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The Federal Court judge also found in paragraph 45 that “[t]he legal advice culminates in the Abacus Memo, which is primarily the work product of Abacus, based on its significant experience in similar transactions, but with the contribution of the Respondents' lawyer, at least as depicted in the disclosed emails” and in paragraph 68 that “the Abacus memo was the fruit of cooperative efforts of both lawyers who were highly experienced in the legal considerations of income tax and related commercial law subjects”. [9]   The Abacus memo was sent to Abacus and Gillis. ...

The new subsection provides: 256 (5.11) For the purposes of the Act, the determination of whether a taxpayer has, in respect of a corporation, any direct or indirect influence that, if exercised, would result in control in fact of the corporation, shall 256 (5.11) Pour l’application de la présente loi, lorsqu’il s’agit de déterminer si un contribuable a, relativement à une société, une influence directe ou indirecte dont l’exercice entraînerait le contrôle de fait de la société: (a) take into consideration all factors that are relevant in the circumstances; and a) il est tenu compte de la totalité des critères qui sont applicables dans les circonstances; (b) not be limited to, and the relevant factors need not include, whether the taxpayer has a legally enforceable right or ability to effect a change in the board of directors of the corporation, or its powers, or to exercise influence over the shareholder or shareholders who have that right or ability. b) il n’est pas tenu compte uniquement de la question — qui n’a pas à être l’un des critères applicables à la détermination — de savoir si le contribuable a un droit ayant force exécutoire, ou la capacité, de faire modifier le conseil d’administration de la société ou les pouvoirs de celui-ci ou d’exercer une influence sur l’actionnaire ou les actionnaires qui ont ce droit ou cette capacité. [23]   Finally, subsection 251(1) of the ITA sets out the circumstances where parties are deemed not to deal with each other at arm’s length. ...

The definition of “eligible individual” in section 122.6 was amended to provide that a parent of a qualified dependant would be an eligible individual if that parent: (i)   is the parent who primarily fulfils the responsibility for the care and upbringing of the qualified dependant and who is not a shared-custody parent in respect of the qualified dependant, or (ii)   is a shared-custody parent in respect of the qualified dependant, [15]   The definition of shared-custody parent was also added to section 122.6 of the Act, which read as follows for the period in issue in this appeal: shared-custody parent in respect of a qualified dependent at a particular time means, where the presumption referred to in paragraph (f) of the definition eligible individual does not apply in respect of the qualified dependant, an individual who is one of the two parents of the qualified dependant who parent ayant la garde partagée  S’entend, à l’égard d’une personne à charge admissible à un moment donné, dans le cas où la présomption énoncée à l’alinéa f) de la définition de particulier admissible ne s’applique pas à celle-ci, du particulier qui est l’un des deux parents de la personne à charge qui, à la fois: (a) are not at that time cohabitating spouses or common-law partners of each other, a) ne sont pas, à ce moment, des époux ou conjoints de fait visés l’un par rapport à l’autre; (b) reside with the qualified dependant on an equal or near equal basis, and b) résident avec la personne à charge sur une base d’égalité ou de quasi-égalité; (c) primarily fulfil the responsibility for the care and upbringing of the qualified dependant when residing with the qualified dependant, as determined in consideration of prescribed factors, c) lorsqu’ils résident avec la personne à charge, assument principalement la responsabilité pour le soin et l’éducation de celle-ci, ainsi qu’il est déterminé d’après des critères prévus par règlement. [16]   The only part of the definition of “shared-custody parent” that is in in dispute in this case is paragraph (b) and in particular the phrase “on an equal or near equal basis”. ...

It is neither a decision of the Board, “nor does it appear to be the product of any adjudicative process involving the admission and consideration of evidence” (ibid.). ...

Rather, it means that a decision that departs from longstanding practices or established internal decisions will be reasonable if that departure is justified, thereby reducing the risk of arbitrariness, which would undermine public confidence in administrative decision makers and in the justice system as a whole. [40]   I am therefore of the view that the decisions of the CBSA were not reasonable in light of this important contextual consideration in the present case. ...

As noted, the appellant’s argument that the judge erred in his consideration of subsection 231.2(3) is inconsistent with the provision’s legislative history. [23]     When Parliament first enacted section 231.2, it required the Minister to meet several statutory preconditions in order to access the provision’s power. ...

The object or purpose of the Act in question may also call for consideration though, generally speaking, speeches made in the Legislature at the time of enactment of the measure are inadmissible as having little evidential weight. ...

Consideration of What Partners Dealing at Arm’s Length Would Do [28] The crux of this case is what should be considered in deciding whether an allocation of income is “reasonable in the circumstances having regard to […] such other factors as may be relevant”. ...

Since argument, the parties have, at the Court’s request, filed further memoranda and I have given the best consideration that I can to their respective submissions in reaching my conclusion on this very complicated matter.s [10] The position, as I see it, is as follows: (1) on the facts of this case, the paragraph 11 (1)(v) benefit is such part of the estate tax levied in respect of the estate ($174,474.72) as is determined under the Act to be “applicable” to the death benefit ($312,125.61) (clause 11 (1)(v)(i)(A)); (2) the part of the estate tax so “applicable” is that part of such tax ‘‘that is proportionate to the value of that property”* [11] (ie, that is “proportionate” to the amount of the death benefit) (first part of subsection 58(4)); (3) prima facie, paragraph (2) means the part of the estate tax that the value of the property (ie, the amount of the death benefit) is of the value of all the property passing on death (ie, the aggregate of the values of all “property” passing on death); (4) however, the second part of subsection 58(4) requires that, where the property passing on death includes property the value of which is deductible in computing aggregate taxable value under subsection 7(1), no part of the tax shall be considered as applicable to ‘‘the property so included” and, therefore, the rule as suggested by paragraph (3) must be revised to say that, for the purposes of computing the subsection 11(1) deduction in this case, the total estate tax is to be regarded as applicable to the value of the property passing on death (ie, $1,627,797.30) minus the value of property the value of which is deductible under subsection 7(1) (ie, $49,500 + $48,911.75) or a net amount of $1,529,385.55; (5) the paragraph 11 (1)(v) deduction in this case is, therefore, The above mathematical conclusion is based on figures in the respondent’s supplementary memorandum which are not challenged by the appellant’s supplementary memorandum filed in reply thereto.! ...

See: “Bill C-56, An Act to amend the statute law relating to income tax and to authorize payments related to provincial sales tax reductions”, Consideration in committee of the whole, House of Commons Debates, 30-3, No. 6 (12 June 1978) at 6315 (Hon Jean Chrétien); 4145356 Canada Ltd. v. ...