Search - 德国民法典第1993条

It is well established that “[a] party cannot introduce new evidence which was not before the decision-maker ” (Rojas v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 1303 at paragraph 9, [2012] FCJ No 1407, which cites Lemiecha (Litigation Guardian) v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1993] FCJ No 1333, 72 FTR 49). ...

It changed its name to “Families as Support Team Society” on June 22, 1993. [4]                The Respondent obtained the status of registered charity on April 6, 1994. [5]                On April 1, 1996, the Respondent requested that the Registrar give public notice, in accordance with subparagraph 9(1)(n)(iii) of the Trade-marks Act, RSC 1985, c T-13 [Trade-marks Act] of the adoption and use of the official mark F A S T. [6]                Pursuant to subparagraph 9(1)(n)(iii) of the Trade-marks Act, the Registrar gave public notice through publication in the Trade-marks Journal of May 1, 1996, volume 43, No 2166, of the adoption and use by the Respondent of the F A S T mark for services as an official mark. [7]                The Respondent had its charity status revoked on May 20, 2006 for failure to file. ...

Furthermore, the citizenship judge was not satisfied with the justifications provided by the applicant with respect to some of the irregularities in the citizenship application and in the residence questionnaire. [7]   Finding that the applicant’s evidence and testimony contained contradictory elements raising issues of credibility, the citizenship judge did not proceed with performing the test set forth in Pourghasemi (Re), [1993] FCJ 232 (Pourghasemi). ...

Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689). [41]            This Court has affirmed on several occasions that a refugee claimant must take all reasonable measures to allow the state an actual chance to protect him or her (Ward, above; Campos Navarro v. ...

Implausibility determinations based on common sense or common experience can be entirely erroneous when that “common sense” or “common experience” is grounded in social or cultural norms that may have no application to the case at hand (Leung v Minister of Employment and Immigration (1994), 81 FTR 303 at 307 (TD); Bains v Minister of Employment and Immigration (1993), 63 FTR 312 at 314 (TD); Santos v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 937 at para 15).   ...

Standard of Review [9]   The standard of review for the RPD’s assessment of the evidence and a claimant’s credibility is that of reasonableness, with considerable deference owed to the advantageous position of the trier of fact (Cambara v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 1019 at para 13, and Aguebor v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] FCJ No 732 at para 4). [10]   The reasonableness standard tasks the Court with reviewing an administrative decision for “the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process” and determining “whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law” (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at para 47). ...

The Applicant and her husband married in Iran on February 8, 1993. Her husband had worked in Iran for 18 years as an engineer before they moved to Canada in 2008 with their two teenage sons. ...

Analysis [7]   It is trite law that an RPD decision based on credibility issues is highly factual and is reviewable on a standard of reasonableness (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at para 53 [Dunsmuir]; Doualeh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 531 at para 16; Kanziga v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 1014 at para 21; Rahal v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 319 at para 22; Aguebor v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] FCJ No 732 (QL) at para 4). [8]   Where the standard of reasonableness applies, the Court’s role is to determine whether the decision falls within a “range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law”. ...

[14]   The Applicant submits expungement should be granted pursuant to paragraph 18(1)(c) of the Act, because as of November 19, 2018, the date this expungement application was commenced, the Respondent’s Mark was abandoned. [15]   Paragraph 18(1)(c) of the Act provides: When registration invalid Quand l’enregistrement est invalide 18 (1) The registration of a trademark is invalid if … 18 (1) L’enregistrement d’une marque de commerce est invalide dans les cas suivants: … (c) the trademark has been abandoned; c) la marque de commerce a été abandonnée; [16]   A two part test to find abandonment of a trademark under paragraph 18(1)(c) is set out in Promafil Canada Ltee v Munsingwear Inc, [1992] FCJ No 611, 44 CPR (3d) 59 per Hugessen, MacGuigan and Desjardins JJA [Promafil], leave to appeal refused (1993), 47 CPR (3d): There is no dispute that in order to find abandonment of a trade mark one has to find: (1) that the mark is no longer in use in Canada and (2) an intention to abandon the mark. ...

On October 14, 1993, he married his second wife, Violetta Suading Ognase, who sponsored him as a permanent resident. ...