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Ryder, [1907] A.C. 420, at 423, 424, said that the justices there were acting " " administratively, for they are exercising a discretion which may depend upon considerations of policy and practical good sense—and they must, of course, act honestly. ... But that was a certiorari proceeding and the Licensing Act under consideration ‘‘expressly leaves” as Lord Loreburn observed, to the discretion of the justices whether they will grant licences or not to persons whom they deem fit and proper persons. ...

If I do not refer to all those cases or to all those arguments it is not to be inferred that I have failed to do so from any disre- gard of those cases and arguments, to all of which I have given consideration. ... It seems to me that the reasoning in that case is applicable to the one under consideration. ...

Then the term "‘depletion’’ is frequently used, and that here has the same meaning as "‘exhaustion’’, as used in sec. 5(a) of the Income War Tax Act, and it has reference to an allowance for the "depletion” of the oil reserves recoverable from the appellant’s oil leases; it is a measure of the annual exhaustion of the mass or source of oil intended for sale, and ordinarily there the chief factor to be taken into consideration is the proportion which the volume of oil exhausted or won in any year, and which becomes stock in hand, bears to the estimated whole volume of oil likely to be recovered in the life time of the oil bearing leases. ... The points in issue seem to have been the subject of careful consideration by the taxing authorities, in respect of matters about which there may well be a variety of opinions. ...

Griffin to say that the appeal in respect of this particular question should be limited to a consideration of the rentals paid and received in 1938 and if he failed on that then the appellant would account for the tax upon the rentals received in 1937. ... The appellant in his income tax returns made in 1936 and in 1937 treated the warehouse rentals as income, and the question of the resale of the warehouse back to the Malkin Company never arose for consideration until November of 1938. ...

It must be kept in mind that there is no question in the present case as to whether the items with which we are presenly concerned are movables or immovables, for by s. 361, para. 3, it is provided as follows: "‘Immovable property shall also comprise all pipes, poles, wires, rails, tunnels, conduits and other constructions and apparatus of every nature used to produce or distribute for public use, motive power, light, heat, water, electricity or for traction purposes, constructed or placed on, over or under property, streets, highways, or elsewhere within the limits of the City, or for conveying or receiving telegraph, telephone or pneumatic messages. ”’ No doubt the City is authorized to impose taxes for certain purposes upon immovable property including such as is now under consideration, but when we turn to the power of the City to impose a tax to be ealled the "‘business’’ tax, the authorization conferred is not an authorization to impose a tax on all immovables but is restricted to a tax upon premises occupied for certain purposes and "‘in which’’ the business is carried on. ... On the whole, I reach the conclusion that the expression "‘premises in which’’ is not sufficiently clear and unambiguous as to warrant its extension so as to include equipment. of the nature now under consideration within its terms, and as a consequence the inclusion of these poles, wires, conduits and station equipment in the defendant’s tax roll for the purpose of assessing’ a business tax thereon is illegal and ultra vires. ...

But, in order that the Company may be exempt from paying the taxes claimed by the City in the case now under consideration, it is not necessary that it should be either ‘‘an instrumentality of the Government, or an emanation of the Crown’’. ... Moreover, with due respect, the Regina judgment, although entitled to great consideration, cannot be looked upon as an authority in this Court. ...

Judicial consideration has been given to the meaning of these words in the case of Bahamas General Trust Company et al v. ... After consideration of these decisions I have reached the conclusion that the deductions here claimed by the Appellant do not come within the nature of ^travelling expenses’’ under this section which, in my view, must be in the nature of itinerant expenses. ...

I do not think this sub-section (sub-section (2) (c) of section 53 of the Finance Act, 1920), is referring to that class of consideration at all. ... “In my opinion this is the meaning of the word ‘interest’ in the enactment under consideration, and, where one company stands in such a relationship to another, the former can properly be said to have a controlling interest in the latter. ...

The ASSIGNEE, in consideration of the assignment to him of the interest provided in clause 1, covenants and agrees out of his receipts from the business of said firm to pay to the Assignor during the latter’s life the sum of annually, by quarterly installments on the first days of Janu ary, April, July and October in each and every year, commencing January 1st, 1928, said annual sum to be the first charge on any receipts from the business of the firm which the Assignee may receive during each and every year. ... Fetherstonhaugh, I found in the Smart Estate Appeal that they were paid by Smart in consideration of the sale by J. ...

Minister of National Revenue, [1940] A.C. 127, which related to a claim for depreciation, the Board held that the appellants were entitled to a deduction for depreciation to such extent as the Minister might allow, and that the Minister had not properly exercised his discretion inasmuch as he had had regard to inadmissible considerations. ... The criteria by which the exercise of a statutory discretion must be judged have been defined in many authoritative cases, and it is well settled that if the discretion has been exercised bona fide uninfluenced by irrelevant considerations and not arbitrarily or illegally, no Court is entitled to interfere even if.the Court, had the discretion been theirs, might have exercised it otherwise. ...