Search - 包建铎违纪违法案件以案促改以案促治专题组织生活会 个人对照检查

Before dismissing the taxpayer’s appeal of 2009, Dawson JA stated (at para. 50): … [T]he use of the phrase “directly or indirectly” evidences Parliament’s intent “to capture any and all methods through which a transaction could increase” the fair market value of a TFSA. In allowing the Crown’s appeal of 2010 and 2012, she stated (at paras. 75, 82): [T]he Tax Court’s concern about “when or how far into the future an advantage … will be considered as attributable to” abusive transactions did not justify a restrictive interpretation of the definition of advantage. Such concern is intended to be addressed by other legislative provisions, including the Minister’s ability to waive or cancel advantage taxes (subsection 207.06(2) of the Act) and to determine the unused TFSA contribution room (subsection 207.01(1) of the Act and more particularly the definition of “unused TFSA contribution room” as enacted in S.C., 2010, c. 25, subsections 57(5) and 57(8). … The ability to waive an advantage tax and reset an individual’s unused TFSA contribution room are the mechanisms intended to address the future impact of abusive transactions. … [W]hile the increase in value in the TFSA in 2010 and 2012 was directly attributable to the performance of the shares held in the TFSA each year, it was indirectly attributable to the swap transactions which increased the number of shares held in the TFSA and their value. ...

This conclusion … necessarily flows from section 2.2 of the loan agreements which made each of the appellants’ entire donation conditional on the loan being approved by the lender …. ... [T]he Tax Court judge was also bound to hold that “no part of [the interconnected transaction] can be considered a gift that the appellant[s] gave in the expectation of no return” …. It follows that there was no gift whether the matter is considered from a common law or a civil law perspective. … In response to a further submission that “it is possible to make a ‘“profitable” gift’ due to the favourable tax consequences that some gifts provide” (para. 54), Noël CJ stated (at para 60): [T]the fact that a tax benefit is received as a result of making a gift cannot, in and of itself, invalidate the gift as to hold otherwise would mean that Parliament would have spoken in vain in providing for tax benefits consequential on making qualified gifts. ...

In finding that such requests could not succeed, Rivoalen JA stated (at paras. 35-37): … If an order setting aside the requirement for information is granted, the Minister will be prevented from properly exercising her powers under the Act. … The Minister has not yet assessed. ... In my view, Valero cannot stop the Minister from carrying out her statutory duty under the Act to assess income tax payable by way of an application for judicial review. … [T]he doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectations cannot be utilized to prevent the Minister from obtaining the necessary documents she requires to properly administer the Act and fulfill her obligations. … Furthermore, Valero’s alternative request was premature: Once the Minister receives the documents, if she assesses Valero for not withholding tax, Valero may have recourse in accordance with administrative law principles. ...

CRA assessed him advantage tax under s. 207.05 equalling 100% of the appreciation of the shares within his TFSA before the shares’ sale – and, following taxpayer submissions, proposed to waive a portion of the tax pursuant to s. 207.06 so as to reduce the effective rate of advantage tax to his marginal federal and provincial tax rate. ... However, he found that the Court should not so exercise its discretion, stating (at para. 18): [W]here the foundation supporting a ruling on a constitutional question is missing or faulty and we do not have to decide the question, we should not do so …. ... They would not fix the fatal problem: Parliament’s over-delegation of taxation power in the first place contrary to section 53 …. ...

Canada (National Revenue), 2016 FCA 94-- summary under Charitable Organization Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 149.1- Subsection 149.1(1)- Charitable Organization expending 70% of revenues on fund-raising and undue benefits inconsistent with wholly-devoted test Before dismissing the appellant’s appeal under s. 172(3)(a. 1) of the revocation of its registration as a charitable organization, Ryer JA noted that one of the grounds for revocation was that the Appellant had failed to devote all of its resources to charitable activities carried on by it (which were not considered to include amounts paid to disabled fundraisers), stating (at paras. 58, 59 & 61): …[O]nly one percent of the funds raised by the Appellant was deployed towards charitable activities in the period under review. ... …[A]pproximately 70% of the Appellant’s revenues for the relevant period were expended on fundraising. … …[F]undraising itself cannot become a raison d'être for a charity. …[T]he high level of fundraising activities undertaken … can reasonably be regarded as having become an end in itself. ...

Jorré J below had found that the taxpayer’s teaching activities were a distinct source of income from her law practice and also made the factual finding that her part-time law practice verged on charitable volunteerism (“du bénévolat”) – and, more generally, found that as such practice had a personal aspect, the question as to whether her practice was a business could (consistently with Stewart) be tested through determining whether it had a reasonable expectation of profit, as to which there was none. ... In affirming the decision below, Nadon JA stated (at paras. 50-51, TaxInterpretations translation): [S]he invoiced her clients for the expenses related to the file as well as for honoraria adjusted as a function of the capacity of the client to pay and … her primary goal was to exercise her profession in a conscientious and professional manner without necessarily making money. … [T]here is no doubt that the law practice of the appellant, when the relevant circumstances are considered in their entirety, certainly qualifies as having a personal aspect. ...

Following the realization shortly thereafter by Newco of a taxable capital gain and recapture of depreciation on a sale of the building, Newco increased the adjusted cost base to Holdco of its shares by effecting a series of s. 84(1) dividends (including a capital dividend) – following which the individual sold his shares of Holdco to a third party for a sale price based on the amount of cash sitting in Newco. In connection with finding that the safe income of Newco was reduced by the amount of corporate income tax ultimately payable by it on its gain on the building sale, notwithstanding that at the time of sale, no income taxes had yet become payable, Webb JA first stated (at para. 39): I agree with … Deuce Holdings that it would only be logical that any arm’s length third party purchaser of shares would take into account any existing tax liability of the corporation, even though such liability may not be payable until a later date. He then stated (at para. 52): Both the fair market value of the shares and the portion of the resulting capital gain that would be attributable to the income earned or realized would reflect the tax liability that, although not payable immediately, would eventually have to be paid. … ...

., “the capital investments by the Loblaw group [,] were not part of Glenhuron’s conduct of business” Woods JA stated (at paras. 82, 84-85): For purposes of the ITA, the term “business” generally means “something occupying the time and attention and labour of a man for the purpose of profit” …. ... [T]his approach is consistent with long-standing jurisprudence which draws a distinction between “capital to enable [people] to conduct their enterprises” and “the activities by which they earn their income” …. ...

Eisbrenner’s submission, … he only had to raise a prima facie case, which he submitted was a lower standard than the balance of probabilities. Therefore, … even though Mr. Eisbrenner had pled the fact that he owned the pharmaceuticals, he was not required to prove this fact on a balance of probabilities. ... Likewise, … Mr. Morrison…. ...

Burke was entitled to none of the benefits, she stated (at paras. 116-117): This, as well as other factors identified … at paragraph 142 of Vavilov such as concerns about delay, fairness to the parties, costs to the parties and the efficient use of public resources, support a finding that the matter should not be remitted to the Appeal Division for redetermination. … Declining to remit a matter to the administrative decision maker may also be appropriate where it becomes evident to the Court that a particular outcome is inevitable …. ...