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Ng – so that he had satisfied the occupancy requirements of ETA s. 254(2)(g). ... Ngai was not a “particular individual” for the purposes of section 254 of the ETA. … In my view, only an individual who is a “particular individual” for the purposes of section 254 is eligible to apply for the new housing rebate. … In going on to find that the Ontario rebate was not available, Webb JA noted that under ETA s. 126(2) and the referenced ITA provisions “a nephew is not related to his aunt or uncle and therefore, Mr. ...

. … [T]he contention of the appellant could lead to absurd consequences. ... Similarly, he stated (at para. 55): [T]here is no doubt that broad expressions such as “taxable supply” and “commercial activity” … must be interpreted irrespective of considerations of lawfulness, public order or morality. That among other things is the reason that income derived from prostitution or the sale of drugs are taxable …. ...

Thus, Rule 317, as modified by Rule 350, merely required CRA to produce the documents which were in the hands of the decision-maker when the decision was made – and not to provide other requested documents (e.g., the constating documents of all registered CAAAs at the time of the decision). However, the affidavit of the CRA decision maker stated that “all relevant materials upon which the CRA relied … have been produced” (para. 27). ... At a minimum, it does not foreclose the possibility that irrelevant material of this kind was before the Minister when the decision was made. … [G]iven the grounds of appeal and the purpose of rules 317 and 318, the Minister should be required to produce any material apart from that already disclosed that was before her when the decision was made, with the exception of properly redacted information. ...

Canada, 2020 FCA 90-- summary under Paragraph 149(1)(d.5) Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 149- Subsection 149(1)- Paragraph 149(1)(d.5) LPIC was not exempt under s. 149(1)(d.5) because its owner, the Law Society, did not provide municipal-type services The Tax Court found that the appellant (“LPIC”) did not qualify under s. 149(1)(d.5) as being owned as to more than 90% by a “municipal or public body performing a function of government in Canada” because its parent, the Law Society of Upper Canada, although a “public body,” did not satisfy the test of “performing a function of government ”- it performed various functions in the course of regulating the legal profession, but not in the course of governing people located in Ontario. In dismissing LPIC’s appeal, Mactavish JA noted: “If the scope of the phrase ‘public body performing a function of government in Canada’ … were as broad as LawPRO says it is, it would not have been necessary for Parliament to have included the words ‘a municipal or’ in the phrase ‘a municipal or public body performing a function of government in Canada’. “ (para. 52) “The marginal note that accompanies paragraph 149(1)(c) refers to the provision as relating to ‘[m]unicipal authorities’, suggesting that in using the phrase ‘a municipality in Canada, or a municipal or public body performing a function of government in Canada’, Parliament intended to exempt municipalities and ‘municipal-type’ authorities.” ...

In rejecting this submission, Webb JA stated that, under a textual approach (para. 43): … [S]ubparagraph [247(2)(b)(i)] raises the issue of whether the transaction or series of transactions would have been entered into between persons dealing with each other at arm's length (an objective test based on hypothetical persons) not whether the particular taxpayer would have entered into the transaction or series of transactions in issue with an arm's length party (a subjective test). … Furthermore (para. 46): If the Crown's interpretation is correct, then whenever a corporation in Canada wants to carry on business in a foreign country through a foreign subsidiary, the condition in subparagraph 247(2)(b)(i) of the Act would be satisfied. ... In his conclusions, Webb JA stated (at para. 81): …[T]he rules in paragraph 247(2)(b) and (d) … do not allow the Minister to simply reallocate all of the profit of a foreign subsidiary to its Canadian parent company on the basis that the Canadian corporation would not have entered any transactions with its foreign subsidiary if they had been dealing with each other at arm's length. ...

After noting (at para. 38) that “increasing the adjusted cost base of the partnership interest by both the fair market value of the transferred properties and the elected amount gives rise to an absurd result,” Noël CJ stated (at para. 48): The Tax Court judge [found] … that the transfers, including the first, occurred after the partnership had been created. Specifically, the appellant’s partnership interest had already been acquired when the shopping centres were transferred, thereby eliminating any possibility that, in addition to the subsection 97(2) adjustment, the partnership interest could be increased under section 54 by the “cost”, i.e. the fair market value, of the transferred property …. ... As well, the Tax Court judge correctly held that the Act tracks the partnership interest as a whole rather than as individual units in “subdivision C dealing with capital gains and capital losses or in subdivision J dealing with partnerships” …. ...

In confirming the Tax Court’s dismissal of the taxpayer’s motion to compel answers to these and other questions, Locke JA first indicated (at para. 22) that it was “tempting to … [consider] that documents must be publicly available in order to be relevant to statutory interpretation,” but then also noted (at para. 30) that Upper Churchill [1984] 1 S.C.R. 297) “leave[s] room for cases where extrinsic evidence will not be relevant, but it also limits the issues to which such evidence might be relevant.” ... In this regard, he agreed (at para. 19) with the Tax Court’s view that “that earlier drafts of a final position paper do not have to be disclosed, and … that even where relevance is established, the Court has a residual discretion to refuse document production.” ... That document is hence similar to the “earlier drafts of a final position paper” which do not have to be disclosed …. ...

. … Mr. Barrs finds himself faced with an interest bill that far exceeds those of the taxpayers who made their requests for relief in 2004. ... Given that the independent third-level review officer failed to engage with the request for greater relief in the open years to ensure equitable treatment, his decision must be set aside. … Failure to engage with an important argument advanced by a party will generally render an administrative decision unreasonable [citing Vavilov] …. ...

In reversing the Tax Court and in finding that the non-capital losses were deductible, Webb JA noted that, under Stewart, the test of whether “the activity is being carried out in a commercially sufficient manner to constitute a source of income” (Stewart, at para. 60) was only engaged “if there is a hobby or personal element to the activity in question” (Brown, at para. 26), and stated (at paras. 27, 29): … Mr. Brown’s decision to provide these management services as a result of his wife’s inability to continue to manage the gallery, does not mean that there is a personal or hobby element to his management services activity …. ... It is possible to find a personal reason why any person is carrying on a particular activity. … Since there was no personal or hobby element in Mr. ...

. … [T]he fact is that the same eighteen persons who formed the Partnership were the very same persons who comprised the Co-Tenancy. … [T]he agreement to pay the tenant inducement payment of $1.2 million was of no legal consequence and.. it cannot be considered an outlay or expense made for the purpose of gaining or producing income…. ...