Search - 德国民法典第1993条

Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] F.C.J. No. 1033, this Court held at paragraph 10: I know that Courts are often reluctant to disadvantage individuals because their counsel miss deadlines. ...

However, the citizenship judge found that, because his last exit from Canada was on December 20, 2008, even if he had been absent from December 2008 to March 2009, he would still have been present in Canada for 1,317 days, which is higher than the minimum of 1,095 days. [13]            The citizenship judge stated that he applied the residency test set out in Pourghasemi (Re), [1993] FCJ No 232 (TD) [Pourghasemi]. ...

Issue #1: The standard of Review of the Decision below [11]            The case law is clear that discretionary orders of prothonotaries ought only to be reviewed de novo by a judge on appeal where: (a) the questions raised in the motion are vital to the final issue of the case; or (b) the orders are clearly wrong, in the sense that the exercise of discretion by the prothonotary was based upon a wrong principle or upon a misapprehension of the facts: See R v Aqua-Gem Investments Ltd, [1993] 2 FC 425 (CA) at 462-63; ZI Pompey Industrie v ECU-Line NV, 2003 SCC 27; Merck v Apotex, 2003 FCA 488 at para 19; Gordon v Canada, 2013 FC 597 at para 10 [Gordon]. [12]            The vitality issue raised in summary judgment case law was briefly addressed at the hearing. ...

Slattery, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 430 [Slattery], the Supreme Court held that the provision should be interpreted broadly. ...

This is consistent with the principle that refugee protection only comes into play when no alternative exists (Canada (Attorney General) v Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 at p 726). ...

Basanti generally alluded to viva voce evidence and to sworn affidavit evidence that was allegedly not properly considered and analyzed by the IAD, but he was unable to point the Court to any persuasive evidence in that respect. [24]   I t is well recognized that a decision-maker is presumed to have weighed and considered all the evidence presented to it unless the contrary is shown (Florea v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] FCJ No 598 (FCA) at para 1). ...

The RPD found that she had not rebutted the presumption of reavailment arising from her obtaining and utilizing her Nigerian passports and had voluntarily, intentionally, and actually reavailed of the protection of Nigeria. [33]   It is also of note that the Applicant’s submissions to the RPD did not include a statutory interpretation analysis and that the two decisions that she referenced, Canada (Attorney General) v Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 and my decision in Hasa v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 270, do not support her proposition, but instead speak to the test for state protection. ...

It was meant to come into play only in situations when that protection is unavailable, and then only in certain situations” (Canada (Attorney General) v Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 at 709 [Ward]).   ...

The more important, however, the evidence not mentioned specifically and analyzed in the reasons, the more willing a court may be to infer from the silence that the decision maker made an erroneous finding of fact without regard to the evidence: Cepeda-Gutierrez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1998 CanLII 8667 (FC) [Cepeda-Gutierrez] at para 17, citing Bains v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 63 FTR 312 (FCTD) [Bains]. [26]   Mr. ...

Landru, [1993] 1 C.T.C. 93 (Sask. Q.B.); (f) unorthodox behaviour which raises a reasonable apprehension that it would be difficult to trace funds or recover them for the tax debt may provide reasonable grounds: Laframboise, supra; Rouleau, supra. [18] As to the factors that can justify the issuance of a jeopardy order, in Re Cormier-Imbeault this Court held that: [7] In this regard, the case law has determined that the presence of one or more of the following factors can justify the issuance of an authorization under subsection 225.2(2) of the ITA: a) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the taxpayer has acted fraudulently; b) the taxpayer has proceeded to liquidate or transfer his or her assets; c) the taxpayer is evading his or her tax liabilities; d) the taxpayer has assets that could potentially lessen in value over time, deteriorate or perish; e) the amount of the debt in relation to income and expenses. [19] A lack of assets or the fact that the taxpayer’s assets are entirely liquid in nature and so can be easily wasted, liquidated or transferred is not, in and of itself, a sufficient justification for the granting of a jeopardy order. ...