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He further rejected Pangaea’s submission that, as it had disposed of its veto right, the exclusion from the definition for an agreement that disposes of the taxpayer’s property applied, stating (at para. 62): I find that there is no evidence of a conveyance or disposition of the Appellant’s veto right — even if it can properly be characterized as “property”. … [T]here was no evidence of an assignment of the veto right to a third party. ...

Because it is not at all clear whether the Letter was directed to the Respondents individually or their connected entities, the first requirement of section 231.7 … for obtaining a compliance order has not been satisfied …. ...

. … If the conditions as set out in section 3 … are satisfied, the supply of the particular residential complex will be an exempt supply. ...

. … It was clearly an appurtenance to the detached home. … There is no requirement in ETA that the residential complex/residential unit exemption involve the transfer of an entire residential unit or a complete residency unit. This would be contrary to the “part thereof” language in section 123(1) of the ETA. … [T]he parties’ expectations with regard to the future demolition do not change the facts on the ground at the time of closing. ...

In finding that the Superior Court had the jurisdiction to provide that the super-priority charge ranked ahead of the deemed trust for the federal source deductions under ITA s. 227(4.1) (as well as the Quebec equivalent), Schrager JA noted: Canada North decided that CCAA courts could grant super-priority charges ranking in priority to s. 227(4.1) deemed trusts Callidus indicated that the “proposal provisions in the BIA serve … the same remedial purpose as those in the CCCA – i.e., the financial rehabilitation of an insolvent corporate debtor” and “to the extent possible, the two statutes should be treated in a harmonized fashion” (para. 46). Regarding the Attorney General’s argument- that BIA s. 50.6(3), which provided that the “court may order that the … charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor,” did not apply because s. 227(4.1) did not create a security interest- “it would seem nonsensical in the overall scheme of the BIA that a court could order that the interim lending charge take priority over the claim of any hypothecary or mortgage creditor but not over the claim of an unsecured creditor benefiting from a sui generis non-proprietary right akin to a floating charge, that is, the ITA Deemed Trust” (para. 51). ...

. … After noting (at para. 24) that an alternative interpretation was that “s. 79(7) is interpreted as simply a provision, in cases involving loss carry backs, that postpones the date when the deduction in the tax payable arises, and thus when interest would begin to accrue,” he found in favour of the latter interpretation, stating (at paras. 26, 29-30): On that point, the respondent’s reliance on the principle that governments have the right to legislate illogically is not a persuasive one. It is also not a principle of statutory interpretation to be readily invoked. … [T]here is a manifest error in the interpretation … that the appellant would be disentitled to any interest payment. That result is not only manifestly unfair, it is directly contrary to the legislative context in which the interest payment provisions were adopted more than 60 years ago. … The language in s. 79(7) is not unambiguous when read in its entire context. ...

In allowing their appeal, Spiro J stated (at paras. 32,-34-35): [Circumstances responsible for the sale] … strongly favour... the Appellants. ... The Appellants offered a plausible explanation…. … Rather than installing multiple televisions, the Appellants installed multiple fireplaces. This strongly suggests that they built the home only for themselves. … [T]he Appellants left nothing for a potential purchaser to customize. … The fact that the Appellants finished everything to their own personal taste strongly suggests that they built the home only for themselves. ...

In order to in effect step up the PUC of the shares in Univar Canada, the group first created (as described in greater detail in the paragraph below) a sandwich structure in which a U.S. subsidiary (“UHI”) of Univar NV held notes and all the shares (having PUC and ACB equal to their FMV) of the appellant (“UHC” – which had been formed for the purposes of these transactions), UHC held all the shares of a U.S. subsidiary (“Univar Inc.”), and Univar Inc. held all the shares of Univar Canada. ... “[S]ection 84.1…permits PUC to be stepped up through such non-arm’s length transfer to the extent of the transferor’s “hard basis” in the transferred shares. … No such latitude is permitted under section 212.1.” … If the Appellant’s position prevailed, any non-resident shareholder could reorganize its corporate structure to interpose layers of Canadian resident subsidiaries within its structure to ensure that subsection 212.1 (1) never applies. ... The exception should not apply in the situation where a non-resident owns shares of the Canadian resident purchaser corporation. … The Appellant fictionally controlled the non-resident, Univar Inc. for less than a day and at all times the Appellant was itself controlled by a non-resident, UHI. ...

Smith J found that the receipts were invalid, stating (at paras 31, 32 and 45): … [A] receipt is a written document delivered in exchange for the receipt of money, goods or services, reflecting the actual amount of money or the fair market value of the property or services received. It follows that a document, though it bears the title “receipt” or “charitable receipt” …, may not be treated or accepted as such if it does not accurately reflect the money paid or the fair market value of the property or services actually provided in exchange. … [A]lthough the donation receipts in question are described as “official receipts” …, they are not in fact receipts as that term is ordinarily understood. ... (para 48) “The receipt issued by [the third charity]… clearly indicates that the Appellant made a cash donation… when her evidence was that she made the bulk of the donation by cheque. … In any event, …it was an inflated donation receipt and on that basis, …invalid.” ...

. … The receipts provided at trial showed ordinary clothes that might well be worn by anyone of Mr. Everett’s age …. I accept that Mr. Everett had to maintain a certain image. … That does not, of itself, convert an inherently personal expense into a business expense. ...