Date: 20080304
Docket: T-756-07
Citation: 2008 FC 297
Ottawa, Ontario, March
4, 2008
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice O'Keefe
BETWEEN:
HER
MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Applicant
and
ALEXANDER TRAN
(also known as Quo Dong Tran, Dung Tran,
Quoc Dong Tran and Quoc Tran)
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
O’KEEFE J.
[1]
This
is a notice of motion brought by Alexander Tran (respondent) for an order
pursuant to subsections 225.2(8) of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.
1 (5th Supp.) as amended, (the Act or Income Tax Act) extending the time
to review an ex parte order of the Honourable Madam Justice
Tremblay-Lamer authorizing the Minister of National Revenue (the Minister or
applicant) to take forthwith the actions described in paragraphs 225.1(1)(a) to
(g) of the Act (the ex parte order), an order setting aside or varying
the ex parte order and an order granting costs on the ex parte motion.
[2]
The
respondent requested that the following relief be granted:
a)
an
order pursuant to subsection 225.2(8) of the Act extending the time for a
review of the ex parte order of the Honourable Madam Justice
Tremblay-Lamer dated May 7, 2007;
b)
an
order pursuant to subsection 225.2(11) of the Act setting aside the ex parte
order of the Honourable Madame Justice Tremblay-Lamer dated May 7, 2007
authorizing the Minister to take forthwith the actions described in paragraphs
225.1(1)(a) to (g) of the Act;
c)
an
order pursuant to subsection 225.2(11) of the Act setting aside the ex parte
order of the Honourable Madame Justice Tremblay-Lamer dated May 7, 2007
awarding costs on the ex parte motion to the Minister; and
d)
an
order for costs in this motion.
[3]
The
applicant requested that the following relief be granted:
a)
an
order dismissing the respondent’s application for an extension of time within
which to make a motion for a review of the ex parte order of Justice
Tremblay-Lamer dated May 7, 2007;
b)
an
order dismissing the respondent’s application for an order setting aside the ex
parte order of Justice Tremblay-Lamer dated May 7, 2007 authorizing the
Minister to take forthwith the actions described in paragraphs 225.1(1)(a) to
(g) of the Act;
c)
an
order dismissing the respondent’s application for an order pursuant to subsection
225.2(11) setting aside the ex parte order of Justice Tremblay-Lamer
dated May 7, 2007, awarding costs on the ex parte motion to the
Minister; and
d)
an
order for costs in this motion.
Background
[4]
On
April 21, 2005, the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) placed liens on real properties
belonging to the respondent in order to secure a goods and services tax arrears.
[5]
On
June 8, 2005, the respondent was charged with a number of offences under the Income
Tax Act including six counts relating to allegedly false or deceptive
statements, one count of tax evasion, one count of making false or deceptive
statement in GST returns under the Excise Act, 2001, 2002, c. 22
and five firearms charges under the Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C.
1985, c. C-46. The respondent was never arrested or subjected to a bail
hearing. Instead, he was summoned to appear in Court. It appears the litigation
of the above noted charges will be complex and lengthy.
[6]
The
respondent submitted that some time in March 2007, the respondent’s counsel at
Edelson & Associates contacted the CRA to inquire as to the amount of and
payment procedure on the GST amount owing.
[7]
On
May 3, 2007, the Minister of National Revenue (applicant) applied for an ex
parte order authorizing the Minister to take collection action forthwith
against the respondent under subsection 225.2(2) of the Act. On May 7, 2007,
Justice Tremblay-Lamer issued a jeopardy order pursuant to subsection 225.2(2)
and an award of costs to the applicant.
[8]
Since
the issuance of the jeopardy order, the Minister has (1) sent the requirements
to pay in respect of the respondent’s bank accounts, (2) obtained from the
Federal Court certification of a debt in the amount of $1,184,242.25, (3) filed
a writ of seizure and sale with the Sheriff of the City of Ottawa, and (4)
registered document generals against three properties.
[9]
On
August 3, 2007, the respondent filed this notice of motion to extend the 30-day
statutory limitation for filing a review application, and to set aside the
jeopardy order granted by Justice Tremblay-Lamer.
Issues
The issues are as
follows:
1. Should
this Court grant an order extending the time for a review of the ex parte
order dated May 7, 2007 pursuant to subsection 225.2(8) of the Act?
2.
Should this Court set aside the ex parte order dated May 7, 2007
authorizing the Minister to take forthwith the actions described in paragraphs
225.1(1)(a) to (g) of the Act?
3.
Should this Court set aside the ex parte order dated May 7, 2007
granting the Minister costs on the motion?
4.
Should this Court grant costs on this application to either party?
Respondent’s Submissions
[10]
The
respondent submitted that the 30-day limitation period provided in subsection
225.2(9) is not absolute. The respondent further submitted that subsection
225.2(9) provides expressly for the extension of that period if satisfied that
the application was made as soon as practicable. The respondent noted that this
Court has an inherent power to vary an order that has ongoing effect, such as a
jeopardy order, where circumstances prove to be different from those known to
the Court at the time the order was made (Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Canada
(Minister of National Health and Welfare), [1999] F.C.J. No. 662
(T.D.)). The respondent submitted that the following circumstances warrant an
extension of time. Firstly, the limitation period was missed through no fault
of the respondent, but rather as a result of the failure by his civil counsel
to complete the work undertaken (Chiarelli et al. v. Wiens (2000),
46 O.R. (3d) 780 (Ont. C.A.); Smallwood v. Hill, [1997] O.J. No.
20 (Ont. C.A.)). Secondly, this application relates to the respondent’s ability
to enjoy his constitutional right to counsel of his choice. Thirdly, the
initial order was issued without full disclosure (R. v. Blom (2002),
167 C.C.C. (3d) 332 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Beacon, [2005] O.J.
No. 4664 (Ont.
S.C.)).
Moreover, there is a general policy in law of not relying upon matters of form
that bear upon criminal cases, where the governing consideration should be the
interests of justice (R. v. Milic, [2001] O.J. 4557
(S.C.J.); R. v. Ubhi, [1992] B.C.J. No. 2895 (B.C.C.A.)).
And finally, the applicant will suffer no prejudice as a result of the delay in
seeking this relief. The respondent encouraged the granting of an extension so
that this matter could be resolved as a matter of substance rather than form.
[11]
The
respondent submitted that for this application to be granted, he must show that
there are reasonable grounds for concluding that the test for granting a
jeopardy order was not met during the ex parte motion. Once this is
established, the onus then shifts to the Minister to justify the jeopardy order
(Canada v. Laframboise, [1986] 3 F.C. 521). The respondent
submitted that a party applying for a jeopardy order must produce cogent
evidence that the respondent would dissipate their assets. Producing some
evidence to show that the respondent could reduce his assets is insufficient.
Furthermore, in seeking a jeopardy order via an ex parte motion, the
moving party must make full and frank disclosure of all relevant facts to the
Court (Celanese Canada Inc. v. Murray Demolition Corp.,
[2006] S.C.J. No. 35).
[12]
The
respondent submitted that during the ex parte motion, the Minister
presented insufficient evidence to prove the foundation of the order.
Specifically, the applicant’s submission to the Court that the respondent was a
possible flight risk was unsupported by the evidence. The only evidence before
the Court as to Mr. Tran’s intention was that he intended to pay his GST debt.
The Minister’s allegations that the respondent was going to pay the GST debt so
he could then liquidate or mortgage his properties and flee the country were
completely unfounded. The respondent also noted that he was not arrested on the
charges he faces, and no bail hearing was held, instead he was simply summoned
to Court. The respondent submitted that the evidence pertaining to the criminal
charges should not have been presented in the application for the jeopardy
order as it was immaterial to the issue before the Court.
[13]
The
respondent submitted the Minister failed to disclose material evidence to the
Court during the ex parte motion. Specifically, the respondent alleged
that CRA was aware that efforts were being made to un-encumber the respondent’s
properties so that he could provide security for his legal fees. This was not
disclosed to Justice Tremblay-Lamer during the application and as such,
constitutes a breach of the Minister’s duty to make full and frank disclosure
during an ex parte motion. The respondent further submitted that this
breach resulted in significant interference with a fundamental tenet of our
system of justice: the right to retain counsel. The respondent submitted that
this interference is heightened in this case as Mr. Tran stands charged with 14
serious offences, which place his liberty in significant peril. The respondent
also alleged that Mr. Tran is unable to represent himself in the criminal
charges proceedings as the case against him is too legally complex, and his
English is poor. The respondent submitted that it is in the public’s interest
to ensure that the respondent is properly defended on these serious charges.
[14]
With
regards to the issue of setting aside the order for costs dated May 7, 2007,
the respondent submitted that if the jeopardy order is set aside, the cost
award would be inappropriate. Furthermore, in light of the Crown’s failure to
disclose material evidence, the costs order should be overturned. It was
submitted that the CRA has not conducted itself appropriately with respect to
the issue of security for its claims as it placed GST liens on the properties
even though it had adequate security for the GST assessments in the form of
cash and cash equivalents that had been previously seized. Furthermore, the CRA
acted inappropriately in either intentionally or negligently refraining from
confirming the GST assessment payout amounts.
Applicant’s Submissions
[15]
The
applicant submitted that this application was filed 87 clear days after the
authorization was served on the respondent; this is well beyond the standard
30-day limitation period. The applicant submitted that in The Queen (Minister
of National Revenue) v. Ament (1996), 97 D.T.C. 5033 (F.C.), the
Court held that in deciding whether or not to grant an extension of time, the
judge must be satisfied that the application was made as soon as practicable.
In that case, practicable was held to mean “capable of being carried out in
action”. In Canada v. Hennelly,
[1999] F.C.J. No. 846, the Federal Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s
finding that “inadvertence was an insufficient explanation for the appellant’s
delay” (paragraphs 6 and 7). The applicant submitted that Mr. Tran provided the
document to his lawyers at Edelson & Associates on May 8, 2007 (the day he
received it) and there is no evidence that he took any subsequent steps to file
the review application himself, to follow-up with his counsel, or to
communicate with other counsel. Furthermore, the applicant noted that the
respondent’s counsel at Edelson & Associates sent the order to a separate
law firm by fax, instead of filing the review application themselves. It
appears that a secondary fax number was used, and as a result, the other lawyer
did not receive the material. The applicant noted that counsel at Edelson &
Associates failed to take measures to confirm that the order had been received
by the other lawyer and it was not until June 29, 2007 that Edelson &
Associates commenced their research into the validity of bringing an
application. Furthermore, it was not until 35 days later that this application
for review was filed. The applicant submitted that the application was not
filed within the 30 day limitation period, nor was if filed as soon as
practicable. Therefore, the limitation period established under subsection
225.2(9) of the Act should not be extended.
[16]
The
applicant submitted that subsection 225.2(11) of the Act specifies that a
review application under subsection 225.2(8), such as the one in this case, is
to be determined in a summary way. A summary review application is not the
proper forum for the determination of whether the respondent’s right to counsel
in his upcoming criminal trial may be infringed (The Queen v. Duncan
(1991), 47 F.T.R. 220 (T.D.) at paragraph 15). In light of this, the Court ought
to disregard the evidence and arguments relating to the respondent’s liberty
interests, criminal charges, and inability to represent himself at his upcoming
trial. These matters are reserved for the criminal trial judge.
[17]
The
applicant submitted that the Court will issue a jeopardy order only where “on
the basis of the material put before the Court, it appeared that the Minister
had reasonable grounds for believing that the taxpayer would waste, liquidate,
or otherwise transfer his assets so as to become less able to pay the amount
assessed and thereby jeopardizing the Minister’s debt” (Canada v. Goldbeck
(1990), 90 D.T.C. 6575). The applicant also noted that the wording of
subsection 225.2(2) stipulates that the Court shall authorize the Minister to
take any of the actions listed in paragraphs 225.1(1)(a) through (g), and as
such, once the evidentiary threshold has been met, there is no discretion on
the Court to refuse the application. Furthermore, the applicant submitted that
the appropriate standard is for the Minister to show that the taxpayer could or
may waste, liquidate or otherwise transfer his property (Minister of
National Revenue v. 514659 B.C. Ltd., 2003 D.T.C. 5150
(F.C.T.D.), M.N.R. v. Goldland Jewelers Ltd., 2006 ABQB
108, 1853-9049 Quebec Inc. v. The Queen, 87 D.T.C. 5093).
[18]
The
applicant submitted that the ex parte motion record disclosed ample
evidence that delay would jeopardize the collection of the income tax debt. The
applicant noted that the record before the Court included a detailed bank draft
analysis showing that the respondent and his wife had previously transferred
significant amounts of money to family members in Vietnam. For
instance, between December 31, 1997 and September 30, 2003, $477,000.00 was
transferred to family members in Vietnam. Previous transfers of
assets out of the taxpayers’ control together with evidence of other transfers
of valuable assets to family members has been found in itself sufficient to
justify the issuance of a jeopardy order (Canada (Minister of National Revenue)
v. MacIver et al. (1999), 99 D.T.C. 5524 (F.C.T.D.)). The applicant
also submitted that the record included evidence to the fact that the
respondent travels once a year to Vietnam and stays for
approximately three months at a time, thus establishing further significant
ties to Vietnam. The
applicant also submitted that the record included evidence of the applicant’s
past unorthodox financial practices. Unorthodox financial practices have in
past cases been recognized as warranting the grant of a jeopardy order (Canada
(Minister of National Revenue) v. Rouleau (1995), 101 F.T.R. 57 (T.D.)).
The applicant submitted that the ex parte motion record provided
evidence that the respondent operated a cash business with significant cash
flow, but inadequate books and records. Moreover, the record also provided
evidence that the respondent had previously transported $225, 000 in cash to
the bank in garbage bags containing low denominations of $10 and $20 bills. The
applicant submitted that there was ample evidence before the Court to grant the
jeopardy order.
[19]
The
applicant also made submissions as to the respondent’s allegation that material
evidence was not disclosed to the Court during the ex parte motion. The
applicant agreed that during an ex parte application, the applicant must
act in the utmost good faith, and make full and frank disclosure so as not to
mislead the Court (Canada (Minister of National Revenue) v. Services
M.L. Marengère Inc. (1999), 2000 D.T.C. 6032). The applicant submitted that
at the time of the ex parte motion, the CRA had no knowledge that the
respondent’s motivation for paying his outstanding GST was to provide security
for his legal fees. The applicant noted that the affidavit of Sara Siebert
states that the CRA had knowledge of Mr. Tran’s intention to secure legal fees
as of March 14, 2007; however, this is contradicted by the affidavit of John
Moore which states that the information as to Mr. Tran’s intention to provide
security for his legal fees was not provided to CRA until June 21, 2007.
Finally, the applicant submitted that in any event, Mr. Tran’s intended use of
the equity in the properties is irrelevant in the context of the application
for a jeopardy order under section 225.2; the question before the Court is
whether or not there are reasonable grounds to believe that the delay in
collecting would jeopardize the collection of all or any part of the amount
assessed. Granting a jeopardy order does not turn on the intention of the
debtor to dissipate assets, the matter must be determined objectively and
realistically (Canada (Minister of National Revenue v. Delauniere,
2007 FC 636). The applicant submitted that in considering the respondent’s
actions in an objective and realistic manner, there were reasonable grounds to
believe that the delay in collection would jeopardize the payment of Mr. Tran’s
income tax debt.
Analysis and Decision
[20]
Issue
1
Should this
Court grant an order extending the time for a review of the ex parte order
dated
May 7, 2007 pursuant to subsection 225.2(8) of the Act?
The
respondent requested an extension of time for reviewing the ex parte
order pursuant to
subsection
225.2(8). The respondent argued that the circumstances of this case warrant the
exercise of this Court’s inherent power to extend the limitation period. The
applicant submitted that the 30-day limitation period has expired and the
application for review was not brought as soon as practicable; therefore, the
Court should dismiss this request.
[21]
The
ex parte order was granted on May 7, 2007 by Madame Justice
Tremblay-Lamer. According to the respondent’s affidavit of Sara Siebert, the
respondent faxed a copy of the order to the law firm Edelson & Associates
on May 8, 2007. I understand that Mr. Edelson then immediately faxed the order
to Mr. Paul Dioguardi, the respondent’s civil tax counsel. This fax was
followed by a voicemail message from Mr. Edelson to Mr. Dioguardi. At this
point, it appears that counsel at Edelson & Associates was satisfied that
Mr. Dioguardi would be taking care of the matter. However, Mr. Dioguardi has subsequently
explained that the order was faxed to a secondary fax number at his office and
did not come to his attention. There was no submission as to why the voicemail
left for Mr. Dioguardi was not followed up on. There is also nothing on the
record to suggest that aside from the voicemail message left by Mr. Edelson to
Mr. Dioguardi, there was any follow-up by counsel at Edelson & Associates.
[22]
On
June 21, 2007, Edelson & Associates learned that no timely application had
been brought by Mr. Dioguardi to remove the jeopardy order. On June 29, 2007
Edelson & Associates commenced their research into the viability of
bringing an application to address this issue. It was not until August 3, 2007,
that Edelson & Associates filed this motion for an extension of time and
application for review. Thus, as noted by the applicant, this application for
review is a full 87 days after the order was served on the respondent; almost
two months in excess of the expiry of the limitation period.
[23]
The
legislative provisions containing the limitation period read as follows:
225.2(1)
In this section, "judge" means a judge or a local judge of a superior
court of a province or a judge of the Federal Court.
[.
. .]
(8)
Where a judge of a court has granted an authorization under this section in
respect of a taxpayer, the taxpayer may, on 6 clear days notice to the Deputy
Attorney General of Canada, apply to a judge of the court to review
the authorization.
(9)
An application under subsection 225.2(8) shall be made
(a)
within 30 days from the day on which the authorization was served on the
taxpayer in accordance with this section; or
(b)
within such further time as a judge may allow, on being satisfied that the
application was made as soon as practicable.
[24]
The
respondent does not deny that the limitation period has expired. A question
remains however, as to whether the respondent’s application was brought as soon
as practicable under paragraph 225.2(9)(b). In Canada (Minister of National
Revenue) v. Desgagné, [2001] F.C.J No. 1213, this Court held at
paragraph 10 that “the Act clearly specifies that in order to grant an
extension of time, the Court must be satisfied that the applicant filed an
application for review of the order as soon as practicable (emphasis added).”
Justice Blais then went on to cite the decision in Moreno v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1996] F.C.J. No. 218,
wherein it was held that an applicant requesting an extension of time must first
prove that there was some justification for the delay throughout the whole
period of the delay and secondly, that they have an arguable case. In my
opinion, the respondent has failed to satisfy the first requirement. While I
recognize that until June 21, 2007, the respondent’s legal counsel at Edelson
& Associates believed that a timely application had been
brought by Mr. Dioguardi, they nonetheless waited until August 3, 2007 to bring
this application. The respondent argued that this delay was needed to “assess the
validity of the application”. While some time may have been needed to organize
the application, I do not feel that a period of over a month, which I note was
the original limitation period, is justified. Consequently, the respondent has
failed to provide a justification for the entire delay between June 21, 2007
and August 3, 2007. As such, I am of the opinion that the application was not
brought as soon as practicable as required by paragraph 225.2(9)(b) of the Act.
[25]
The
only remaining means of extending the limitation period is for this Court to
use its inherent discretion to extend the 30-day limitation period. The
appropriate test for an extension of time was developed in Canada (Attorney General) v. Hennelly (1999),
244 N.R. 399 (F.C.A):
1. there is a continuing
intention to pursue his or her application;
2. the application has some
merit;
3. there would be no
prejudice arising from the delay on the not moving party; and
4. there exists a reasonable
explanation for the delay
Furthermore, I note that the Federal Court of
Appeal in Hennelly above, observed that justification for an extension
of time turns on the facts of each particular case.
[26]
In
the present case, the Mr. Tran appears to have had a continuing intention to
pursue his application. In my opinion, there is some merit to the application
being that the respondent alleges a breach of the Minister’s requirement to
disclose all material facts during the ex parte motion. Furthermore,
there appears to be no prejudice to the Minister arising from the delay.
However, with regards to a reasonable explanation for the delay, I am not
satisfied that one exists.
[27]
As
previously discussed, an application was not filed within the 30-day limit
because the respondent’s counsel at Edelson & Associates faxed the order to
the respondent’s civil tax lawyer, thinking that they would be filing the
application. When counsel at Edelson & Associates realized on June 21, 2007
that no application had been filed, they then waited over a month to file this
application on August 3, 2007. While I accept that there might have been a
reasonable explanation for the delay up to June 21, 2007, there is no
reasonable explanation for the delay between June 21st and August 3rd.
I note that despite having knowledge that the time limit had already expired,
counsel at Edelson & Associates waited over a month to bring this
application. The only reasons provided by the respondent for this delay is the
fact that they needed time “to assess the validity of bringing the application”.
I find this explanation does not meet the requirement of a reasonable
explanation, especially since the time taken to assess the validity of the
claim was in excess of the original 30-day limitation period. This is not
reasonable.
[28]
In
my opinion, this Court should not exercise its inherent power to extend the
limitation period. In
Chin v. Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration),
[1993] F.C.J. No. 1033, this Court held at paragraph 10:
I
know that Courts are often reluctant to disadvantage individuals because their
counsel miss deadlines. At the same time, in matters of this nature, counsel is
acting in the shoes of her client. Counsel and client for such purposes are
one. It is too easy a justification for non-compliance with the rules for
counsel to say the delay was not in any way caused by my client and if an
extension is not granted my client will be prejudiced. I come back again to
the question of fairness. It is unfair for some counsel to be proceeding on the
basis that barring unforeseen events the time limits must be met and for others
to be assuming that all they need do is plead overwork, or some other
controllable event, and they will be granted at least one extension of time. In
the absence of an explicit rule providing for the latter I proceed on the basis
that the former is what is required.
[Emphasis
added]
[29]
The
case of Chin above, involved counsel who had failed to meet the
limitation period for filing because of pressure of work and scheduling issues.
While the facts in the present case are different, the circumstances are the
same in that the reason for delay was not outside the control of counsel. I am
of the opinion, that in the circumstances of this case, it is reasonable for
this Court to expect counsel to follow-up on the fax sent, especially when no
reply was received from the voicemail message left shortly after the fax was
sent. Moreover, it is equally reasonable for this Court to expect counsel, upon
discovering that an application was not made in a timely fashion, to file this
notice of motion as quickly as possible and not wait over a month to assess its
validity before filing. In my opinion, the principle articulated in Chin above,
applies to the present case. The test for an extension of time in Hennelly above,
has not been satisfied.
[30]
I
note that counsel for the respondent argued that this application related to
the respondent’s ability to enjoy his constitutional right to counsel of his
choice. I agree with the applicant that these are matters for the criminal
trial judge to consider.
[31]
The
respondent’s request for an extension of time for a review of the ex parte
order of Madame Justice Tremblay-Lamer is denied.
[32]
Because
of my finding on the request for the extension of time, I will not be dealing
with the remaining issues.
[33]
The
application of the respondent to extend the time for the filing of an
application to review Madame Justice Tremblay-Lamer’s order having been denied,
the respondent’s application is dismissed.
[34]
The
applicant shall have the costs of the application.
JUDGMENT
[35]
IT
IS ORDERED that the application of the respondent to extend the time for the
filing of an application to review Madame Justice Tremblay-Lamer’s order is
denied and consequently the respondent’s application is dismissed with costs to
the applicant.
“John
A. O’Keefe”
ANNEX
Relevant
Statutory Provisions
The relevant
statutory provisions are set out in this section.
The Income
Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) as amended:
|
225.1(1)
If a taxpayer is liable for the payment of an amount assessed under this Act,
other than an amount assessed under subsection 152(4.2), 169(3) or 220(3.1),
the Minister shall not, until after the collection-commencement day in
respect of the amount, do any of the following for the purpose of collecting
the amount:
(a) commence
legal proceedings in a court,
(b) certify
the amount under section 223,
(c) require a
person to make a payment under subsection 224(1),
(d) require an
institution or a person to make a payment under subsection 224(1.1),
(e) [Repealed,
2006, c. 4, s. 166]
(f) require a
person to turn over moneys under subsection 224.3(1), or
(g) give a
notice, issue a certificate or make a direction under subsection 225(1).
225.2(1)
In this section, "judge" means a judge or a local judge of a
superior court of a province or a judge of the Federal Court.
. . .
(8) Where a
judge of a court has granted an authorization under this section in respect
of a taxpayer, the taxpayer may, on 6 clear days notice to the Deputy
Attorney General of Canada, apply to a judge of the court to review
the authorization.
(9) An
application under subsection 225.2(8) shall be made
(a) within 30
days from the day on which the authorization was served on the taxpayer in
accordance with this section; or
(b) within
such further time as a judge may allow, on being satisfied that the
application was made as soon as practicable.
. . .
(11) On an
application under subsection 225.2(8), the judge shall determine the question
summarily and may confirm, set aside or vary the authorization and make such
other order as the judge considers appropriate.
|
225.1(1)
Si un contribuable est redevable du montant d’une cotisation établie en vertu
des dispositions de la présente loi, exception faite des paragraphes
152(4.2), 169(3) et 220(3.1), le ministre, pour recouvrer le montant impayé,
ne peut, avant le lendemain du jour du début du recouvrement du montant,
prendre les mesures suivantes:
a)
entamer une poursuite devant un tribunal;
b)
attester le montant, conformément à l’article 223;
c)
obliger une personne à faire un paiement, conformément au paragraphe 224(1);
d)
obliger une institution ou une personne visée au paragraphe 224(1.1) à faire
un paiement, conformément à ce paragraphe;
e)
[Abrogé, 2006, ch. 4, art. 166]
f)
obliger une personne à remettre des fonds, conformément au paragraphe
224.3(1);
g)
donner un avis, délivrer un certificat ou donner un ordre, conformément au
paragraphe 225(1).
225.2(1)
Au présent article, «juge » s’entend d’un juge ou d’un juge local d’une cour
supérieure d’une province ou d’un juge de la Cour fédérale.
. .
.
(8)
Dans le cas où le juge saisi accorde l’autorisation visée au présent article
à l’égard d’un contribuable, celui-ci peut, après avis de six jours francs au
sous-procureur général du Canada, demander à un juge de la cour de réviser
l’autorisation.
(9)
La requête visée au paragraphe (8) doit être présentée:
a)
dans les 30 jours suivant la date où l’autorisation a été signifiée au
contribuable en application du présent article;
b)
dans le délai supplémentaire que le juge peut accorder s’il est convaincu que
le contribuable a présenté la requête dès que matériellement possible.
. .
.
(11)
Dans le cas d’une requête visée au paragraphe (8), le juge statue sur la
question de façon sommaire et peut confirmer, annuler ou modifier
l’autorisation et rendre toute autre ordonnance qu’il juge indiquée.
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