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In finding that Maersk’s fees came within Article 9 rather than 13, Sikri J stated (at para 12): '[P]rofit' from operation of ships under Article…9 … would necessarily include expenses for earning that income and … [the] more so, when it is found that the business cannot be run without these expenses. This Court … has categorically held that use of [a] facility does not amount to technical services, as technical services denote services catering to the special needs of the person using them and not a facility provided to all. ...

. … [T] here is no evidence that the auditor … was authorized, in the course of her duties, to disclose it in whole or in part. ...

[T]he wide scope of "legal advice" … and the concept of "continuum of communications" must be taken fully into account. If the dominant purpose of the communication is … to settle the instructions to the lawyer then … that communication will be covered by LAP. ... The purpose of the email was modest: it was intended to show that … not all of the executives at CAA shared the approach suggested by Mr Haines' earlier email. ...

. … The taxable supply that triggers payment (and the duty to pay tax) was never provided because the agreement that contemplated it was disclaimed. ... If payment must be deemed to have been made and taxes collected, it stands to reason that the triggering event be the payment of the damages that replace what would otherwise have been paid. … Conversely, what the ARQ proposes – that the payment be deemed to have been paid years before- would create a fiction that is entirely arbitrary. ...

. … It was clearly an appurtenance to the detached home. … There is no requirement in ETA that the residential complex/residential unit exemption involve the transfer of an entire residential unit or a complete residency unit. This would be contrary to the “part thereof” language in section 123(1) of the ETA. … [T]he parties’ expectations with regard to the future demolition do not change the facts on the ground at the time of closing. ...

In finding that the Superior Court had the jurisdiction to provide that the super-priority charge ranked ahead of the deemed trust for the federal source deductions under ITA s. 227(4.1) (as well as the Quebec equivalent), Schrager JA noted: Canada North decided that CCAA courts could grant super-priority charges ranking in priority to s. 227(4.1) deemed trusts Callidus indicated that the “proposal provisions in the BIA serve … the same remedial purpose as those in the CCCA – i.e., the financial rehabilitation of an insolvent corporate debtor” and “to the extent possible, the two statutes should be treated in a harmonized fashion” (para. 46). Regarding the Attorney General’s argument- that BIA s. 50.6(3), which provided that the “court may order that the … charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor,” did not apply because s. 227(4.1) did not create a security interest- “it would seem nonsensical in the overall scheme of the BIA that a court could order that the interim lending charge take priority over the claim of any hypothecary or mortgage creditor but not over the claim of an unsecured creditor benefiting from a sui generis non-proprietary right akin to a floating charge, that is, the ITA Deemed Trust” (para. 51). ...

. … After noting (at para. 24) that an alternative interpretation was that “s. 79(7) is interpreted as simply a provision, in cases involving loss carry backs, that postpones the date when the deduction in the tax payable arises, and thus when interest would begin to accrue,” he found in favour of the latter interpretation, stating (at paras. 26, 29-30): On that point, the respondent’s reliance on the principle that governments have the right to legislate illogically is not a persuasive one. It is also not a principle of statutory interpretation to be readily invoked. … [T]here is a manifest error in the interpretation … that the appellant would be disentitled to any interest payment. That result is not only manifestly unfair, it is directly contrary to the legislative context in which the interest payment provisions were adopted more than 60 years ago. … The language in s. 79(7) is not unambiguous when read in its entire context. ...

Pagone J stated (at paras. 6, 8, 11, 12 and 33): … The inquiry into derivation is not into whether an entitlement to receive has arisen or whether an amount has been received, although both entitlement and receipt may be relevant in determining whether there has been derivation. ... That the interest income had been derived upon accrual, … is not denied by the fact that … “SRC made only 2 loan advances in 10 years, and occasionally provided other financial accommodation in other forms”. ... There was no suggestion on the evidence that payment of the accrued interest income from its parent was uncertain. … [T]he lending of money and the provision of financial accommodation for reward to its parent company was part of its business or income earning activities. ...

Aubé JCQ found (at paras 69.1, 69.5, 69.6, 70, 71, and 72, Tax Interpretations translation): … [T]he whole family was involved in the project. … The profit realized on the sale was used to reimburse the lines of credit. ...

At issue was whether the full assessed amount qualified as an “amount payable, within the meaning of subsection 223(1) of the Income Tax Act … by an individual,” in which case s. 172.1 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, which provided more onerous conditions for the discharge of an individual with substantial amounts of such “personal income tax debts,” would have been applicable. ... The assessed amount can change from time to time by virtue of judicial decisions or new assessments: Terra Nova Properties … [1967] 2 Ex. ...