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In finding that such claim was barred by the four year limitation period s. 225(4)(b), Russell J stated (at paras 11 and 14): … [E]ven on the basis that Garmeco did unequivocally state that IHI would have been the proper claimant, that would not mean that IHI now can point to the Garmeco decision and require the Minister to credit it with the claimed ITCs. … … [T]he wording of paragraph 225(4)(b)… is drafted very restrictively … making clear that it is “the person” who is claiming the ITCs, and not any other person, including a person who had previously claimed, who must abide by the statutory four year limitation. ...

In rejecting that submission, Visser J stated (at paras 25, 26, 27, 29, 31, 34, 36): … [E]ach of the criteria set out in paragraph 110.1(1)(d) are separate, and in particular … they are not part of the determination of when a gift has been made, which in my view occurs when a donor legally effects a voluntary transfer of property to a donee …. … [T]he certificates are necessary to claim a deduction under paragraph 110.1(1)(d) of the Act, but not to determine if a gift of land has been “made” for the purpose of paragraph 110.1(1)(d). ...

In response to a Rule 58 question imposed as to whether such “tax” (after also taking s. 207.06 into account) was “in law a penalty or a tax,” and after noting (at para. 42) that the apparent context of the question was that “[i]f section 207.05 were a penalty, a due diligence defence applies, and a successful defence renders non-qualified income free of tax,” Bocock J found that such provisions imposed a tax, stating (at paras. 44, 58): Barring ambiguity, any interpretation holding that the words “a tax is payable” creates a penalty, where penalties are otherwise exceptionally stated to be so in the legislation, impugns the coherency of the Act …. … A charge labelled as a tax may have characteristics so clearly coercive and disproportionate that one concludes it is a penalty; however, this case does not meet that standard. ...

MacPhee J further stated (at paras 49, 50 and 51): The Appellant owned a home in Ethiopia…, spent many of his work days there… [, and] had a driver, gardener, companion and pet with him in Ethiopia. These factors do support the fact that he may have also been a resident in Ethiopia in 2013. … The case law is clear that a party can be a resident in two places at the same time. … … I find … that the Appellant was a resident in Canada in 2013. If the test were to be mutually exclusive, … I would also find the evidence to be stronger in support of his residence being in Canada, as opposed to Ethiopia. ...

In allowing the taxpayers’ appeals of the denial of such SBD claims through the application of s. 256(2.1), MacPhee J stated (at para. 66): I also am satisfied that the main reasons for the second tier of corporations which were created as part of the restructuring were to: · obtain tax deferrals of up to 25 months; · be more flexible in moving partners in and out of the structure ….; · be able to deal with their concerns about Mr. ...

. … … [T]he translated documents provided by Mr. Tang do not require this Court to exercise any discretion since these documents already meet the requirements set out by Rule 89. … The list of documents clearly indicated that some of Mr. ... The Minister was made aware of the translation issue prior to the hearing. … [A]n opportunity to examine Mr. Tang’s translator would, without expert evidence or an alternative translation, have had no impact on the admissibility of the translated documents. … ...

Applying the presumption against tautology, Parliament thus intended a corporate party to be able to be represented by either counsel or some third party individual who was not a lawyer. … … [M]eaning must be given to the clear subsection 17.1(1) Parliamentary language that a party, a term encompassing both corporate and non-corporate parties, may appear in person in a general procedure appeal. ... Additionally, …the “outside accountant” potentially … would be an important if not key witness at any hearing of this appeal. … For these two reasons I will dismiss the corporate Appellant’s application per Rule 30(2)…. The Rules do not seem to provide for an application for individuals who are appellants in general procedure appeals to be represented by anyone other than either counsel or themselves. … ...

(r.4) did not apply, stating (at paras 110 and 111): … (r.4) encapsulating ancillary elements of the supply being provided is not sufficient for the exception to be satisfied, as the services listed in the definition must include the predominant elements of the supply. … … [T]he supply provided by Visa also involves services such as information collection, market research and product design. However, … these services do not encapsulate the predominant elements of the supply. ...

Vocan submitted that its facility was a health care facility, being “a facility … operated for the purpose of providing medical … care,” so that its supply of the reports was exempted under Sched. ... In finding that the Vocan facility was not a health care facility, Lyons J stated (at para. 117-119): A contextual analysis supports that “medical care” is to be interpreted as being connected to the practice of medicine. … … “[M]edical care” does not mean “health care”. ...

In rejecting this submission, MacPhee J stated (at para. 19): An implied contract … does not meet the requirements of the Act in order to make a deduction of support payments. ... The parties continued through the 2018 taxation year to consider themselves bound by their 2011 separation agreement. … … I am guided by the plain meaning of the words of the Act …. ...