Search - 制暴无限杀机 下载

After noting that the pleadings of both parties effectively required him to treat the Appellant as making a single compound supply to Access, Graham J found, notwithstanding the provision of the cash by the Appellant to the cardholder, that such single supply was a taxable supply, stating (at paras. 138, 155, 158): … I find that [the cardholders] … paid the surcharge fee to Access for arranging for the transfer of money, not to the Appellant for transferring the money. … Access benefited from having the Appellant transfer the money. ... This was the predominant element of the supply it received …. … [T]he predominant element of the single compound supply made in the Subsequent Periods was the exclusive right to place and operate ATMs at the Resort and to process all transactions arising therefrom. This licence is a taxable supply …. Graham J also found (at para. 18), that of the words in para. ...

. … c) The usual activities of a money lending business of this nature were not consistently present. There was no negotiation of financial terms with the borrowers, no revision of legal documentation reflecting the appellants’ direction and discernment and the lending opportunities were offered by a single third party and, at that, only on a take it or leave it basis; … d) … ACI … acted as the primary party engaged in the relevant trade or undertaking and was not a mere agent or bare trustee facilitating the operation of Susan and Barry’s money lending business. … e) Had the loans not ultimately defaulted, the Appellant was willing and did continue to advance funds solely for the purpose of earning interest, rather than turning the loans over for a profit in the nature of a business. … Words and Phrases loan ...

After stating (at para 37) that “ medical appointments in paragraph 118.3(1.1)(d)… would not include an appointment where there is actual treatment or testing that is part of the treatment,” Jorré J went on to find that the taxpayer spent more than 14 hours per week on qualifying therapy, as required by s. 118.3(1)(a.1), stating (at paras 41, 42, 44 and 48): … The medical formula is given in very precise doses four times a day and administering it is no different from administering any other prescription medication. … [T]he time spent relating to the blood tests and to the administration of the formula can be counted as part of administering the therapy. … … While Phe is an element of nutrition, the activities necessary to assure precise delivery every day of 300 milligrams of Phe to the child, and no more than 300 milligrams, are much more akin to the administration of a medication than to the management of a diet. … [M]easuring and controlling Phe intake is properly characterized as administration of the therapy and not as control of X’s diet with the consequence that the correct way to apply these rules [in subsection 118.3(1.1)] is to consider that the time spent determining the amount of Phe to be consumed and actually consumed, including the time spent logging Phe intake, should be considered as part of the 14‑hour a week average. ...

In finding that the donated works’ FMV was their purchase price rather than their higher appraised value, he stated (at paras. 74, 90, 96): Although the participant experts did their best to explain why the donated value was higher than the price actually paid, … I refer … to the statement … in Klotz “…it is devoid of common sense and out of touch with ordinary commercial reality”. ... It appears … that the appraisers deliberately turned away from other markets. … [T]hey did not comply with the USPAP standards. … (1) they did not refer to prior sales of the property; (2) there is no reference to providence; (3) there was multiples of the same print bought and dated; (4) there was no reference to the price paid by the donors; (5) the use of the art was not considered; and (6) no consideration was given to the impact of the flooded market place. ... I believe this was done solely for the purposes of documenting the tax shelter being sold to the public. … [T]he appraisals … are unreliable and not credible…. ...

. … The evidence did not show that flight attendants who commuted to the Calgary airport using their own car were more reliable and flexible than those using other means of transportation. … … I was not presented with any evidence that …quantifies the effect on Jazz’s profits or costs of the use of a parking pass by Mr. Smith and/or other flight attendants. … The only conclusion I can reach is that Jazz paid for the parking pass simply because it was required to do so pursuant to the Collective Agreement. … ...

DaSilva’s notice of assessment was to be printed. … The problem is that Mr. ... Subsection 335(6) requires that, if the Minister wants to rely on an affidavit to prove mailing, the affiant must have charge of the appropriate records and must have reviewed them. … … Ms. ... Neill. … The Respondent could easily have obtained an affidavit from Ms. ...

In finding that these contributions were not foreign income “taxes,” Bocock J stated (at paras 10 and 11): … [T]he Supreme Court of Canada, in … Lawson … listed the following four characteristics of a “tax” …: a) enforceable by law; b) imposed under the authority of the legislature; c) imposed by a public body; and d) made for a public purpose. … [T]he mandatory contributions deducted from Mr. Zong’s UK employment income … prima facie do not meet the fourth [requirement]: made for a public purpose. Because the payor receives a direct personal and financial benefit from his or her contributions in the future, the Minister and this Court [citing Yates] have held that such contributions are not a tax for public purposes. … ...

. … … [C]onstructive receipt applies with respect to Mrs. Sutton’s remuneration received from the Appellant. ...

The Queen, 2016 TCC 238-- summary under Subsection 211.91(1) Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 211.91- Subsection 211.91(1) Part XII.6 tax applies to CEE which is invalidly (as well as validly) renounced on a look-back basis The taxpayer, which was assessed under Part XII.6 for applying the look-back rule in s. 66(12.66) to Canadian exploration expenses (CEE) which were ineligible for treatment under the rule because they were renounced to a non-arm’s length shareholders, argued, referring to a statement in Joseph v Joseph, [1963] 3 All ER 486 at 490 that The word “purports” … does not mean “professes”. ... Miller J stated (at paras. 42-43, 47): …It is clear that “an amount purported to be renounced in respect of expenses incurred or to be incurred” must refer to an amount “claimed” to be renounced or “intended” to be renounced whether the claim is true or not. … … If the legislators intended that section 211.91 only applied where the corporation effectively renounced an amount, they could have achieved this goal by simply omitting the word purport. … Subsection 66(12.66) allows a corporation to renounce CEE that it has not yet incurred. ...

Before determining to award pre-offer costs of 35% of BMO’s actual costs of $684,471, Graham J stated (at paras 4, 6 and 7 and 8): The general wording of subsection 147(3.1) … indicates that a party receiving substantial indemnity costs following a settlement offer is entitled to party and party costs to the date of service of the settlement offer. … … Awarding substantial indemnity costs provides an incentive to settle early…. Subsection 147(3.3) ensures that offers are made early by requiring that … an offer must be made at least 90 days before the hearing and must not expire earlier than 30 days before the hearing. ...