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., 2021 FCA 223-- summary under Subsection 152(3.4) Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 152- Subsection 152(3.4) respective roles of Tax Court and Federal Court in reviewing CEWS claims CRA, which had taken the view that Iris Technologies in fact had not experienced a significant decline in its qualifying revenues during COVID, denied Iris’ CEWS (wage subsidy) claims – initially on the basis of exercising its discretion under s. 164(1.6), which provides that the Minister, before the time for filing the taxpayer’s return for the year, “may refund to the taxpayer all or any part of the [deemed CEWS] overpayment” arising under s. 125.7(2). ... Whether the Minister erred in determining that there was no overpayment is to be adjudicated in the Tax Court; whether the Minister erred in refusing to refund an overpayment is for the Federal Court to decide. … Rennie JA went on to find that in substance Iris’ application was a challenge to the Minister’s determination, reflected in the subsequent notice of determination made pursuant to s. 152(3.4), that Iris had not generated a CEWS (deemed overpayment) amount under s. 125.7(2), and found that Iris’ judicial review application should be struck. ...

For instance, the taxpayers now argued that each of the principals could have chosen to not form a Serviceco, whereas the terms of the Partnership Agreement appeared to provide that there was no such choice – so that “the evidence and factual findings in the Tax Court may well have been different had the parties been focussed before the Tax Court on the issue [now] raised by the Appellants …” (para. 29). ...

Khanna’s testimony that they shared the income from the rental properties they owned … nothing on the record address[ed] her involvement in or knowledge about the details of the rental business” (para. 17). ... She concluded (at para. 27): … As this Court has said, “[w]ilful blindness pivots on a finding that the taxpayer deliberately chose not to make inquiries in order to avoid verifying that which might be such an inconvenient truth. ...

The assessments were issued for the improper purpose of depriving the Federal Court of jurisdiction to hear administrative law grievances raised by Iris- as to which Rennie JA noted (at para. 13) that “where the true purpose of the application is to seek practical relief against the exercise of a discretion, the bar in section 18.5 does not apply” – but went on to indicate that such was not the case here. ... Issuing a declaration that does not quash or vacate the assessments would serve little or no purpose …. ...

(r.5) of the financial service definition provided an exclusion from financial service for “property … that is delivered or made available to” CIBC “in conjunction with” CIBC selling financial products of PC Bank, the supply made by PC Bank to CIBC was taxable. ... Parliament does not speak in vain …. He then concluded (at para. 68): CIBC has failed to establish that the Tax Court Judge committed any palpable and overriding error in his finding that PC Bank supplied the “Bundle of Rights” to CIBC. ...

In affirming this finding, Boivin JA distinguished Kevin Davis Dentistry, which gave effect to the expressed Parliamentary intent to “provide for different tax treatment of supplies of orthodontic appliances and orthodontic service” (para. 25) whereas, here, the Ontario regulations did “not amount to as clear an indicator of Parliament’s intent as the GST Act did in Kevin Davis Dentistry ” and “the intended tax treatment of what would constitute separate supplies in the present circumstances is not outlined in any statute as it was in the GST Act in Kevin Davis Dentistry ” (para. 28). ...

., 2011 FCA 120 … information pertaining to the policy of the Act, even where it is not taxpayer specific, can be relevant on discovery. … ...

. … [A]lthough auditors are entitled to be provided with “all reasonable assistance” in performing their audits (paragraph 231.1(1)(d)…), they cannot compel taxpayers to reveal their “soft spots”. … After referencing financial reporting obligations of public companies under provincial securities legislation including the accurate reporting of accrued taxes and before noting concerns of CPA Canada that required disclosure to CRA of tax accrual working papers would reduce the candour of disclosures by companies to their external auditors, he stated (at para. 86): By enacting subsection 231.1(1), Parliament could not have intended to vest the Minister with a power so sweeping that it would undermine those obligations. ...

. … With respect to the interpretation to be given to the word "knew", this Court clarified that a subjective test must be used to determine whether the requisite knowledge exists. ... That said, it is not enough to proclaim ignorance to escape sanctions; common sense and objective factors may be taken into account in deciding whether a claimant has a subjective knowledge of the falsity of his or her statements. … Before remitting the file to the SST-AD for a fresh decision, De Montigny JA stated (at para 14): By implicitly endorsing the decision of the SST-GD that the intent to defraud would be required for a person to "knowingly" make a false or misleading statement, the SST-AD erred. ...

. … [61] …[A] taxpayer should have the burden to prove, on a balance of probabilities, any facts that are alleged by that taxpayer in their notice of appeal and that are denied by the Crown. ... Woods JA, in also dismissing the appeal, stated that she agreed with the comments of Stratas JA, who stated (at para. 70) that he found “much of what [Webb JA said] … to be thoughtful, illuminating and attractive”, but also (at para. 71) that he declined “to express a definitive opinion on the correctness of his views on this fundamental point.” ...