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Leblanc JA noted: (at para. 46, TaxInterpretations translation) that the “text of subsection 280(1) and section 280.1 … does not provide further guidance on whether the unpaid or unpaid ‘amount’ on which interest and penalty may be charged is gross or net [of rebate entitlements]” (at para. 50) that the rebate provisions in this case were intended by “Parliament … to remedy a situation that would otherwise be inequitable to non-registrant ‘builders’" who were unable to claim input tax credits for their GST costs (see para. 68), (at para. 64) that if the respondent had not reported the transaction and instead been assessed by CRA under s. 191(3), CRA would have been required under s. 296(2.1) to grant the rebate amounts Leblanc JA then stated (at paras. 66, 69): To paraphrase … Humber College, it would be incongruous, to say the least, if provisions purporting to assist a taxpayer caused more harm to a well-meaning taxpayer than to a less well-meaning one …. This cannot be the result that Parliament intended in enacting subsection 280(1) and section 280.1 …. I do not believe that Parliament, in enacting subsection 280(1) and section 280.1 …, had in its mind that the determination of the "amount" to be paid or remitted for the purposes of calculating interest and penalty for late filing of the GST return could, in circumstances such as these …, be made without regard to any rebate otherwise payable to the taxpayer. ...

After stating (at para. 61) that “subsection 94.1(1) … contemplates in express terms that an instrument that derives its value from fluctuating portfolio investments can be a debt” and (at para. 87) that a narrow construction of “debt” would go contrary to the purpose of the above provisions of “annual imputation of income while … foreign investments are in place,” Noël CJ found that future crystallization of the amount due was sufficient, and concluded (at para. 91): When regard is had to the text, context and purpose of paragraph 94.1(1)(a), a debt arises for purposes of this provision when an amount or credit is advanced by one party to another party; an amount is to be paid or repaid by that other party at some point in the future in satisfaction of the advance and this amount is fixed or determinable or will be ascertainable when payment is due. As these three conditions are present here … this suffices to dispose of the appeal …. ...

In finding that no penalty could be imposed, Monaghan JA noted (at para. 16) that essentially the only testimony was of the taxpayer’s husband, which “was almost entirely about his actions and inactions,” so that essentially “nothing on the record address[ed] her involvement in or knowledge about the details of the rental business … and nothing on the record establish[ed] whether … the appellant knew she had unreported income prior to receipt of the reassessments” (para. 18). ...

This occurred – the offer of another public company (“Inco” – the 25% minority shareholder) was accepted by the Diamond Fields shareholders, thereby triggering the payment by Diamond Fields of the break fee. ...

This occurred – the offer of another public company (“Inco” – the 25% minority shareholder) was accepted by the Diamond Fields shareholders, thereby triggering the payment by Diamond Fields of the break fee. ...

In confirming the decision of the Federal Court to the same effect, Rennie JA stated (at para. 21): The [latter] proposal letter … is not a reviewable decision or order. … [I]t did not determine any of the taxpayer’s rights, substantive or procedural…. Before so concluding, he stated (at paras 13, 17): The Notices of Reassessment having been issued, the question whether an injunction could have issued restraining their issuance pending determination of the second-level VDP application is moot. … [T]he reassessments are valid and binding until set aside by the Tax Court…. ...

This occurred – the offer of another public company (“Inco” – the 25% minority shareholder) was accepted by the Diamond Fields shareholders, thereby triggering the payment by Diamond Fields of the break fee. ... Among other findings: “Diamond Fields paid the Fees in order to entice Falconbridge to make an offer pursuant to the merger arrangements” so that it was “reasonable to consider that the Fees were received by Falconbridge as an inducement for the purposes of s. 12(1)(x)” (para. 61 – and in this regard “the evidence as to Falconbridge’s motivation to negotiate a fee (i.e., to deter another bidder and to earn a profit if the bid failed) is not relevant to this issue” (para. 63); and “The Fees were linked to Falconbridge’s operations as a nickel mining company”, which “required access to ore deposits” so that they were received “in the course of” those activities (a phrase which was essentially equated with "in connection with") (para. 70); furthermore, “the Fees were linked to an acquisition of shares that had the capacity to produce property income” so that they were “also received in the course of earning income from property” (para. 71). ...

. … [T]he Tax Court concluded that leaving them as assumptions placed an onus on the respondents that they would not otherwise bear. ... An assumption that is a statement of mixed fact and law does not put any additional onus on the taxpayer … [since] “when the validity of the assessment is attacked in point of law…there is really no onus on either party ….” ... Further, the Tax Court did not consider whether leaving the assumptions as is would better serve the trial process. … [T]he Tax Court therefore erred in law …. ...

The Queen, 2009 TCC 70, to “enable … more extensive changes to be made to a statutory provision than were permitted by mutatis mutandis ” so that it was “no longer … limited to points of detail,” Evans J.A. remarked (at paras. 53-54): It is reasonable to conclude that when Parliament in 1983 replaced the Latin phrase in subsection 227(10) with "plain" English and French words it merely intended to make the provision more accessible. ...

Canada, 2020 FCA 47-- summary under Consistency Summary Under Tax Topics- Statutory Interpretation- Consistency presumption of consistent expression is not absolute In the context of his view that the determination of whether “Notes” held by an offshore fund in which the taxpayer was invested constituted “debt” should be determined in light of the text, context and purpose of the particular provision at issue (s. 94.1(1)(a)) rather than such determination being made for purposes of the Act as a whole, Noël CJ stated (at paras. 52-53): The parties also proceeded on the assumption that the meaning of debt is the same throughout the Act regardless of the provision in which this word is used …. The presumption of consistent expression supports this approach …. However, this presumption is not absolute. ...