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. … … [A]t the acquisition date, there were no sources of goodwill that could explain the $6 billion gap which was attributed by Barrick to goodwill. That unexplained gap suggests that the DCF calculations used by Barrick's valuers to value Placer's land, its principal asset, were wrong. … [T]he danger identified by the majority in Murry of attributing a value to goodwill which actually inheres in an asset was readily apparent. … At the acquisition date, Placer was a land rich company which had no material property comprising legal goodwill. … [italics in original] ...

After having noted (at para. 10) that ‘fundamental characteristics of religion include that the followers have a faith in a higher power such as God, entity, or Supreme Being; that followers worship this higher power; and that the religion consists of a particular and comprehensive system of faith and worship,” Rivoalen JA found that the Minister’s denial of the appellant’s registration as a charity did not violate its rights under the Charter, stating (at paras. 15 and 16): Section 27 of the Charter is not a substantive provision that can be violated and is “relevant only as an aid to interpretation” …. The respondent, however, concedes that the state’s duty of religious neutrality under section 2(a) of the Charter relates to section 27, in part “with a view to promoting and enhancing diversity” …. … [S]ection 2 of the Charter protects the rights of the appellant’s members to practise their beliefs in Atheism and the Minister cannot interfere with the practice of these beliefs …. ... The appellant can continue to carry out its purpose and its activities without charitable registration …. ...

In finding that these contributions were not foreign income “taxes,” Bocock J stated (at paras 10 and 11): … [T]he Supreme Court of Canada, in … Lawson … listed the following four characteristics of a “tax” …: a) enforceable by law; b) imposed under the authority of the legislature; c) imposed by a public body; and d) made for a public purpose. … [T]he mandatory contributions deducted from Mr. Zong’s UK employment income … prima facie do not meet the fourth [requirement]: made for a public purpose. Because the payor receives a direct personal and financial benefit from his or her contributions in the future, the Minister and this Court [citing Yates] have held that such contributions are not a tax for public purposes. … ...

This is particularly egregious considering that the 2009 claim had been accepted on the basis of the same information given by Honey Fashions (although admittedly on the basis of the pre-QAR policies and before CBSA issued the D8-11-7 Memorandum). … [T]he CBSA should have provided an explanation to Honey Fashions with respect to its departure from past practice. … …[T]he decisions of the CBSA were not reasonable…. ... Accordingly, on the basis of … Vavilov, it was open to the Federal Court to hone in on the fact that the CBSA official made no reference to his earlier decision or to the longstanding departmental practice of accepting name change requests without certain supporting documentation. I therefore agree … that the CBSA’s decisions lack justification, transparency and intelligibility. … … A decision maker cannot deviate from earlier decisions or from a longstanding past practice, especially when it is too late for those affected by these decisions to adjust their behaviour accordingly, without providing a reasonable explanation for that departure. ...

. … … When the true character of the relief sought in this case is considered, the request for payment of the refund is an attempt to short-circuit the recourse mechanisms established by Parliament. ...

. … … [C]onstructive receipt applies with respect to Mrs. Sutton’s remuneration received from the Appellant. ...

The Queen, 2016 TCC 238-- summary under Subsection 211.91(1) Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 211.91- Subsection 211.91(1) Part XII.6 tax applies to CEE which is invalidly (as well as validly) renounced on a look-back basis The taxpayer, which was assessed under Part XII.6 for applying the look-back rule in s. 66(12.66) to Canadian exploration expenses (CEE) which were ineligible for treatment under the rule because they were renounced to a non-arm’s length shareholders, argued, referring to a statement in Joseph v Joseph, [1963] 3 All ER 486 at 490 that The word “purports” … does not mean “professes”. ... Miller J stated (at paras. 42-43, 47): …It is clear that “an amount purported to be renounced in respect of expenses incurred or to be incurred” must refer to an amount “claimed” to be renounced or “intended” to be renounced whether the claim is true or not. … … If the legislators intended that section 211.91 only applied where the corporation effectively renounced an amount, they could have achieved this goal by simply omitting the word purport. … Subsection 66(12.66) allows a corporation to renounce CEE that it has not yet incurred. ...

. … … [T]he Minister may not extend the time under this provision unless the application has been made within one year. ... Woods JA further found (at paras 47, 48 and 52): The relief that ConocoPhillips seeks is to use the general waiver provision in subsection 220(2.1) … in order to engage the objection process without having to comply with its statutory conditions. ... The general waiver provision cannot be applied in this manner to override a more specific provision. …... ...

Harris was informed that he had to file both his personal and business tax returns but that the business returns had to be filed first – and concluded that since this conversation had taken place before 405’s disclosure, that such disclosure was not voluntary. Before finding that the decision not to grant voluntary disclosure was unreasonable because it lacked transparency, so that the matter was to be returned to another decision maker for redetermination, Gleeson J stated (at paras 19, 22): The failure to address how enforcement action against one taxpayer would “likely” uncover information that is the subject of voluntary disclosure by another taxpayer undermines the elements of justification, transparency, and intelligibility. … … Neither the decision letter nor the “memo to file” engages in any analysis as to how the enforcement action against Mr. ... Simply looking at the relationship between the parties is insufficient …. ...

However, TSI filed a Notice of Discontinuance on May 2, 2016 and the appeal was deemed to be dismissed on June 24, 2016 pursuant to s. 16.2(2) of the Tax Court of Canada Act (the “ TCC Act”). ... [S]ubsection 16.2(2) of the TCC Act … simply provides that the appeal is deemed to be dismissed. It does not deem that any issues that were raised by the party who instituted the particular proceeding have been determined by the Tax Court. … … [S]ince that appeal was discontinued, there has been no judicial determination of whether the determinations were made within the time period as set out in subsection 152 (1.4) of the Act or after the expiration of this time period. ...