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Miller J: “had concluded that a reassessment will be considered valid if the intention of the Minister at the time of [its] making…was to pursue verification;” and had found that that “there is no law…to the effect that a protective assessment is invalid if issued for the sole purpose of leaving the door open to conduct or continue an audit” (- and she went on to indicate that Karda was similiar); and noted (at para. 129) that it was necessary to issue the reassessments in order to implement the accord with RTA respecting its directly incurred SR&ED expenditures. Respecting an RTA submisssion that, under s. 152(1), the MInister was required to make a determination of the amount of tax before issuing the reassessments, D'Auray J stated (at para 154, Tax Interpretations translation): In my view, RTA confuses the validity and correctness of an assessment. … [I]n... ... Miller J. … explained that in the Anchor Pointe decision the Federal Court of Appeal considered the correctness of the assessment as the product of the examination, and not the validity of the assessment as the process. … Accordingly, the reassessments were valid. ...

After noting (at para. 725) that “the purpose of the foreign affiliate regime is to allow Canadian multinationals to compete in international markets through foreign subsidiaries without attracting Canadian income tax,” Owens J stated (at para. 726) that “there is nothing exceptional, unusual or inappropriate about the Appellant’s decision to … have CESA execute the HEU Feed Agreement.” Accordingly, the transactions respecting the HEU Feed and Urenco Agreements were not described in s. 247(2)(b)(i) – nor were the BPCs and CC Contracts, which were not “commercially irrational” (para. 736) – and it thus was not relevant (regarding s. 247(2)(b)(ii)) that the primary purpose of the series respecting the HEU Feed and Urenco Agreements (but not of the BPCs and CC Contracts) in light of the use as part of the series of a foreign affiliate (CESA/DCEL) was to save Canadian tax. Turning to s. 247(2)(a) and (c), he found that in light of the depressed uranium market at the time, the HEU Feed Agreement that in a sense was accorded on CESA did not have significant value, and that it only became very valuable to CESA as a result of the significant increase in market uranium prices after 2002 (para. 787) – and a similar analysis applied to the Urenco Agreement. ...

. … Creating legal (or equitable) relationships to give effect to a tax plan is not the perpetration of a sham. ... Paris regarding the legal relationships created under Québec law. … … [E]ven if the Appellant’s sole reason (motive) for creating the Trust and transferring the Class F Shares to the Trust was to save tax, that is not in and of itself evidence of a sham. … Own J further found (at para. 75): I have considerable difficulty understanding the basis of the Respondent’s submission that the creation of the Trust was legally ineffective. ...

. … Justice Woods’ concerns in Garron about the ambiguity inherent in the phrase “directly or indirectly” may perhaps not be entirely appropriate in the context of the transfer of property … [which] has a defined end point, although a circuitous route may be taken to get there. Here there is no easily defined or delineated end point … regarding the length of time during which an increase may still be attributed to an impugned transaction. A more restrictive interpretation of paragraph (b) … avoids these difficulties. ...

In 2010, the Minister assessed the Henro (to include an income account gain) and 984 (to reverse the previously reported capital gain and refund the capital gains tax, plus interest, totalling $1.7M) on the basis that the 2003 drop-down had occurred on a non-rollover basis – but its assessment of 984 was found to be void as being statute-barred. ... However, the resulting 2015 reassessment of 984 could not be justified as valid based on s. 169(3) because the 2010 assessment was itself invalid – hence, 984 was not an appealing “taxpayer” referred to in s. 169(3) (as it was not engaged in a valid appeal procedure). This meant that the only basis for justifying the 2015 assessment of 984 was that, pursuant to s. 160.1(1), the 2010 refund represented an amount that had been “refunded to a taxpayer … in excess of the amount to which the taxpayer was entitled as a refund under this Act.” ...

Five years later, a taxable capital of $46.4M was allocated to AIGLP from a lower-tier sale, with the result that most of this amount was allocated to the four family trusts – who purported to offset this income allocation through losses transferred out of a loss company that had been acquired by them. ... He found that in light of ss. 96(2) and 102(2), partnership members of AIGLP were to be treated as members of it for s. 103 purposes – as were the trust members of AIGLP. ... In applying these principles, he noted that the allocations were highly disproportionate to capital and the inverse of work performed, stating (at paras. 108, 128): … [T]he allocation to the partners were extremely unreasonable, whether it be the allocation of the first $1 million of the formula or the balance. …. ...

Singh beneficially owned ½ of the home prior to 2009, so that there was a gratuitous transfer of property by Mrs. Singh in 2009 to him, MacPhee J stated (at paras 26, 27, 28): … [Mr. Singh] exercised continued use and possession of the home. ... Singh was the largest income earner in the family up to 2004. … [B]oth parents and the children all pooled their income together to ensure all home payments were made. … “One needs very cogent evidence that a spouse who is shown as the legal owner of an interest in property is not also the beneficial owner.” ...

At that time, the taxpayer was deemed by s. 256(9) to have no longer had legal control of the subsidiary from the beginning of that day – and the taxpayer also was dealing with the subsidiary at arm’s length as a factual matter at that time, given that a WTC nominee had taken charge as director and officer of the subsidiary two days’ previously, as requested by it for its commercial (albeit, ineffectual) purposes. ... In this regard, Owen J stated (at paras. 209-210): [I]n my view the words “consideration given for the property”, when read in the context of the entire subsection, can only mean consideration given by the transferee for the property regardless of who receives that consideration. … Subsection 160(1) is imposing a liability on the transferee for the transferor’s liability under the ITA. This can only be done in a fair and reasonable manner if the transferee receives credit for the consideration given for the property that triggers the liability. … ...

In very general terms, significant elements of the series of transactions included: Grenon’s RRSP transferring its units of FMO to a newly-formed unit trust (“TOM” – which was found in Grenon not to qualify as a mutual fund trust) – in exchange for units of TOM representing close to 100% of the issued and outstanding TOM units. ... All of these transactions were pre-ordained. … [I]t cannot be said that the Appellants enjoyed “the three key attributes of ownership, namely, risk, use and possession” …. ...

However, Jorré J found that such a wide range of decisions were specified in the USA to require unanimous director (or shareholder) approval – to the point that he characterized Kruger as having control of only operating, and not strategic, decisions – that Kruger did not have de jure control. ...