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Campbell J stated (at para. 14): … The fact that the tip amount is paid to a committee and pooled with other amounts paid to the attendants before distribution does not change the nature of the payment. It remains a gratuity for services provided by the slot attendant by virtue of his employment. … ...

Consistently with the two-part test referenced in Sagaz (would the evidence, if presented have changed the result; and could the evidence have been obtained before trial with the exercise of due diligence – in that regard, notign that counsel had shown due diligence), and applying Rule 138(1) permitting a judge to reopen a hearing “for such purposes … as are just,” Sommerfeldt J allowed the invoices to be admitted after the hearing, after having given the Crown an opportunity to cross-examine the taxpayer on this evidence (which the Crown declined to do). ...

Robert’s ¼ interest was transferred equally to the three surviving siblings immediately after the distribution to the four beneficiaries of their respective shares of the residence. Unpaid federal income taxes of Robert exceeded the value of his ¼ interest in the residence. ... Smith J also found that the exemption clause in the will had no effect, and concluded (at paras 44 and 45): I find that the overall evidence clearly establishes that she received property following a transfer of the residence without consideration from her brother, and that the four criteria set out in Livingston … have been met. ...

. …. Furthermore, the fact that GEM initially booked the relevant costs on its books did not alter the reality that the benefit of such costs accrued directly to the owners. Sommerfeldt J concluded (at para 88): … [T]o the extent that GEM supervised or managed the development and construction of the nursing homes, it did so as agent for and on behalf of the three Owners. … GEM, as principal, did not supply construction services to the Owners. ...

In allowing the taxpayer’s appeal, Paris J stated (at paras 33, 37 and 39): … [3850625] confirmed that the test for whether an item of income should be included in gross resource profits is “whether the [income in question is] sufficiently connected to the [taxpayer’s] production and processing activities to constitute income from that source”….. ... …[T]he Forward Contracts were entered into and closed out in the course of the Appellant’s business of production and processing from the Doyon Mine. … [T]he Appellant’s sole reason for entering into the Forward Contracts was to hedge the risk of price fluctuations in the price of gold that it expected to produce from the Doyon Mine. … ...

He first found (at para. 37) that the requirement in s. 296(2.1)- that the Minister had assessed “an overdue amount payable under Part IX”- had been satisfied by virtue of “the February 20, 2014 assessment which denied the NHR and as well assessed the amount of GST/HST overdue ….” He then stated (at para. 38, 42): I do not think that in assessing on February 20, 2014 the Minister did determine, per subsection 296(2.1), as to whether an allowable rebate- in particular the NRRPR which had not at that time been applied for- would have been payable to the Appellant as a rebate under Part IX if it had been applied for. … …I do consider that that question [of whether the Appellant would qualify for an NRRPR] is, per subsection 296(2.1), a matter for the Minister to “determine” as part of the assessment of February 20, 2014, which assessment is under appeal herein. … Certainly the Minister had encouraged the Appellant in February 2014 when the NPR application was denied to submit a NRRPR application; signalling that the Minister considered that the Appellant might well qualify for that rebate. ...

. … The retroactive nature of the revocation altered history, causing an altered timeline to replace the original timeline. … Had the appeal come to trial before the Minister issued the June 2017 notice of revocation, I would have been dealing with the original timeline and would have come to a different conclusion. In the original timeline, the revocation would not have occurred, the registration would still have been in place and the reassessment could therefore not have stood. … I do not see any practical difference between a law being given retroactive effect and a fact deemed by law to exist retroactively being given retroactive effect. ...

. … [T]herefor his conduct, for purposes of the due diligence defence, should be examined from that point on. ... In further finding that due diligence had not been established, he stated (at paras 102 and 103): Since Chriss establishes that a director must carry out his or her duties “on an active basis”, it would appear to follow logically that a director cannot simply delegate his or her oversight duties to a subordinate, at least not without some evidence of an established management system involving, for example, periodic reporting. … …[T]he onus was on him to satisfy the Court that indeed a management system had been put in place. His evidence … falls short of convincing the Court that the Appellant had sought to fulfill his duties “on an active basis” and that he had taken measures to prevent the failure of Atcon and NB Inc. to effect GST remittances after April 30, 2009. ...

. … Maréchaux [noted] that it is "self-evident that a person who has the use of borrowed money, repayable in twenty years’ time, without having to pay interest has thereby received a significant benefit” [and that] "the ‘put option’ was a significant benefit provided to the donor by the lender in return for the payment. ... " "Therefore, whether the civil law or common law meaning of the word “gift" in 118.1 is used, the result would be the same in these cases because none of the Appellants had the requisite donative intent with respect to the cash portion of the amounts transferred to the Foundation. ... " ...

The benefit is …. 10% of construction costs of $259,293 or, $25,929. This is clearly an advantage not available to regular customers …. ... The Queen, 2009 TCC 588 that: None of [the cited cases], however, support the appellant’s proposition that adjustments to the expenses of a previous fiscal period, and concomitant changes to the income of the employee for a previous year, may be made on a retroactive basis …. ...