by the respondent. ...

The second requirement of subsection (3) of section 83 is that: (3) An amount that would otherwise be included in computing the income for a taxation year of a person* [1] who has, either under an arrangement with the prospector made before the prospecting, exploration or development work or as employer of the prospector, advanced money for, or paid part or all of, the expenses of prospecting or exploring for minerals or of developing a property for minerals, shall not be included in computing his income for the year if it is the consideration for (a) an interest in a mining property acquired under the arrangement under which hey [2] made the advance or paid the expenses, or, if the prospector was his employee, acquired by him through the employee’s efforts,... ...

It was a real tug-of- war between parties, with taxes a major consideration. ...

It is a question of whether certain payments made by the appellant husband are deductible as alimony payments under paragraph 11(1)(l) of the Income Tax Act, RSC 1952, c 148. 2 The case would probably not be before the Board at this time if it were not for the decision of Mr Justice Walsh in MNR v R E Hastie, [1974] F.C. 117, [1974] C.T.C. 131, 74 D.T.C. 6114, and of this Board in subsequent cases following the Hastie case, particularly J A C Belanger v Minister of National Revenue, [1974] C.T.C. 2170, 74 D.T.C. 1130. 3 The interpretation of the meaning of paragraph (l) of subsection 11(1) has been almost completely reversed as a result of the Hastie decision. 4 In the Belanger case I said that, in my view, Mr Justice Walsh had not taken an irresponsible approach to the interpretation but had, in my respectful view, merely brought the law up to current standards and in line with changing social conditions. 5 However, one must be careful that one does not fall into the area of irresponsibility when determining what is a deductible expense, pursuant to paragraph 11(1)(l), for the spouse making the claim. 6 This is an unusual case in that there was an order of the Supreme Court of Ontario dated May 21, 1968, which was entered in the records of the Supreme Court of Ontario on June 12, 1968. 7 In that order, which was an order of the Master, the appellant in this case was ordered to pay $100 a week plus certain other items. 8 This situation continued until June 16, 1969, I believe it was, when a separation agreement was entered into between the appellant and his spouse setting out in detail the respective obligations of each. 9 The appellant claims now that, in the light of the Hastie decision, he should be entitled to deduct all the items which he has been ordered to pay pursuant to the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ontario and which, except for the amounts, have been carried forward into the separation agreement of June 16, 1969, which is appellant's Exhibit No 2. 10 I think I said in the Belanger case (and I interpreted Mr Justice Walsh's decision in the Hastie case by looking at the order or the agreements as a whole to see what the husband was being ordered to pay) that it seemed to me that the decision really set out a mode of calculating the dollar-and-cent value of what the paying spouse was responsible for paying and deducting under paragraph 11(1)(l). 11 There is testimony in this case that the wife would not and did not make payments that were due on the former matrimonial home, and I think one of the comments that I made in referring to the Hastie decision was that the short-circuiting of payments from spouse to recipient for the benefit of the recipient spouse or children should not preclude the deduction to the spouse who was making the payments, because such a preclusion might work a hardship on the offspring of the marriage. 12 In this case, the evidence before me is that there were three children, the oldest being about ten and the youngest only about one or two years old at the time the order was entered into. 13 As I said in a recent case in Ottawa (the name of which escapes me) and as has been said by the appellant today, it is only in recent years, when incomes have surged ahead either by virtue of changing social conditions, inflation or be it what may, that persons who would ordinarily not have taken the trouble to question an assessment of the Taxation Division are now in a bracket where they will and do question their assessments. 14 I do not say this applies directly to this appellant, because he is a lawyer, but I think a great many respectable and highly competent legal firms have, over the years, drawn up documents without any real appreciation or concern for the tax consequences of the documents. 15 I think, also, with all due respect, that the same applies to my former colleagues on the Bench, and that a great many orders and judgments are or have been issued without any consideration as to the tax consequences to either or both of the litigants before them. 16 Therefore I do not find it unusual that the order of June 12, 1968, or May 21, 1968, as the case may be, should not contain, or does not contain, the precise wording that would fit the items enumerated therein clearly within the framework of paragraph 11(1)(l) of the Act. ...

This the respondent did not do, and the Board sets aside any further consideration of that aspect of the respondent’s argument. ...