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Subsection 248(1) of the Act defines "property" as follows: "property" — "property" means property of any kind whatever whether real or personal, or corporeal or incorporeal and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, includes (a) a right of any kind whatever, a share or a chose in action, (b) unless a contrary intention is evident, money, (c) a timber resource property, and (d) the work in progress of a business that is a profession... ... Dionne & Mercier et al. (1928), 44 C.K.B. 15, the Court said the following at 16 et seq.: Whereas the only question presented by the case is as to whether this gift is a gift inter vivos and of present property or a gift of future property, resulting from death, and any other question raised by the parties is by common agreement eliminated as having no relevance to the case; Whereas the fact of providing that the money given will be payable within three months of the donor's death does not, as the learned Superior Court judge recognized, imply that the gift is a gift mortis causa, as this clause is only a term which delays execution of the gift; and whereas the fact of providing that the money given to each donee will be paid from and out of the most clear and apparent property in the estate of the donor does not necessarily imply that the gift in the instant case is a gift of future property, even if this stipulation is taken as similar to the clause discussed by writers and the courts regarding things given to be taken from the property of the donor's estate; Whereas as a matter of sound logic and legal interpretation, to determine the nature of an act undue importance should not be attached to any particular phrase: rather, all parts of the document should be considered and it should be taken as a whole; Whereas under art. 777 C.C. the criterion for a gift inter vivos, and its essential component, are "that the donor should actually divest himself of his ownership in the thing given”, and whereas in the instant case such divestiture unquestionably occurred, since it states in the said deed of gift that the donor now gives each of the donees the sum of $10,000, reserves a usufruct to himself and undertakes to pay the amounts given to each donee, and that the donor further formally states that he “absolutely divests himself of the bare ownership of the three sums of $10,000 each so given, and recognizes that he is a debtor therefor to the donees" so that as of this moment his estate has become subject to an obligation to pay the said three sums of $10,000; In view of the last paragraph of art. 777 C.C., which provides that a gift “of a sum of money or other indeterminate thing which the donor promises to pay or to deliver divests the donor in the sense that he becomes the debtor of the donee"; Whereas, for these reasons, the gift in the instant case is a gift inter vivos of present property, and the Superior Court judgment finding the said gift to be void as being a gift mortis causa of future property is in error... and at page 23: When a donor states that he undertakes to pay each of the said donees the amounts mentioned above, it cannot be said that an obligation has not immediately been created requiring the donor as of that moment to pay the sum and acting as a charge on his estate, even though the due date for payment is delayed until his death. ...

Ground 2: Common Law Rights to Resist Discovery and Against SelfIncrimination I am prepared to assume without deciding that the common law privileges against self-incrimination were not subsumed in the Charter provisions — an issue which is more squarely raised before this Court in Thomson Newspapers v. ... Solloway Mills & Co., [1931] 1 D.L.R. 831, a decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal, and the second was Triplex Safety Glass Co. v. ...

Firstly, if the estate would trade their property for the apartment building / would purchase the apartment building outright from the estate for $165,000. net. ... Appeal dismissed. 1 *For an earlier and similar assessment see S & S Properties Ltd v The Queen, [1978] CTC 412; 78 DTC 6294, per Walsh, J. at 419 (DTC 6299). 2 *In Hiwako Investments Ltd v The Queen, [1978] CTC 378; 78 DTC 6281, Jackett, CJ said by way of obiter dicta at 384 (DTC 6285): “I might also add a word with reference to "secondary intention’. ...

The scheme of the Act is not to seize, then search — but to search, and seize only documents that may afford evidence of violations. ... The learned trial judge said at p 24: “... In my view retrospectivity is not in issue in this case. ...

On October 27, 1978, Cluff Agencies wrote the following letter to its general insurance customers: Dear Dr Leon Norris: We are pleased to announce that effective October 1st, 1978, Fred C Cluff Agencies has merged with Lillico Insurance, 1308 — Central Avenue in Prince Albert. ... In filing his income tax return for 1978 Mr Lillico included the Lillico Insurance Agency Statement of Operations for the period January 1, 1978 — Dec 31, 1978; included as an expense in computing the net loss from operations in the statement of operations was the sum of $51,127.76 for “Agency purchase”. ...

Near the end of the extract quoted supra from 293 and 294, immediately following the reference to subparagraph 125(1)(a)(i), there is a mark +, indicating a footnote. ... On 197 of the CTC report of that case there is the following paragraph, in brackets: (“For reasons that are stated later in this judgment, what is income from ‘a business other than an active business’ must mean income from a business that is in an ‘absolute state of suspension’ — see quotation from The Queen v Rockmore Investments Limited, that is, devoid of any quantum of business activity, but which has some asset which produces income.”) ...

His duties require him to be away from his employer’s office for ninety % or more of his working hours. ... The headnote in the report of the Cekota case states: “all three requirements of section 11(9)” — now section 8(1)(h) “must be met before a taxpayer can obtain relief. ...

In fact, the plan was to sell Kitchener City Hall and replace the market building for a $15 million office and commercial development. 3.11 In their testimony, the appellants and Mr Kelleher affirmed that the plans of the said development were not known to them and that they were even secret. 3.12 In an article, however, (Exhibit A-1) written in Kitchener-Waterloo Record on June 25,1971 and entitled “Public” ‘not kept out of city plans’ ”’ it is written: Citizens of Kitchener have not been shut out of urban renewal discussions as some critics of a $15 million downtown development claim. ... It bought undeveloped land, subdivided and serviced it and sold the lots (transcript p 62); (n) in addition to owning a cottage and a personal home, the appellant owns a property at Sunset Street in Kitchener, Ontario; (o) in the early seventies, he also owned a few small apartment buildings in Kitchener. 3.20 On the advice of his accountants, the appellant considered the transfer of the property to Tartan as a sale and the profit of $61,000 ($185,000- $63,000 = $122,000; Harper $61,000; Kelleher $61,000) as a capital gain. ...

Pearson (1) Lord Wensleydale said: “ I have been long and deeply impressed with the wisdom of the rule, now I believe, universally adopted, at least in the Courts of Law in Westminster Hall, that in construing wills, and indeed statutes, and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther.” ... In my opinion, the rule has always been this: — if the words of an Act admit of two interpretations, then they are not clear; and if one interpretation leads to an absurdity, and the other does not, the Court will conclude that the legislature did not intend to lead to an absurdity, and will adopt the other interpretation.” ...

And the Appellant has marked with an ‘x‘ the following answer: “You are a resident of another country who will be temporarily living in Canada for / days”. ... I lost in excess of $150,000 + loss in currency depreciation in Canada since then. ...