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Tool & Die Company Limited to W.S.W. Tool & Die Inc., the writ of execution and report of nulla bona were in the former company name. ...

. … The idea that … a company, has a separate legal personality from its shareholders has been protected and reaffirmed from Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 onwards. ...

The shares of HHT would be transferred to Boulevard LP in exchange for REIT units – except that shareholders electing for rollover treatment would exchange their shares instead with Boulevard LP for Class B exchangeable LP units of Boulevard LP. ... While it might be stretching the point to contend that the holders of the common shares of HHT are receiving, in exchange, the securities of "another body corporate", even though Boulevard LP would be acting at the instance of its corporate general partner, Boulevard GP, given the pervasive use of real estate investment trusts in our contemporary economy, I conclude that the key operative portion of the plan – the exchange of securities – constitutes "any other reorganization or scheme involving the business or affairs of the corporation or of any or all of the holders of its securities or of any options or rights to acquire any of its securities that is, at law, an arrangement", within the meaning of OBCA s. 182(1) (h). ...

Before dismissing the application, Ahmed J stated (at paras. 45, 49): I agree with the Applicant that legislation may be inconsistent with section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 if it creates financial obstacles that impose undue hardship on potential litigants …. However, in light of the Applicant’s gross earnings and numerous related companies, I am not persuaded by the Applicant’s argument that the Appeal Payment Provisions cause it undue hardship. … Trial Lawyers is distinguishable … because the Appeal Payment Provisions are remedial, not punitive. ...

She stated (at para. 120-121): A legitimate expectation arises when a government official makes “clear, unambiguous and unqualified” representations within the scope of their authority to an individual about an administrative process that the government will follow: … Mavi, 2011 SCC 30 …. ... The Court may only grant appropriate procedural remedies to respond to a legitimate expectation …. ...

Rowe and Martin, JJ, jointly speaking for the minority of three, accepted (at para. 151) that, under the Treaty, the “ allocation of taxing powers follows the theory of ‘economic allegiance’," under which “taxes should be paid on income where it has the strongest ‘economic interests’ or ties, either in the state of residence or the source state,” – whereas here there was an abuse of that Treaty object since the “evidence demonstrate[d] that Alta Luxembourg had no genuine economic connections with Luxembourg as it was a mere conduit interposed in Luxembourg for residents of third-party states to avail themselves of a tax exemption under the Treaty” (para. 177). ... The object of the business property exemption was to provide a “ tax break [that] encourages foreigners to invest in immovable property situated in Canada in which businesses are carried on (e.g. mines, hotels, or oil shales)” (para. 77). ... Canada “could also have insisted on a subject-to-tax provision” under which it would forego its right to tax capital gains only if the other state actually taxed those gains – but did not (para. 85). ...

The Court found that, in light of considerations of procedural fairness, the Quebec equivalent of ITA s. 165(3) should be read as if it contained the additional bolded words noted below (para. 17): [T]he Minister shall … reconsider the assessment and … make a reassessment, and send the Minister's decision to the person by mail and to its designated representative, if any. ...

In finding that Houmet had no beneficial entitlement to the interest, Falk LJ first stated (at paras. 49, 52 and 54): [T]he concept of beneficial ownership is well established …. In essence, it means ownership for the benefit of the person in question …. ... There was no evidence to suggest that Houmet could have used the funds received for any other purpose [other than to pay for the assignment to it], or that it could benefit from them in any other manner. … Further, Houmet's involvement was entirely ephemeral …. ...

The "typical sources" of goodwill acknowledged in Murry were "typical sources" because " they motivate service or provide competitive prices that attract customers " (emphasis added). And Murry and the decision which preceded it, Box [(1952) 86 CLR 387], recognised that in the modern world, patronage – in the sense of customers through the door – was no longer the sole means of generating or adding value (or earnings) to a business by attracting custom. ... That unexplained gap suggests that the DCF calculations used by Barrick's valuers to value Placer's land, its principal asset, were wrong. … [T]he danger identified by the majority in Murry of attributing a value to goodwill which actually inheres in an asset was readily apparent. … At the acquisition date, Placer was a land rich company which had no material property comprising legal goodwill. … [italics in original] Words and Phrases goodwill ...

The presumption that a reasonableness review should be applied can be rebutted where there is a statutory appeal mechanism in place (thereby entailing application of a standard of correctness to questions of law) – however, the Court made it clear that this did not include provisions, such as ss. 18 to 18.2, 18.4 and 28 of the Federal Courts Act – so that this aspect does not appear to apply to reviews of CRA decisions (other than assessments). ... Reasons that “simply repeat statutory language, summarize arguments made, and then state a peremptory conclusion” will rarely assist a reviewing court in understanding the rationale underlying a decision and “are no substitute for statements of fact, analysis, inference and judgment” …. ... Rather than confirming a meaningful presumption of deference for administrative decision-makers … the majority’s reasons strip away deference from hundreds of administrative actors subject to statutory rights of appeal; rather than following the consistent path of this Court’s jurisprudence in understanding legislative intent as being the intention to leave legal questions within their mandate to specialized decision-makers with expertise, the majority removes expertise from the equation entirely and reformulates legislative intent as an overriding intention to provide — or not provide — appeal routes; and rather than clarifying the role of reasons and how to review them, the majority revives the kind of search for errors that dominated the pre- C.U.P.E. era. ...