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Hogan J found that the predominant element of the supply made by PC Bank to CIBC was the provision of a “bundle of rights” consisting mainly of the right to solicit LCL’s clients in LCL’s stores, the right to use trademarks, and the right to issue points under the LCL Loyalty Program, and that “the Bundle of Rights … enabled CIBC to sell financial products and services” by “allow[ing] CIBC to tap into LCL’s loyal and extensive customer base” (paras. 62, 70). ... (r.5) of the financial service definition provided an exclusion from financial service for “property … that is delivered or made available to” CIBC “in conjunction with” CIBC selling financial products of PC Bank (para. 21), the supply made by PC Bank to CIBC was taxable. ... This constitutes, at best, a secondary element of the PC Bank Supply. … [T]he above services are also excluded under the definition of “financial services” by reason of the application of Exclusionary Paragraph (r.4). ...

. … Justice Woods’ concerns in Garron about the ambiguity inherent in the phrase “directly or indirectly” may perhaps not be entirely appropriate in the context of the transfer of property … [which] has a defined end point, although a circuitous route may be taken to get there. Here there is no easily defined or delineated end point … regarding the length of time during which an increase may still be attributed to an impugned transaction. A more restrictive interpretation of paragraph (b) … avoids these difficulties. ...

In 2010, the Minister assessed the Henro (to include an income account gain) and 984 (to reverse the previously reported capital gain and refund the capital gains tax, plus interest, totalling $1.7M) on the basis that the 2003 drop-down had occurred on a non-rollover basis – but its assessment of 984 was found to be void as being statute-barred. ... However, the resulting 2015 reassessment of 984 could not be justified as valid based on s. 169(3) because the 2010 assessment was itself invalid – hence, 984 was not an appealing “taxpayer” referred to in s. 169(3) (as it was not engaged in a valid appeal procedure). This meant that the only basis for justifying the 2015 assessment of 984 was that, pursuant to s. 160.1(1), the 2010 refund represented an amount that had been “refunded to a taxpayer … in excess of the amount to which the taxpayer was entitled as a refund under this Act.” ...

Five years later, a taxable capital of $46.4M was allocated to AIGLP from a lower-tier sale, with the result that most of this amount was allocated to the four family trusts – who purported to offset this income allocation through losses transferred out of a loss company that had been acquired by them. ... He found that in light of ss. 96(2) and 102(2), partnership members of AIGLP were to be treated as members of it for s. 103 purposes – as were the trust members of AIGLP. ... In applying these principles, he noted that the allocations were highly disproportionate to capital and the inverse of work performed, stating (at paras. 108, 128): … [T]he allocation to the partners were extremely unreasonable, whether it be the allocation of the first $1 million of the formula or the balance. …. ...

Singh beneficially owned ½ of the home prior to 2009, so that there was a gratuitous transfer of property by Mrs. Singh in 2009 to him, MacPhee J stated (at paras 26, 27, 28): … [Mr. Singh] exercised continued use and possession of the home. ... Singh was the largest income earner in the family up to 2004. … [B]oth parents and the children all pooled their income together to ensure all home payments were made. … “One needs very cogent evidence that a spouse who is shown as the legal owner of an interest in property is not also the beneficial owner.” ...

At that time, the taxpayer was deemed by s. 256(9) to have no longer had legal control of the subsidiary from the beginning of that day – and the taxpayer also was dealing with the subsidiary at arm’s length as a factual matter at that time, given that a WTC nominee had taken charge as director and officer of the subsidiary two days’ previously, as requested by it for its commercial (albeit, ineffectual) purposes. ... In this regard, Owen J stated (at paras. 209-210): [I]n my view the words “consideration given for the property”, when read in the context of the entire subsection, can only mean consideration given by the transferee for the property regardless of who receives that consideration. … Subsection 160(1) is imposing a liability on the transferee for the transferor’s liability under the ITA. This can only be done in a fair and reasonable manner if the transferee receives credit for the consideration given for the property that triggers the liability. … ...

However, Jorré J found that such a wide range of decisions were specified in the USA to require unanimous director (or shareholder) approval – to the point that he characterized Kruger as having control of only operating, and not strategic, decisions – that Kruger did not have de jure control. ...

Hershfield J found that the amended purchase agreement entailed, at most, a supply of a co-ownership interest in the property by the appellant to her friend in consideration for her friend’s guarantee – and did not result in any interest in the condo also being supplied by the builder to the friend (so that the new housing rebate was not denied to the appellant). ... Indeed, if such an agreement had been entered into to gain an unintended tax advantage, it might be seen as a wholly artificial transaction – a sham. ...

The Queen, 2017 TCC 20-- summary under Recipient Summary Under Tax Topics- Excise Tax Act- Section 123- Subsection 123(1)- Recipient named purchaser rather than alleged beneficial purchasers was the recipient of real estate sale The vendor of a commercial property signed a sale agreement with a purchaser (Mayling) who was not registered for HST purposes – but then, on closing, was directed to transfer title to a purchaser (840 Holdings), which was HST-registered. The vendor was later informed that, in fact, 840 Holdings was purchasing on behalf of two other registered companies who had acquired beneficial co-ownership interests in the property – and who self-assessed themselves for the applicable HST. ...

Notwithstanding a statement in the Dealership Sale Service Agreements that neither party was “the agent … of the other for any reason,” she found that, in fact, Jayco arranged for the carrier (a Jayco subsidiary) to ship the RVs to Canada on behalf of the dealers rather than of it. In this regard, she stated that a statement in the Dealership Sale Service Agreements that neither party was “the agent … of the other for any reason” had “to be interpreted in its context” (para. 116) and, in fact, Jayco acted on the dealers’ behalf in arranging delivery. ...