Search - consideration

The appellant takes the position that the amounts received by him from the sales were not taxable by virtue of subsection 83(3) of the Income Tax Act as it read in 1965, being the consideration for an interest in a mining property acquired for the appellant by a prospector pursuant to an arrangement whereby the appellant advanced money to or paid the expenses of the prospector for the purpose of prospecting or exploring for minerals and thereby being exempt income within the meaning of paragraph 139(1)(o) of the said Act. ... It appears clear from a careful reading of section 83 as a whole that its purpose is to encourage development of mineral resources by, inter alia, prospectors, or persons who have financed prospectors, by ensuring they are not taxed upon amounts received in consideration for mining properties which they have prospected, explored or developed. ... No exhaustive list has been compiled and perhaps no exhaustive list can be compiled of the considerations which are relevant in determining that question, nor can strict rules be laid down as to the relative weight which the various considerations should carry in particular cases. ...

Company Inc must be treated as having been issued. for a total consideration of Five Hundred and Sixty-Three Thousand, Two Hundred and Four Dollars ($563,204), of which Sixty-Three Thousand, Two Hundred and Four Dollars ($63,204) was paid in cash and Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000) in the form of a conveyance of the rights to use the said patents, franchises and trade marks. ... These can be regarded in either of two ways: (a) The Appellant had acquired a gift; or (b) The consideration which the US corporation paid for its 49% interest in the Appellant consisted not only of $63,204 in cash, but also included the rights to use the existing technology which it transferred to the Appellant. 4. ... As a matter of fact, therefore, in my view, there was no gift of these intangible assets listed in the so-called Deed of Gift (Exhibit 1E) by the US Company to the appellant, nor were they part of the consideration to the extent of $500,000 by which the US Company acquired a 51% equity share interest in the appellant in February 1957. ...

An amount received by one person from another, (a) during a period while the payee was an officer of, or In the employment of, the payer, or (b) on account or in lieu of payment of, or In satisfaction of, an obligation arising out of an agreement made by the payer with the payee immediately prior to, during or immediately after a period that the payee was an officer of, or in the employment of, the payer, shall be deemed, for the purpose of section 5, to be remuneration for the payee’s services rendered as an officer or during the period of employment, unless it is established that, irrespective of when the agreement, if any, under which the amount was received was made or the form or legal effect thereof, it cannot reasonably be regarded as having been received (I) as consideration or partial consideration for accepting the office or entering into the contract of employment, (ii) as remuneration or partial remuneration for services as an officer or under the contract of employment, or (iii) in consideration or partial consideration for covenant with reference to what the officer or employee is, or is not, to do before or after the termination of the employment. ...

Les faits que je crois pertinents sont les suivants: depuis plusieurs années, l’appelante est marchande de meubles et acheta en mars 1970, de diverses personnes, huit bâtiments à logements et certains avec un local commercial; ces propriétés sont adjacentes l’une à l’autre; le prix d’achat payé à 4 propriétaires différents totalise $134,500 et le prix pour l’achat de 2 propriétés d’un autre propriétaire est indiqué pour chaque propriété à $1 et autre considération; à l’audition, l’on n’a pas pris soin d’établir la valeur de la considération de ces deux propriétés; le prix total payé, tenant compte de cette considération inconnue, est donc nécessairement plus que $134,500; le prix dans chaque cas est payable après 2 ans, excepté un cas où il est payable après un an; les baux devaient être respectés sous peine de perdre le bénéfice du terme; les propriétés acquises sont assez vieilles et aucune ne comporte de logements de classe; l’on a établi approximativement, pour l’année 1972, $9,700 de revenu brut de loyer; sans tenir compte de l’intérêt, ce qui est anormal, l’on établit les dépenses à $2,800 et l’on obtient un revenu de $6,900; les quatre contrats de vente où le prix réel est indiqué démontrent que l’intérêt, pour douze mois, et pas nécessairement pour 1972, serait de 9% sur $10,000 ou $900, 8% sur $27,000 ou $2,160, 10% sur $40,000 ou $4,000, 10% sur $19,000 ou $1,900, soit un total de $8,960; si l’on déduit $8,960 d’intérêt, ce qui est normal, du montant de $6,900 de revenu de loyer, l’on obtient un déficit de $2,060; le témoin de l’appelante, un comptable agréé, n’a pas cru bon de prendre en considération les intérêts comme il se devait; le président-directeur général de l’appelante a été échevin puis maire de Sherbrooke vers le temps ou au temps de l’achat des bâtisses adjacentes; de par ses fonctions d’échevin ou encore plus de maire, le président-directeur général était ou devait être au courant des développements en sa ville et ce avant quiconque d’autre; vers la fin de l’année 1971 l’appelante sait qu’un très gros centre d’achats s’installera à Sherbrooke et que des maisons de renommée nationale y vendront des meubles et feront concurrence à l’appelante; dès la fin de 1971 l’on parle de démolir les propriétés qui sont toutes adjacentes; l’appelante a l’intention de déménager; l’appelante commande une étude qui indique qu’il faut agrandir les locaux, que l’achat de meubles se fait dans le centre da la ville, qu’un déménagement doit être fait en demeurant dans le centre de la ville, que le site des bâtisses groupées serait bon; sur la foi de ce rapport, l’appelante se sait confirmée qu'il lui faut d’autres locaux; l’appelante, tout comme le rapport, considère que le site des bâtisses adjacentes est adéquat pour y construire son magasin; une autre étude est faite qui démontre incidemment que la placement est meilleur s’il y a une construction nouvelle; en décembre 1972 l’on décide d’effectuer la démolition à un coût de $4,000; l’appelante construisit son magasin, son entrepôt et eut un parc de stationnement pouvant garer 40 voitures; les immeubles acquis en mars 1970 ont été gardés jusqu’en avril 1973, soit 3 ans et 1 mois, mais le but de démolir et de construire peut avoir été la fin motivant l’achat des propriétés adjacentes. ...

As such, the applicant maintains that the Director's exercise of discretion to refuse to waive interest and penalties was not reasonable. [17] The respondent submits that the first fairness report took into consideration the alleged economic hardship of the applicant because it performed an analysis on the monthly family cash surplus. ... (See fairness request report- second review, respondent's record at page 26.) [18] The respondent claims that the Director's decision to agree with the report's findings was not a reviewable error and that the latter did in fact take into consideration the alleged economic hardship of the applicant in making his decision to deny a fairness request. [19] I disagree with the Director's decision vis-à-vis the second fairness report and the applicant's alleged economic hardship. ... If the report is to take into consideration spousal income, why would it not take into consideration spousal expenses in determining whether or not the applicant is experiencing economic hardship? ...

The rule has been that decisions classified as discretionary may only be reviewed on limited grounds such as the bad faith of decision-makers, the exercise of discretion for an improper purpose, and the use of irrelevant considerations:    see, for example, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 2 "> Maple Lodge Farms Ltd. v. ... Nor was it established that the decision-maker exercised his discretion for an improper purpose or used irrelevant considerations. ... Where the statutory discretion has been exercised in good faith and, where required, in accordance with the principles of natural justice, and where reliance has not been placed upon considerations irrelevant or extraneous to the statutory purpose, the courts should not interfere.... ...

Standard of Review [20]      In a recent case concerning subsection 220(3.1), Heneghan J. cited Kaiser, supra, when considering the standard of review of discretionary decisions in the context of subsection 220(3.1): The scope of judicial review in relation to a Ministerial decision, made in the exercise of discretion, is limited to reviewing whether the Minister has properly exercised his discretion, with regard for relevant considerations and without regard to extraneous factors. ... Where the statutory discretion has been exercised in good faith and, where required, in accordance with the principles of natural justice, and where reliance has not been placed upon considerations irrelevant or extraneous to the statutory purpose, the courts should not interfere. ... There is no indication of bad faith on the part of the Minister or his delegate, no breach of natural justice and there was no reliance placed on considerations extraneous to the statutory provisions, hence the Court should not intervene. [25]      The application for judicial review is therefore dismissed. ...

Under existing legislation, consideration may be given to cancelling or waiving interest in those situations where an individual is experiencing financial difficulties and has no ability to pay the liability in full. ... Where the statutory discretion has been exercised in good faith and, where required, in accordance with the principles of natural justice, and where reliance has not been placed upon considerations irrelevant or extraneous to the statutory purpose, the courts should not interfere. [22]            The Applicant's personal liability for payment of the taxes was confirmed by the Tax Court of Canada in its judgment dated September 21, 2000. ... The Applicant was entitled to have his case considered on the basis of the record and without consideration of extraneous facts such as those contained in the previous application of a separate person. ...

Further, the Applicant’s length of employment is equally irrelevant with regard to reporting obligations and the calculation of penalties applicable to omissions in this respect. [27]            As for what the Applicant characterizes as irrelevant considerations contained in the summary of facts, particularly the consideration of the fact that he never complained of the missing T4A slip, the Court disagrees with the Applicant’s characterization of this consideration as being irrelevant. ... That he neglected to do so is a relevant consideration in the circumstances. [28]            There is no evidence that the decision maker (not the author of the summary of facts) was biased. ...

  [7]                The timetable relevant to the consideration of this motion is as follows:   August 10, 2009 Statement of Claim filed December 8, 2009 Statement of Defence and Counterclaim filed May 4, 2010 Reply to Defence and Counterclaim filed June 18, 2010 Action placed under Case Management     January 10, 2011 Trial date fixed for 35 days in Toronto, beginning 22 October, 2013 August 9, 2013 Amended Defence and Counterclaim filed on consent September 29, 2012 Bifurcation Order deferring the issues as to damages, etc. ... Sarfati’s report October 25, 2013 Solicitors for Janssen file a letter with the Court seeking a date to discuss when a formal motion to amend their pleadings can be heard October 31, 2013 The Notice of Motion respecting the matters now under consideration is filed November 5, 2013 Teleconference between the Court and Counsel fixing this motion to be heard November 7, 2013 November 7, 2013 This motion is heard December 2, 2013 Date fixed for trial to begin   [8]                As can be seen, Janssen’s solicitors did not retain Dr. ... Ultimately, it boils down to a consideration of simple fairness, common sense and the interest that the courts have that justice be done. [11]            On all the factors considered by Bowman, TCJ- timeliness, extent to which the amendments would delay a trial, the extent to which a position taken by the party seeking the amendment would require the other party to change its position- the Plaintiffs have, as I have set out above, satisfied me that no amendment should be made. ...