Search - 报销 发票日期 消费日期不一致

. … … [I]t would be surprising if on a proper interpretation the relevant statutory provisions gave the Minister the power to make a determination with respect to future eligibility. However, I can see nothing that would prevent the Minister from determining that the person was eligible in certain past years and informing the person that the Minister’s present intention was to assume that the person would continue to be eligible for certain future years. … Jorré DJ found that the taxpayer became eligible for the DTC in 2014, stating (at paras 21, 23, 25, 27): … I am satisfied that over time her conditions and her restrictions were getting worse. … … [T]he Appellant was doing physical labour in factories during much of the 2010 to 2014. ... …[T]he statutory tests … under subsection 118.4(1) … requires that the restriction be assessed when the individual is using available therapy and appropriate devices or medication. … [I]f an individual who would otherwise be markedly restricted is not markedly restricted through the use of medication, for example, then the individual would not meet the marked restriction test. ...

. … A contextual analysis of subsection 118.61(1) supports Dr. Zhang’s position … [as] unlike element “B”, which uses the phrase “which may be deducted”, element “D” uses the phrase “that the individual may deduct”. … The purposive analysis supports the Respondent’s position … [as in the] Department of Finance Technical Note … “amount of the tuition and education tax credits carryforward that is deductible for the current year” is used to describe element “D”. ... Graham J concluded (at para 18): … I am satisfied from the purposive analysis that the contextual problem is simply a result of poor drafting. ...

. … While the Law Society is required to have the public interest in mind when it carries out its regulating functions, this does not mean that it is performing a function of government. … The Law Society performs its various functions in the course of regulating the legal profession, not in the course of governing people located in Ontario. … None of the functions of the Law Society constitute a legislative function. … [T]he Law Society … by-laws relate to regulating the legal profession in Ontario, not governing the people of Ontario. [A] judicial function is only performed by a judge of one of Canada’s courts. … Accordingly, the taxpayer was not entitled to the exemption under s. 149(1)(d.5). ...

Before going on to find that s. 54.2 did not apply, Graham J first noted that it was unnecessary, given his findings below, for him to address whether the Tissue Division was a separate business, and then stated (at paras 25, 27 and 28): It is unclear on the face of section 54.2 how I am to determine whether the assets … transferred to 722 represent all or substantially all of the assets of the Tissue Division. ... It is arguable that the test in section 54.2 could be satisfied so long as the recipient had received all of the key assets of the business, regardless of their value. … …I find that the test in section 54.2 is intended to be a somewhat flexible test but that there is no reason not to consider the fair market value of the assets when applying the test. … Graham J found, to the extent that the test in s. 54.2 considers fair market value, the taxpayer had not met the test, stating (at paras 32, 33): … [T]he assets transferred to 722 would make up only 68% of the total assets of the Tissue Division. While I acknowledge that all or substantially all does not mean 90% and that the specific percentage that meets the test in any given context may vary, I cannot accept that it means something just over two-thirds. … There was no evidence as to the fair market value of the portion of the Progress Property [or] … the Whitby Property used by the Tissue Division. … Had these assets been included in the … calculation, the percentage of fair market value transferred to 722 would have been even lower. ...

Contrary to the Minister's focus on available information as of 31 December 2009, "instead, the taxpayer may rely on information that comes into existence after the end of the year, but before the filing-due date, to fulfill his … obligation to report…" (para. 69). After noting (at para. 81) that "the decision in Flexi-Coil indicates that a debt is a bad debt when the taxpayer determines that the debt is uncollectible and, in making this determination, has acted reasonably and in a pragmatic, business-like manner, applying the proper factors," Owen J stated (at para. 85) that "the information available to the Appellant as at April 30, 2010 indicated that as of December 31, 2009 SA had no resources to pay its debts other than what it might collect from EMB under the receivership … [and] it would have been perfectly reasonable for the Appellant to conclude that only a portion of the principal owed was likely to be recovered and that the Interest was illusory and would not be recovered." Respecting the Minister's claim that "the Appellant should have recorded the Interest as income and then claimed the deduction" (para. 89), Owen J noted (at para. 89) that the Minister "was not able to identify exactly how the deduction … is claimed on the return," that "although the letter did not make specific reference to paragraph 20(1)(l) or 20(1)(p), it did state that the Interest was not … collectible … [representing] the essential characteristic of a bad debt" (para. 90) and "in any event … it is well established that it is open to a taxpayer to amend his return through the appeal process [citing Imperial Oil, 2003 FCA 289, at para. 10]" (para. 91). ...

In confirming this assessment, Owen J found (at paras 127, 129 and 131): … Since the pharmaceuticals were not (and could not be) imported into Canada for sale, the approach to valuation adopted for the CGI Program is patently flawed since it is using a Canadian market (Ontario) to value generic pharmaceuticals that cannot be sold in that market. ... Morrison did not present independent evidence of the fair market value of the pharmaceuticals he donated to EBF in 2003. … Mr. ... Morrison in and of itself. … Mr. Morrison was not a willing or knowing participant in the use of “pretense documents”. … … I accept that Mr. ...

CRA asserted that the MAP proceedings did not result in binding agreements between Sifto and CRA and, even if they did, they did not fix the arm’s length transfer price – so that CRA was not only authorized, but was required, by the ITA to issue the post-audit reassessments once in possession of the new audit information. ... To suggest that the MAP agreements simply addressed double taxation of Compass ignores the factual context in which the agreements were reached by the Minister and the IRS through their respective representatives. … …[I]n a letter from the USCA to Compass dated January 25, 2011 … the USCA states: … A mutual agreement has been reached regarding the transfer price of the transaction between Compass and...Sifto…. … This correctly recognizes that the adjustments to income allowed by paragraph (1) of Article IX of the Convention are the result of a transfer price and that it is impossible to agree to the adjustments to the Appellant’s income without also agreeing to the implicit transfer price that yields those adjustments. ...

Miller J stated (at paras 19 & 21): … The Tax Court of Canada can look at a taxpayer’s circumstances and make a determination as to what facts are true and what legal and equitable rights are available to the taxpayer where such findings will assist the court deciding the correctness of the assessment. The Tax Court of Canada cannot order what a court of equity can order as a result of finding an equitable trust exists. … It can, however, analyze the correctness of an assessment acknowledging any and all rights a taxpayer may have. … In going on to conclude that there was not a Quistclose trust, he stated (at paras 23, 29, 34 & 35): … the Quistclose trust… provides a right to a lender to an equitable remedy in situations where the lender has loaned funds to a borrower for a specific purpose, and where the lender is exposed to the risk of other creditors swooping in and snatching those funds from the borrower before the borrower uses them for the intended purpose. … … With the Quistclose trust, the property is vested with the borrower who has a fiduciary obligation to use funds for a specific purpose or return the funds to the lender. … … The Appellants, in granting an irrevocable authority to Capital to deliver monies to the charity, had exhausted any power they might have had while the funds were held by FMC. Capital, and only Capital, could direct FMC: the Appellants could not, once the funds were delivered to FMC, direct otherwise. … … I have concluded that until the funds were delivered to the charity’s lawyers, the Appellants had no legal or beneficial interest in the funds. ...

One line reflects a purely textual approach, not affected by any retroactive change of circumstances applying to the pertinent taxation year. … The other line of authority … recognizes as relevant a subsequent order cancelling support arrears arising in the context of a de facto shift of a child’s primary residence…. In Barthels, … Hershfield TCJ considered that subsequent cancellation of support arrears where a custodial child had moved to the claimant parent’s residence did neutralize the original requirement to pay support amounts. … Russell J further stated (at para 19) My preference as to these two lines of authority is that represented by Barthels. ... … In this regard, he held (at para 26): … I concur with the decision of this Court in Young, … per Sarchuk, J., that no statutory language used in or in connection with subsection 118(1) indicates that the deductions may be prorated for a taxation year, noting in contrast with other provisions in the Act by which Parliament has explicitly provided for proration. ...

Applying the presumption against tautology, Parliament thus intended a corporate party to be able to be represented by either counsel or some third party individual who was not a lawyer. … … [M]eaning must be given to the clear subsection 17.1(1) Parliamentary language that a party, a term encompassing both corporate and non-corporate parties, may appear in person in a general procedure appeal. ... Additionally, …the “outside accountant” potentially … would be an important if not key witness at any hearing of this appeal. … For these two reasons I will dismiss the corporate Appellant’s application per Rule 30(2)…. The Rules do not seem to provide for an application for individuals who are appellants in general procedure appeals to be represented by anyone other than either counsel or themselves. … ...