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After confirming the decision of the Minister to revoke the registration of the Foundation under s. 168(1)(e) on the grounds of essentially no records substantiating the consulting fees (and in finding that the decision of the Minster to revoke under s. 168(1)(b) on the grounds that the consulting fees had not been established to satisfy the requirement for the Foundation to devote all of its resources either to charitable activities or as gifts to qualified donees, Woods JA stated (at paras. 53, 57): … The Appeals Directorate noted that most of the funds received and disbursed by the Foundation were to registered charities in which …[Mr. ...

Here, although Veracel was the larger corporation, essentially all its assets were the subscription-receipt cash proceeds – and “There was no scenario under which Veracel would have been allowed to retain the money…” (para. 53). ...

Although it was unnecessary to decide on the further ground for revocation that Many Mansions was engaging in activities inconsistent with its registered object (of “advanc[ing] and teach[ing] the religious tenets, doctrines, observances and culture associated with the Christian faith”), Laskin JA nonetheless stated (at para. 6): Many Mansions submits that judgments on matters of religious doctrine or theology have no place in government …. ...

He noted that not respecting the void character under the Civil Code of a partnership contract for carrying out an illegal activity would have the “absurd consequence” that, on the one hand, the taxpayer would be held liable for the entirely of the uncollected GST of the unlawful activity, whereas, on the other hand, “given the illegality of those activities, the taxpayer would not have any recourse … to reclaiming, from the co-debtors, their respective portion of the total debt before a civil court” (para. 37). ...

Rennie JA further stated (at paras. 49, 51): … I do not wish to be taken as endorsing the Minister’s arguments that the issuing of the notices of assessment deprives the Federal Court of jurisdiction to consider the Minister’s exercise of discretion under the ETA. ...

., the expectation “that judges will consider the decisions of their colleagues carefully and, if they choose to differ, will explain why … is not a basis for appellate intervention.” ...

In finding that it was an EBP, he cited (at para. 29) Oldman for the proposition that “[o]rdinarily … an Act of Parliament must prevail over inconsistent or conflicting subordinate legislation,” and then stated (at para. 30): [S]ince the definition of a prescribed trust is set out in the Regulations, the paramountcy of the definition of an employee benefit plan in the Act must govern. ...

Furthermore, the secretary of her husband’s accountant prepared a “Form 1 – Initial Return/Notice of Change” stating that the taxpayer’s directorship started on September 4, 2003 and ceased on December 12, 2003, although the accountant’s recollection of it having been sent to the Ontario Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations, was not reflected in the Ministry’s records. ...

Webb JA found that the taxpayer was estopped from now arguing that the amounts that she had treated as dividends in fact were not dividends (so that s. 160 did not apply to their payment)- because the appropriate procedures for the declaration and payment of the amounts as dividends were not followed and because s. 38(3) of the OBCA prohibited the payment of a dividend by an insolvent corporation – on the basis of the application of the principle (based on Wolofsky, 2001 FCA 119) that: [A] taxpayer who has benefited from having an amount included in his or her income as a dividend in a particular taxation year (and who has not objected to the assessment of tax based on having received this dividend) is estopped from claiming in any subsequent appeal related to the application of section 160 of the Act, that the previous filing position was wrong. ...

Webb JA found that the taxpayer was estopped from now arguing that the amounts that she had treated as dividends in fact were not dividends (so that s. 160 did not apply to their payment)- because the appropriate procedures for the declaration and payment of the amounts as dividends were not followed and because s. 38(3) of the OBCA prohibited the payment of a dividend by an insolvent corporation – on the basis of the application of the principle that: [A] taxpayer who has benefited from having an amount included in his or her income as a dividend in a particular taxation year (and who has not objected to the assessment of tax based on having received this dividend) is estopped from claiming in any subsequent appeal related to the application of section 160 of the Act, that the previous filing position was wrong. ...