Search - 包建铎违纪违法案件以案促改以案促治专题组织生活会 个人对照检查

. … As for the meaning of the verbs “to maintain” and “entretenir”, there is an overlap between the two versions, with the French verb emphasizing a meaning which is present in English, though not as the primary meaning. … As a result, I would conclude … that section 22 is broad enough to include the “operation” of the wastewater disposal facility by the City. ...

Respecting the scope of s. 6, Noël C.J. further noted (at para. 12): [S]ection 6 does effectively amend the statutory time periods in federal legislation for starting proceedings in this Court: see, for example, subsection 27(2) of the Federal Courts Act … (the time limit for bringing appeals) and sections 18.1(2) and 28 [thereof] … (the time limit for bringing an application for judicial review). … Thus, if a party had thirty days to appeal a judgment of the Federal Court to this Court and twenty days had elapsed by March 13, 2020, the deadline for appealing the judgment would be September 23, 2020. ... For example, orders requiring a proceeding to be prosecuted urgently on shortened time limits to further the public interest and to avert some harm or prejudice would be invalidated with retroactive effect. … The Federal Courts Rules are not made “under an act of parliament” in the usual way in which this term is understood. … Beyond this, construing section 6 as allowing Parliament to unilaterally interfere with the management and governance of ongoing proceedings would invade a core judicial function …. ...

Laskin JA found that VISA was supplying an exempted financial service and not an administrative service, stating (at para. 63): [C]onsistent with the Tax Court judge’s findings … Visa’s services “form an essential part of the ability for CIBC to offer credit card based services to their clients," … they "[give] CIBC customers the ability to purchase goods and services anywhere in the world without CIBC having to individually contact each merchant to set up payment arrangements with them," and that "[i]f CIBC was forced to create such a payment network on its own, even if technically feasible, this network would invariably be much less widely accepted than the one offered by Visa." … I would add that Visa’s services relieve CIBC and other issuers of the need to investigate and analyze the risk profile and solvency of the merchants that accept credit cards in payment for goods and services. To describe the benefit that CIBC obtained from Visa’s services … as "quintessentially administrative," does not … adequately recognize the reality of the benefit that CIBC derived. ...

Nearly every error a taxpayer might make in over-contributing to his or her RRSP (other than a simple arithmetical error) will be caused by a misunderstanding of the applicable limits – an error of law. … Similarly, the fact that the error might have been made by a third party advisor or as a result of erroneous advice given by such advisor does not automatically mean that the error cannot be reasonable. ... However, in going on to dismiss his appeal, she stated (at paras, 77-78): … Mr. ... Connolly does not appear to have made any inquiries … to confirm his contribution room. ...

This was accomplished by setting up a sandwich structure immediately after the acquisition, under which a new Canadian unlimited liability company, capitalized with notes and high-PUC shares, held the shares of a U.S. corporation holding Univar Canada – so that such U.S. corporation could distribute the shares of Univar Canada (on a Treaty-exempt basis) to its controlling Canadian purchaser (the ULC) without technically being affected by the s. 212.1(1) deemed dividend rule. ... Thus … the purpose of section 212.1 … was not to prevent the removal from Canada, by an arm’s length purchaser of a Canadian corporation, of any surplus that such Canadian corporation had accumulated prior to the acquisition of control. ... Whether the surplus of the Canadian corporation is removed by completing the alternative transactions described … above or by completing the transactions that were done in this case, the same surplus is removed from Canada. ...

The Crown relies on the distinction drawn in this publication between remedial amendments and clarifying amendments and emphasizes the assertion that in this case the amendments “clarify” the prior law (… Economic Action Plan 2012, pp. 414-415 ….) ...

This occurred – the offer of another public company (“Inco” – the 25% minority shareholder) was accepted by the Diamond Fields shareholders, thereby triggering the payment by Diamond Fields of the break fee. The break fee did not qualify as proceeds of disposition of a Falconbridge right to merge, as she did not consider there to be such a right: Diamond Fields could not promise the acceptance by its shareholders of the Falconbridge offer nor could it fetter the fiduciary obligations of its board – there was no capital gain. ...

Before confirming the decision below to dismiss the application, LeBlanc JA found: Regarding the stipulation in Art. 25, para 1 of the Canada-Switzerland Treaty that “an exchange of information will only be requested once the requesting Contracting State has pursued all reasonable means available under its internal taxation procedure to obtain the information,” he stated that “[t]he true intentions of the parties, as they emerge from extrinsic materials when it comes to Article 25 (namely to promote the exchange of information to the maximum extent possible with a view, notably, of preventing tax evasion and avoidance), are reflected … in the actual language of that provision, coupled with that of the Interpretative Protocol" which, in Art. 2(c) thereof, "stated that the notion of 'foreseeable relevance' is intended 'to provide for exchange of information in tax matters to the widest possible extent', provided the requesting State does not engage in 'fishing expeditions' or request information 'unlikely to be relevant to the tax affairs of a given taxpayer'" (para. 28). Furthermore, “it was reasonably open to the CRA … to proceed with the … RFIs at the time it did in view of the fact that Messrs. ... Regarding the applicants’ submission that the specific listing in the Protocol, of types of information that could be requested, established a “ceiling” for such requests, LeBlanc JA stated (at paras. 47, 49) that “paragraph 2(b) of the Interpretative Protocol establishes a threshold, not an upper limit” and that “on a reasonableness analysis … there is no issue with the fact that the CRA provided the Swiss Authorities with more information—essentially background information—than what was minimally required by paragraph 2(b) of the Interpretative Protocol.” ...

Leblanc JA noted: (at para. 46, TaxInterpretations translation) that the “text of subsection 280(1) and section 280.1 … does not provide further guidance on whether the unpaid or unpaid ‘amount’ on which interest and penalty may be charged is gross or net [of rebate entitlements]” (at para. 50) that the rebate provisions in this case were intended by “Parliament … to remedy a situation that would otherwise be inequitable to non-registrant ‘builders’" who were unable to claim input tax credits for their GST costs (see para. 68), (at para. 64) that if the respondent had not reported the transaction and instead been assessed by CRA under s. 191(3), CRA would have been required under s. 296(2.1) to grant the rebate amounts Leblanc JA then stated (at paras. 66, 69): To paraphrase … Humber College, it would be incongruous, to say the least, if provisions purporting to assist a taxpayer caused more harm to a well-meaning taxpayer than to a less well-meaning one …. This cannot be the result that Parliament intended in enacting subsection 280(1) and section 280.1 …. I do not believe that Parliament, in enacting subsection 280(1) and section 280.1 …, had in its mind that the determination of the "amount" to be paid or remitted for the purposes of calculating interest and penalty for late filing of the GST return could, in circumstances such as these …, be made without regard to any rebate otherwise payable to the taxpayer. ...

After stating (at para. 61) that “subsection 94.1(1) … contemplates in express terms that an instrument that derives its value from fluctuating portfolio investments can be a debt” and (at para. 87) that a narrow construction of “debt” would go contrary to the purpose of the above provisions of “annual imputation of income while … foreign investments are in place,” Noël CJ found that future crystallization of the amount due was sufficient, and concluded (at para. 91): When regard is had to the text, context and purpose of paragraph 94.1(1)(a), a debt arises for purposes of this provision when an amount or credit is advanced by one party to another party; an amount is to be paid or repaid by that other party at some point in the future in satisfaction of the advance and this amount is fixed or determinable or will be ascertainable when payment is due. As these three conditions are present here … this suffices to dispose of the appeal …. ...