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For a period of five years from the date hereof in the event Everett's Truck Stop Ltd. decides to sell the property and/or business at [illegible — probably Beauval], Saskatchewan, Polar Oils Ltd. shall have a right of first refusal to match any bona fide offer made to Everett's Truck Stop Ltd. on the same terms and conditions as Everett's Truck Stop Ltd. is prepared to accept from the third party, and Polar Oils Ltd. shall have a period of one month to examine an offer to purchase from a third party and accepted by Everett's Truck Stop and on or before the conclusion of the period of one month shall advise Everett's Truck Stop Ltd. of Polar Oils Ltd.'s intention to exercise its right of first refusal and purchase the property on those terms and conditions. 4. ... Had Polar paid the appellant the sum of $119,658 as the price of its committment and had the appellant paid Mel’s Truck Stop Ltd. the same amount, the use made by the appellant of the funds could not have altered the nature of the receipt in the appellant’s hands — a receipt for a commitment integrally bound up with its day-to-day business and having the quality of income. ...

Following the amendments in chapter 63 of S of C 1970-71-72 sections 18(l)(a) and 18(2) read as follows: 18. (1) In computing the income of a taxpayer from a business or property no deduction shall be made in respect of (a) General limitation — an outlay or expense except to the extent that it was made or incurred by the taxpayer for the purpose of gaining or producing income from the business or property. 18. (2) Notwithstanding paragraph 20(1)(c), in computing the taxpayer’s income for a taxation year from a business or property, no deduction shall be made in respect of any amount paid or payable by the taxpayer in the year and after 1971 as, on account or in lieu of payment of, or in satisfaction of, (a) interest on borrowed money used to acquire land, or on an amount payable by him for land, or (b) property taxes (not including income or profits taxes or taxes computed by reference to the transfer of property) paid or payable by him in respect of land to a province or a Canadian municipality, if, having regard to all the circumstances, including the cost to the taxpayer of the land in relation to his gross revenue, if any, therefrom for that or any previous year, the land cannot reasonably be considered to have been, in that year, (c) included in the inventory of a business carried on by the taxpayer, (d) otherwise used in, or held in the course of, carrying on a business carried on by the taxpayer, or (e) held primarily for the purpose of gaining or producing income of the taxpayer from the land for that year, except to the extent that the taxpayer’s gross revenue, if any, from the land for that year exceeds the aggregate of all other amounts deducted in computing his income from the land for that year. ... Plaintiffs action will therefore be maintained with costs and the reassessment made for defendant’s 1974 taxation year is restored. 1 *The return shows a figure of $580,522 but the parties agree that $495,765 is the correct figure. 2 f There is a $1 discrepancy here which is not significant. 3 * Section 10 is the section dealing with evaluation of inventory property and paragraph 20(1)(aa) permits deduction (notwithstanding paragraph 18(l)(a)) of “an amount paid by the taxpayer in the year for the landscaping of grounds around the building or other structure of the taxpayer that is used by him primarily for the purpose of gaining or producing income therefrom or from a business’’. ...

When asked why he considered the obligation under a credit note as current liability and the obligation under a warranty as contingent, he said: ‘.. the credit note, while it is a liability, is also an existing obligation today. ... At page 179 [87] he refers to the English case of Edward Collins & Sons, Ltd v The Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1924), 12 TC 773, in which it was held that the deduction for an apprehended future loss was not permissible. ...

For that purpose it borrowed money and lent it to the subsidiaries at a rate 1 Vi % in excess of that which it paid. ... As Kerwin J, as he then was, pointed out in Montreal Light Heat & Power Consolidated v MNR, [1942] CTC 1; 2 DTC 535, applying the principle enunciated by Viscount Cave in British Insulated and Helsby Cables, Limited v Atherton, the usual test of whether an expenditure is one made on account of capital is, was it made ‘‘with a view of bringing into existence an advantage for the enduring benefit of the appellant’s business’’. ...

LaForest J. highlighted the fact that, in this section, “... Indians holding lands or personal property in their own right outside the reserve hold that property on the same basis as all other similarly situated property holders”[FN24: <p><em>Supra</em>note 21 at 128. ... The respondent in this case has suggested, as potential locations of the employer, the Department of Supply & Services office in Winnipeg, the City of Ottawa and the location of the Hospital itself. ...

A definition of “sham” is found in the matter of Snook v London & West Riding Investments Ltd, [1967] 1 All ER 518, where Diplock, LJ at page 528 says: As regards the contention of the plaintiff that the transactions between himself, Auto-Finance Ltd. and the defendants were a sham, it is, I. think, necessary to consider what, if any, legal concept is involved in the use of this popular and pejorative word. ... An analysis of schemes similar, in principle, to the one of the present instance, is found in Lupton v FA & AB, Ltd, [1968] 2 All ER 1042, where we read, at page 1051, these remarks of Megarry, J: If on analysis it is found that the greater part of the transaction consists of elements for which there is some trading purpose or explanation (whether ordinary or extraordinary), then the presence of what I may call “fiscal elements’’, inserted solely or mainly for the purpose of producing a fiscal benefit, may not suffice to deprive the transaction of its trading status. ...

The shares were not actually “ allotted or issued” by the company to the four members of the syndicate until September 25, 1951. ... The meaning of “ benefit of whatever kind” is clearly quite broad;... ...

For those situations where the T2113 designation and T2114 information return are both late, if eligible R & D expenditures were carried out to offset the Part VIII tax liability, we will: a. accept the late-filed designation; b. apply the LFP on the designation; payment will be Collections responsibility and not a determining factor in our acceptance of the designation; and c. allow the investors' S.R.T.C.s as claimed. 2. If the R & D expenditures were not attempted, not eligible, or partially eligible: a. the designation will not be accepted; b. the LFP on the designation will be refunded, if paid; and c. the investor's S.R.T.C.s will be disallowed. ...

The classical exposition as to what constitutes a sham was given by Diplock, LJ (as he then was) when he said in Snook v London & West Riding Investments, Ltd, [1967] 1 All ER 518 at page 528: As regards the contention of the plaintiff that the transactions between himself, Auto-Finance, Ltd and the defendants were a “sham”, it is, I think, necessary to consider what, if any, legal concept is involved in the use of this popular and pejorative word. ... Finsbury Securities Ltd v Bishop (Inspector of Taxes), [1965] 1 All ER 530, and FA & AB Ltd v Lupton (Inspector of Taxes), [1971] 3 At ER 948, are not helpful in resolving the problem before me. ...

I adopt the reasoning and approach of Southey, J. in Re Borden & Elliot v. ... The individual accused can all be assumed to have suffered, to this date, the “ stigmatization of the accused, loss of privacy, stress and anxiety resulting from a multitude of factors, including possible disruption of family, social life and work, legal costs, uncertainty as to the outcome and sanction” described by Lamer, J. in Mills at S.C.R. 920, C.C.C. 539, which description was adopted by Cory, J. in Askov (at S.C.R. 1211, C.C.C. 468) to which he added at S.C.R. 1219, C.C.C. 474: There could be no greater frustration imaginable for innocent persons charged with an offence than to be denied the opportunity of demonstrating their innocence for an unconscionable time as a result of unreasonable delays in their trial. ...