Search - 包建铎违纪违法案件以案促改以案促治专题组织生活会 个人对照检查

However, TSI filed a Notice of Discontinuance on May 2, 2016 and the appeal was deemed to be dismissed on June 24, 2016 pursuant to s. 16.2(2) of the Tax Court of Canada Act (the “ TCC Act”). ... [S]ubsection 16.2(2) of the TCC Act … simply provides that the appeal is deemed to be dismissed. It does not deem that any issues that were raised by the party who instituted the particular proceeding have been determined by the Tax Court. … … [S]ince that appeal was discontinued, there has been no judicial determination of whether the determinations were made within the time period as set out in subsection 152 (1.4) of the Act or after the expiration of this time period. ...

IX, s. 2(d) on the basis that this provision referenced the ordinary location of the insured vehicles, and there was no evidence on that point – and accordingly confirmed the denial of Northbridge’s related input tax credit claims. ... An accident (or other insurable event) occurs at a particular location. … … Since the policies issued by Northbridge in part related to accidents (and other insurable events) that are usually situated outside Canada, the supply of a portion of the policies qualified as a zero-rated supply. … “[R]isks” means the risk of a claim arising from an accident or other insurable event. ...

In fact, the Appellants just seemed to ignore it, when in my opinion, having regard to their skills in and knowledge of the securities industry from working as executives for a wealth management firm and the multiple other circumstances or red flags that went up … they were clearly aware of the impact of the IPO’s value on their holdings. In affirming these findings that the CRA assessments were not statute-barred, Boivin JA stated (at para. 5): We are all of the view that the Judge correctly identified and applied the two-step approach to determine whether the appellants could be reassessed beyond the normal reassessment period pursuant to subparagraph 152(4)(a)(i) of the Act (Vine …). … We all agree with his conclusions for essentially the same reasons. ...

Furthermore, respecting the Crown’s argument that s. 150(2), which expressly provided that s. 150(1) did not apply to imported supplies, implied an intention the s. 150(1) would apply to the exported services of WMI, Noël C.J. stated (at para. 50): [S]ervices in contrast with tangible goods cross the border only in a virtual sense so that the exigible tax on imported services cannot be collected in the usual way – i.e., at the time of entry when the goods are released …. ... As explained in the commentaries which accompanied the amendment to subsection 150(2), “[a]pplying the closely-related group election to those supplies would result in both parties to the election avoiding tax altogether …” …. ...

. … [T]he IRPA temporary resident regime explicitly requires the conferral of temporary residency by an immigration officer. … … From June 27, 2011 to February 21, 2013, she was a refugee claimant. … From February 22, 2013 (when her refugee claim was denied) to September 15, 2015 (when permanent residency was granted to her), the appellant had no status in Canada. ...

ITA 231.2(3) and ETA s. 289(3) for Roofmart to disclose various particulars for all of its customers who in the past 4 ½ years had made purchases of construction materials from Roofmart exceeding $20,000 or $10,000 per annum, depending on the year. ... The statutory criteria are not altered by the size of the request. … … The existence of some customers who may be of no interest to the Minister for the purposes of verifying compliance cannot determine whether an order should issue. ... That the group in this case is ascertainable is a finding of mixed fact and law, and the appellant has demonstrated no error that would warrant interference He also stated (at paras 45): GMREB established that a pending or existing tax audit of a particular individual is not a precondition to the exercise of power under subsection 231.2(3) …. ...

. … The jurisprudence is clear (and abundant) that courts should not decide constitutional cases in a factual vacuum. … … [L]egislation which, on its face, contains Charter violations may yet be found to be constitutional on the basis of contextual facts and the balancing of interests pursuant to section 1 of the Charter. … In the present case, there are no facts in support of the Friedmans’ constitutional arguments; there are merely hypothetical possibilities which may or may not arise. … [I]t was conceded that there was no basis for alleging a disguised criminal investigation. ...

The remuneration would have been paid for services rendered as part of the commercial activities of Look or the termination of those activities …. … [T]here would be a connection between the litigation to establish (after the registrant has stopped making taxable supplies) that there was an amount of overpaid compensation (and collecting that amount) and the termination of the commercial activity of the registrant because that compensation would be related to services rendered while the registrant was making taxable supplies. Therefore, there is a connection between the termination of Look’s commercial activity and the legal services acquired in relation to the litigation against the Former Executives that would be sufficient to permit Look to claim the input tax credits …. ... Because subsection 141.1(3) of the Act is the more specific provision that only applies in certain situations, it will override subsection 141.01(2) …. ...

After agreeing with Pamel J below that such documents were part of the court file and thus accessible to the public under Rule 26 unless a confidentiality order was obtained, Montigny JA went on to reject the taxpayer’s submission (in reliance on Gernhart) that making the certified record public as a matter of course violated section 8 of the Charter, stating (at para. 70, 72 and 75, TaxInterpretations translation): Anyone engaging the courts in an action … must expect that large parts of his or her private life will become publicly accessible. This is the case under Rule 26, as well as under paragraph 241(3)(b) of the ITA, which provides that the confidentiality of information provided to the Minister does not apply in legal proceedings relating to the administration or enforcement of the Act. … The documents were not transmitted by the Minister automatically but at the request of Mr. ... Rémillard's own request that the Minister transmitted the relevant documents to the Court Registry. … … Mr. ...

In rejecting this submission, Gleason JA stated (at paras. 15, 16): On its plain meaning, a deeming provision does not constitute an “election” or “appointment” …. … This textual interpretation is also supported by the interpretive presumption of consistent expression, which would require, unless the context dictates otherwise, that the terms “elected” and “appointed” be given a meaning in subsection 119(2) that is consistent with other provisions in the OBCA where these terms are used …. ...