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He noted (at para. 88) that Johnston, [1948] S.C.R. 486, had not said “anything about … the shifting of the persuasive burden to the Minister,” that this was “explained by the fact that only one party can bear the persuasive burden in respect of an issue such as the correctness of an assessment” and that comments of L’Heureux Dubé J in Hickman to a different effect “were obiter dicta ” (para. 93). ... In such circumstances, it is not unfair to the Appellants to allow the Minister to assume what went on behind the curtain. … By participating in the Programs without further inquiry, the Appellants accepted the risk that the facts behind the curtain were not what they expected them to be. I therefore conclude that the Minister’s assumptions of fact … are to be taken as true … and that in accordance with the principles stated in House, the taxpayer must present at least a prima facie case to demolish those assumptions of fact. … As Eisbrenner was unable to do so with respect to the donation by him of the certificates, the denial by the Minister of charitable credits for their donation was confirmed. ...

Smith J indicated (at para. 522) that: [T]he T3GR Return was the prescribed form intended by CRA to meet the filing requirements of RRSP trustees pursuant to paragraph 150(1)(c) and subsection 207.2(1) of the Act and section 204 of the Regulations and … it was intended as a streamlined process for the reporting of group RRSPs involving hundreds of thousands of plans under one specimen plan. Smith J noted (at para. 523) that the T3GR form “specified that ‘to report taxable income (…) trustees must complete a T3 … Return’,” and found (at para. 525) that “the T3GR Returns were not intended to override a trustee’s other reporting obligations arising from the Act, notably the obligation to file a T3 Return pursuant to paragraph 150(1)(c) or to report taxable income arising from subsection 146(10.1),” and (at para. 533) that the assessments made by CRA based on the T3GR returns were made “only in connection with the taxable plans and not in connection with the non-taxable plans that were listed for information purposes only, including the RRSP Trust.” ...

Miller J: “had concluded that a reassessment will be considered valid if the intention of the Minister at the time of [its] making…was to pursue verification;” and had found that that “there is no law…to the effect that a protective assessment is invalid if issued for the sole purpose of leaving the door open to conduct or continue an audit” (- and she went on to indicate that Karda was similiar); and noted (at para. 129) that it was necessary to issue the reassessments in order to implement the accord with RTA respecting its directly incurred SR&ED expenditures. Respecting an RTA submisssion that, under s. 152(1), the MInister was required to make a determination of the amount of tax before issuing the reassessments, D'Auray J stated (at para 154, Tax Interpretations translation): In my view, RTA confuses the validity and correctness of an assessment. … [I]n... ... Miller J. … explained that in the Anchor Pointe decision the Federal Court of Appeal considered the correctness of the assessment as the product of the examination, and not the validity of the assessment as the process. … Accordingly, the reassessments were valid. ...

. … [T]here is no case law that suggests a transferor includes a person who ceases to exist and has not otherwise undertaken some act or omission which transfers property prior to its… demise or dissolution. … After its dissolution, CIA could not legally, and … did not factually direct, author or contemplate such a transfer…. ...

Although the realization of the capital gain – to be offset by the value-shift loss – was realized in internal transactions, unlike Triad Gestco and 1207192, this was not a relevant difference. ...

Vocan submitted that its facility was a health care facility, being “a facility … operated for the purpose of providing medical … care,” so that its supply of the reports was exempted under Sched. ...

See summaries under s. 9 – timing, s. 12(1)(x), and s. 9 – computation of profit. ...

. … [R]eliance is not the test for relevance. … [C]onsideration of the documents in the context of the audit of the Appellant is sufficient to make them relevant for the purposes of discovery. ... After noting (at para. 85) that “[i]f the GAAR Committee had considered the Appellant’s case, there is no doubt that the Appellant would be entitled to discovery of all non‑privileged documents considered by the GAAR Committee in deciding to assess the Appellant under the GAAR,” Owen J stated (at para. 86): [T]he Appellant is equally entitled to all non-privileged documents considered by the GAAR Committee in deciding to assess under the GAAR the unrelated taxpayer described in the Similar Case … because that decision directly resulted in the subsequent decision to assess the Appellant under the GAAR. ...

MacPhee J found that the filing of the extension application was insufficient to consider that the proceeding (the appeal) had been launched before the dissolution – and essentially followed 1455257 Ontario in finding that the Manitoba statute “does not allow a dissolved corporation to initiate a civil procedure” (para. 13), and also stated (at para. 12): Pursuant to the Tax Court of Canada Rules (General Procedure), an originating document means a document that is filed under section 21 of the Tax Court of Canada Act …. The only document filed by the Appellant under section 21 … was the Notice of Appeal, which was filed on May 26, 2017, a little more than a month after the corporation was dissolved. ...

In further finding that the transfer of the RRSP Proceeds to such trust gave rise only to a s. 160 liability of such trust, viewed as a separate person, and not to the taxpayer personally, he stated (at paras. 47-48): Subsection 104(2) … deems a trust to be an individual in respect of the trust property …. Thus, a tax debt owed by a trust is a debt of the trust itself … [and] is not a personal debt of the trustee. ... However, there was “an indirect transfer from the Appellant’s mother to the Appellant by means of a trust for no consideration at a time that her mother owed tax” (para. 84) for s. 160(1) purposes respecting not only the transfer to her of her share of the residue of the trust but also regarding the transfer to her of other funds out of the trust funds including the payment out of such funds of legal fees relating to this tax dispute (which Graham J regarded as a personal rather than an estate expense) – so that the taxpayer was liable under s. 160(1) for such amounts. ...