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Laskin JA found that VISA was supplying an exempted financial service and not an administrative service, stating (at para. 63): [C]onsistent with the Tax Court judge’s findings … Visa’s services “form an essential part of the ability for CIBC to offer credit card based services to their clients," … they "[give] CIBC customers the ability to purchase goods and services anywhere in the world without CIBC having to individually contact each merchant to set up payment arrangements with them," and that "[i]f CIBC was forced to create such a payment network on its own, even if technically feasible, this network would invariably be much less widely accepted than the one offered by Visa." … I would add that Visa’s services relieve CIBC and other issuers of the need to investigate and analyze the risk profile and solvency of the merchants that accept credit cards in payment for goods and services. To describe the benefit that CIBC obtained from Visa’s services … as "quintessentially administrative," does not … adequately recognize the reality of the benefit that CIBC derived. ...

The taxpayer then argued that the Year 19 reassessment was invalid because it did not satisfy s. 152(5), which prohibits the Minister from reassessing beyond the normal reassessment period to include income that “was not included in computing the taxpayer’s income for the purposes for an assessment, reassessment or additional assessment made … before the end of [that] period.” ... Savics was reassessed in [Year 7], the initial assessment … was still an assessment that was made before the end of his normal reassessment period. … I do not accept that the purpose of subsection 152(5) … is to prevent the Minister, in reassessing a taxpayer under subsection 165(3) … from restoring a taxpayer to their original filing position by reinstating a particular source and amount of income that had been reported by the taxpayer, assessed as filed, and then subsequently deleted as a result of a reassessment. ...

. … The jurisprudence is clear (and abundant) that courts should not decide constitutional cases in a factual vacuum. … … [L]egislation which, on its face, contains Charter violations may yet be found to be constitutional on the basis of contextual facts and the balancing of interests pursuant to section 1 of the Charter. … In the present case, there are no facts in support of the Friedmans’ constitutional arguments; there are merely hypothetical possibilities which may or may not arise. … [I]t was conceded that there was no basis for alleging a disguised criminal investigation. ...

CRA took the view that Iris, contrary to its claims, had not experienced a significant decline in its qualifying revenues, and denied the claims – initially on the basis of exercising its discretion under s. 164(1.6), which provides that the Minister, before the time for filing the taxpayer’s return for the year, “may refund to the taxpayer all or any part of the [deemed CEWS] overpayment” arising under s. 125.7(2). ... Whether the Minister erred in determining that there was no overpayment is to be adjudicated in the Tax Court; whether the Minister erred in refusing to refund an overpayment is for the Federal Court to decide. … The relief sought makes clear that the essential character of the notice of application is a challenge to the correctness of the finding that no “amount” is payable by way of a refund under subsection 125.7(2) and to vacate the notice of determination. … Subsection 152(1.2) … provides for objection and appeal rights following a notice of determination, and Parliament has directed that those proceedings are to be in the Tax Court of Canada …. ...

In the course of reversing the finding below that Emergis could not deduct such tax pursuant to s. 20(12) because such tax could (in accordance with the exception at the end of s. 20(12)) “reasonably be regarded as having been paid by a corporation [Emergis] in respect of income from a share … of a foreign affiliate [the LLC],” Webb JA and Goyette JA stated (at paras. 32, 35-36): … Envision Credit Union … noted that when the ITA considers the assets held by a corporation to be the assets held by the shareholders, it does so explicitly …. … The income from the shares of LLC was paid to NSULC. ...

In rejecting the Bank’s position, Woods JA indicated: Given that “Parliament seeks certainty, predictability and fairness in tax legislation … [i]f Parliament did not intend to impose interest when a loss carryback is claimed as a result of an audit adjustment, it is likely that Parliament would have provided for this with explicit language” (para. 39). ... It was “likely that Parliament knew that subparagraph (b)(iv) could function in a manner similar to a penalty … [and] that substantial interest could accrue under subparagraph (b)(iv) if the carryback request resulted from an audit” (para. 50). Although the Crown’s position could “result in different treatment between loss carrybacks and …. loss carryforwards … Parliament enacted a specific provision dealing with loss carrybacks, and it chose not to adopt an analogous provision for loss carryforwards” (para. 53). ...

., drivers) and intercorporate loans – and entered into cross-currency and interest rate swaps with an arm’s length bank to effectively convert much of its income stream into fixed rated Canadian-dollar interest. ... After noting (at para. 55) that the Canadian Pioneer case ([1980] 1 S.C.R) had found that the meaning of “banking … should be based on a formal, institutional approach rather than a substantive approach, in the sense of the functions of banking” so “that the use of the term ‘bank’ in the name of the entity, and whether it is regulated, are factors to be considered, rather than the actual activities that are conducted”, Woods JA found that the Tax Court had erred in finding that there was an implied requirement in “banking” that the receipt side of the business have an element of competition and that “the exclusion does not apply if a business simply manages its own funds “ (para. 57) and, indeed “Parliament has not explicitly required competition as an element of the foreign bank exclusion” para. 60). ... In finding that the receipt side i.e., “the capital investments by the Loblaw group [,] were not part of Glenhuron’s conduct of business” she stated (at paras. 84-85): Applying the meaning of “business,” there is no reason to conclude that the capital invested by the Loblaw group would have occupied the time and attention of Glenhuron in any meaningful way. … [T]his approach is consistent with long-standing jurisprudence which draws a distinction between “capital to enable [people] to conduct their enterprises” and “the activities by which they earn their income” …. ...

. … [S]ee Wertman …. [I]t could not be seriously argued that Penn Central was in the business of dealing in stock, and no such submission was made. … There is [however] some authority for the proposition that income from property that is being used in a business may, in appropriate circumstances, be income from the business itself; an example might possibly be income in the form of interest from a bank account, the bank account being used in the day-to-day operation of the business. …The question is … whether the [Canada Southern] shares themselves constituted a fund “employed and risked” in the business. ...

After finding (at para. 57) that these “terms of the Settlement Agreement are sufficiently certain” to apply to the Appellants in relation to Glenelg, Boivin JA went on to affirm the conclusion of the Tax Court Judge that the terms of the Settlement Agreement were principled and in accordance with the Galway principle, stating (at paras 66, 67): The rule in Galway … prohibits the parties from arriving at settlements that have no basis in the ITA. Since the question in Galway was whether a particular amount of money was to be treated as income or not, the parties could not compromise on the tax treatment of that sum. … The same cannot be said of the facts in the case at bar. … The Tax Court Judge indeed found that: “[s]ection 67 ITA clearly gives the basis for disallowing a portion of the expenses claimed by a particular taxpayer; it does not have to be an all or nothing” …. ...

. … … [T]he Minister may not extend the time under this provision unless the application has been made within one year. ... Woods JA further found (at paras 47, 48 and 52): The relief that ConocoPhillips seeks is to use the general waiver provision in subsection 220(2.1) … in order to engage the objection process without having to comply with its statutory conditions. ... The general waiver provision cannot be applied in this manner to override a more specific provision. …... ...