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. … What occurred was a revocation, it would appear on an unsolicited and unobserved basis, of the company’s territorial licence to operate in Macao. ... …In effect, the existing business and inventory became stranded and almost valueless because of hugely impactful legislative change. … Further, there was no authority for Mr. Groscki to act as liquidator. … Some instrument or action must award or grant some authority or at least “colour of right” to “administer assets” in the course of a dissolution, winding up and/or liquidation. … He went on to find (at para. 70) that, even if the appellant had been a legal representative, he was not in “possession and control” of EMI Macao’s property, stating that such control was instead in the hands of a related distributor corporation. ...

In denying their claims for the clergy residence deduction, on the basis that they were not in charge of or ministering to a congregation, Campbell J stated (at para. 124): [I]n Fitch, Bowman J. narrowed the scope of “ministering” by specifically carving out an exception pertaining to teachers of religious studies [stating;] [T]eaching may well- and frequently does- form a component of ministering, but teaching in itself is not ministering …. Nor do I think that a group of students can be said to be a congregation in the sense of an assemblage or gathering of persons to whom a minister provides spiritual counselling, advice, illumination and inspiration. … (Emphasis added) Campbell J further found (at para 167, before again quoting Fitch, and at 199): Even if I had been persuaded that the Appellants’ activities and duties at the VHA constituted “ministering”, I could not conclude that a class of elementary school students gathered for Jewish religious education and instruction would be a “congregation” within the meaning of paragraph 8(1)(c)(ii) of the Act. … …[T]he VHA, as an elementary day school, cannot be categorized as a “place of worship”, nor can its students be viewed as gathering there for the purposes of religious worship. Even though the Appellants led students in prayer services … [t]he primary character of the VHA is that of a school that conforms to the requirements of the British Columbia Ministry of Education. ...

The Queen, 2018 TCC 262-- summary under Subsection 165(1) Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 165- Subsection 165(1) objection can be made after the proposal letter and before the notice of reassessment – but must state “I object” On May 11, 2015, the taxpayer was sent a letter by Mr. ... Payne did not qualify as a notice of objection, and that the taxpayer was out of time for an extension under s. 166.2(5)(a), Sommerfeldt J stated (at paras 17, 18): …[T]o be a notice of objection, a document “must include an actual objection to an assessment,” or at least some indication that the particular taxpayer is objecting to an assessment. … [The taxpayer's] letter of April 27, 2015 … does not contain any statement taking issue with the CRA’s categorization of those expenses. … Unfortunately, I have been unable to find anything in the letter to indicate that [the taxpayer]... was objecting to a reassessment. ...

. … The Appellant, Paletta International, claims that all of the properties were acquired either to farm or to develop for rental revenue. … I struggle to accept the implication that the Palettas rarely had a secondary intention to profit from the sale of their lands if the retail or industrial opportunities did not pan out. … The Respondent demonstrated a pattern of real estate holdings in the Paletta companies whereby the Palettas accumulate properties outside urban boundaries and hold them for long periods of time. ... The timing of the acquisition, in 1979, is consequential – I accept that at that point in time, farming was of greater significance to the family business than it is currently. ...

The Queen, 2020 TCC 91-- summary under Paragraph 247(2)(a) Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 247- New- Subsection 247(2)- Paragraph 247(2)(a) fee earned by Canadian servicer fell within “rough, but … acceptable, range of what an arm’s length service provider might have enjoyed” A Barbados international business corporation (“NewAgco Barbados”), that was a subsidiary of a Canadian company owned by two Canadian brothers, purchased a herbicide in the US and sold it to Canadian farmers, and paid management fees to another Canadian company (“AgraCity”) wholly-owned by one of the two brothers for assisting in making this happen. In rejecting the Crown position that ss. 247(2)(a) and (c) resulted in a transfer pricing adjustment, Boyle J stated (at paras. 99, 116 and 118): There was nothing … that could provide material support for the Respondent’s position that if NewAgco Barbados and AgraCity were arm’s length parties, they would have entered into a Services Agreement on terms and conditions that gave 100% of the ClearOut sales profits to AgraCity and no share whatsoever of those profits to NewAgco Barbados- nor did they provide any data, information or support that would help establish that the service fees payable to AgraCity were different than, or outside the range of, what arm’s length parties would be expected to provide for. … The only evidence the Court has on the point indicates that the amount paid to AgraCity generated a return on its costs that was in the range of what somewhat comparable arm’s length parties earn. … The taxpayer has provided credible, unchallenged, uncontested and unrefuted expert evidence based on available data that confirms the amount reported by AgraCity as its profit over the costs of its services to NewAgco Barbados was well within the somewhat rough, but in my view acceptable, range of what an arm’s length service provider might have enjoyed in circumstances similar to what I have found to be the transactions between NewAgco Barbados and AgraCity. ...

Before determining to award pre-offer costs of 35% of BMO’s actual costs of $684,471, Graham J stated (at paras 4, 6 and 7 and 8): The general wording of subsection 147(3.1) … indicates that a party receiving substantial indemnity costs following a settlement offer is entitled to party and party costs to the date of service of the settlement offer. … … Awarding substantial indemnity costs provides an incentive to settle early…. Subsection 147(3.3) ensures that offers are made early by requiring that … an offer must be made at least 90 days before the hearing and must not expire earlier than 30 days before the hearing. ...

Accordingly, CRA disallowed the corporation’s input tax credit claims – effectively on the basis that there was a single supply of exempt orthodontic services. Before going on to confirm the corporation’s position that it made both exempt and zero-rated supplies to its patients on a 65/35 basis, so that the zero-rated supplies generated ITCs, Wong J stated (at para. 44): … [T]he arrangement itself would fall under the discretionary powers granted to the Minister by subsection 169(5) …. By virtue of the arrangement, the Minister is using her statutory discretion to exempt orthodontists from certain requirements of subsection 169(4), and to specify terms and conditions of the exemption. … ...

In rejecting the appellants' arguments that the Part III assessments were statute-barred, Smith J stated (at paras. 93-94): … The Appellants cannot argue that the nil reassessments are statute-barred and then ask the Court to extrapolate from that and conclude that the Part III Reassessments that are the subject matter of these appeals are also statute-barred and “therefore invalid and without legal force.” ... Moreover, … nothing prevents the Court … from reviewing the validity of transactions that are alleged to have triggered the subject capital gains and capital losses and that are alleged to form the basis for the additions made to the capital dividend accounts. Before going on to find that the purported acquisition by the appellants of trust units that had a high tax basis (whose alleged disposition generated the capital losses) were a sham, he stated (at para. 95): If I am wrong in so concluding, then I find that the Part I Reassessments were not statute-barred and that the Minister was entitled to issue them because … the Appellants had made a misrepresentation that was attributable to neglect, carelessness or wilful default or fraud, as required by subparagraph 152(4)(a)(i) of the ITA. ...

Vocan submitted that its facility was a health care facility, being “a facility … operated for the purpose of providing medical … care,” so that its supply of the reports was exempted under Sched. ... In finding that the Vocan facility was not a health care facility, Lyons J stated (at para. 117-119): A contextual analysis supports that “medical care” is to be interpreted as being connected to the practice of medicine. … … “[M]edical care” does not mean “health care”. ...

Bocock J was asked to address the Rule 58 question: Are sections 207.05 and 207.06 … unconstitutional as a consequence of Parliament having improperly delegated the rate-setting element of that tax to the Minister of National Revenue in contravention of section 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867 …. In finding no such unconstitutionality “because no improper delegation occurred” (para. 103), Bocock J stated (at paras. 85, 99-100): A plain reading of the criteria [in s. 207.06(2)] reveals specific and mandatory guidance for the Minister’s exercise of discretion, with flexibility to allow the Minister to serve the overarching purpose of providing relief where just and equitable. … There is no unfettered discretion vested in the Minister’s agents to relieve from tax or refuse to relieve from tax under the TFSA Waiver [in s. 207.06] in the absence of comprehensible reason. … [T]he presumption of consistent expression and similar language between the TFSA Charge [in s. 207.05] and TFSA Waiver, when viewed with other unchallenged charging and relieving provisions in Part XI.01 of the Act, support the conclusion that the provisions, inter se, are distinct tax and relief provisions. ...